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A. Background 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), a new 
Islamic party established at the beginning of the Reformasi era, has provoked a critical 
response from observers. There is increasing debate among observers about the true 
nature and aims of PKS. As we shall see, some of this debate rests on a superficial 
understanding of the party and stereotypical views of its political activities. On the one 
hand, there are those who regard this party as a promising development in Indonesian 
politics, citing its commitment to clean government, democracy, civil society, social 
welfare, and peaceful change. 1 On the other hand, there are those who consider PKS to 
have a hidden agenda that has the potential to endanger democratic life and Indonesia's 
status as a plural country.2 Some in this second group liken PKS to "hardline" Islamic 
groups, and one writer has even claimed it was a greater danger than Jamaah Islamiyah. 3 
Despite this debate, much of the literature on PKS only illuminates certain aspects of the 
party and there is a need for more thorough research in understanding its real 
characteristics. 
Moreover, the most comprehensive study to date of PKS also presents a variety 
of, and even contradictory, opinions. The study conducted by Ali Said Damanik about the 
transformation of PKS from a campus-based religious movement indicates a strong 
influence of Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), Islamic organization 
founded by influential dakwah activist Hasan Al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, inside PKS. 4 
Damanik also believes that PKS has an inclination to the Islamic fundamentalism 
1 See for example, Sholahuddin, "Menepis 'Fundamentalisme' PKS", ·www.islamlib.com, 4 October 2004. 
Ken Miichi, Jakarta Post, 21 September 2002. 
2 Happy Susanto, "Memahami Realitas PKS",www.Islamlib.com, 27 October 2004. 
3 Sadanand Dhume, "Indonesian Democracy's Enemy Within, Radical Islamic party threatens Indonesia 
with ballots more than bullets", YaleGlobal, 1December2005. 
4 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Ta/nm Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, 
(Bandung: Teraju, 2002). 
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tradition which influences this party to become an ideological party. 5 Conversely, Aay M. 
Furkon's study of the influence of Al-Banna in PKS comes to a different conclusion. 6 He 
argues that the influence of Al-Banna is not comprehensive and PKS is able to adapt 
within the Indonesian political environment. In this regard, Furkon believes that PKS' s 
political views are in line with Islamic modernism. 
However, breaking away from the "dichotomy" of "modernist" and 
"fundamentalist'', Yon Machmudi offers the term "global santri" to describe the 
characteristics of PKS, as a group that has close relation to the Middle East Islamic 
movement, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.7 After a detailed examination of a 
number of Muslim groups inside the party, of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and of how PKS adapts its objectives to the Indonesian context, Machmudi argues that 
PKS represents a new Islamic political model in the present day Indonesia. He believes 
that this new model of politics brings hope for Indonesian Muslims in terms of 
understanding the implementation of syari 'ah as a concrete solution for the social life 
rather than as only political jargon. Nandang Burhanudin in his study of PKS's views on 
the implementation of syari 'ah (Islamic law) describes PKS as an "idealist-
comprehensive" party, which believes in the comprehensiveness of Islamic teachings for 
people lives. 8 In this regard, Burhanudin believes that although it pursues a flexible 
strategy, PKS is a party that is consistent in struggling for syari 'ah implementation in 
Indonesia. 
Furthermore, previous studies of Islamic politics in Indonesia also indicate a 
range of opinion in explaining the position of PKS. Lili Romli, in his study of the 
political constellation inside Islamic political parties during the People's Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) annual meeting in 2000, considers PKS to be a fundamentalist party by 
pointing out the implementation of syari 'ah as one of the main political agendas of this 
party. 9 On the other hand, in explaining the diversity inside Islamic groups in Indonesia 
5 Ibid, pp. 246. 
6 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Jdeologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda 
Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004). 
7 Yon Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Wajah baru Islam Poltik Indonesia, (Bandung: Harakatuna 
Publishing, 2005). 
8 Nandang Burhanudin, Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 2004). 
9 Lili Romli, Partai Politik Islam Era Reformasi dan Piagam Jakarta dalam Sidang Tahunan MPR 2000, 
thesis (MA), unpublished, (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 2001). 
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today, Mark R. Woodward believes PKS is an example of Islamic modernism which, 
according to Woodward, is concerned with attempts to create an Islamic state through 
democratic means. 10 However, Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, 11 Greg Barton, 12 Anies 
Rasyid Baswedan, 13 Saiful Mujani and William Liddle14 use the term "Islamist" to 
explain and label the character of PKS, because in general it implements Islamic ideals 
and symbols. This "Islamist" label, generally equates PKS with other parties such as the 
Crescent Star Party (PBB) and United Development Party (PPP). On the other hand, in 
comparing PKS with other new "radical" Islamic organizations in Indonesia during the 
Reformasi era, Elizabeth Fuller Collins describes PKS as "a moderate alternative to 
"radical Islamism" in Indonesia". 15 
The various opinions above show that PKS is a complex phenomenon which is 
not easy to comprehend. The lack of a study which focuses on the political thinking and 
actions of PKS contributes to difficulty of understanding this party. Although studies 
have described PKS from many points of view, particularly in terms of history, the 
influence of global political and Islamic movements, and its political actions at the 
surface level, a comprehensive study of PKS's political thinking and actions has yet to be 
undertaking. 
This sub thesis therefore attempts to fill a gap in the literature on PKS by 
analysing the political thinking and behaviours of PKS at the beginning of the Reformasi 
era in Indonesia. This study puts forward 'moderate fundamentalism' as a term for 
understanding the defining characteristic of PKS. Moderate fundamentalism in short 
refers to the characteristics of fundamentalism in the moderate perspectives, which 
enables moderate fundamentalist to be involved in political activities adaptively or 
without using radical means. In using this term, I argue that PKS is part of the 
10 Mark R Woodward, "Indonesia, Islam and the Prospect for Democracy", SAIS Review Vol. XXI, No.2 
(Summer-Fall, 2001), pp. 33-34. 
11 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The ]\!fiddle East, Islamism and Indonesia, 
(Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Politcy, 2005). 
12 Greg Barton, Indonesia's Struggle, Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, (Sydney: NSW Press, 
2004). 
13 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia, Present and Future Trajectory", in Asian Survey, 
Vol. XLIV, No 5, September/October. 
14 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Indonesia's Approaching Election: Politics, Islam and Public 
Opinion", in Journal of Democracy Volume 15, No. 1January2004. 
15 Elizabeth Fuller Collins, "Islam is the Solution", Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia", see in 
http://mvw. classics. ohio. edu/faculty /collins/islamsolution. pelf 
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fundamentalist group, which differentiates it in principle from other modernist groups or 
parties in Indonesia. Its moderate nature, however, also differentiates PKS from the 
"radical camps" within the fundamentalist group. Thus this thesis argues that to include 
PKS in the same group with other Indonesian "radical" groups such as the Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI) is false, as is regarding this party to be in the same position as 
other modernist parties such as PBB. The use of the term moderate fundamentalism 
allows the diversity within the fundamentalist group to be observed and contributes a new 
insight into Indonesian Islamic political parties in Indonesia today. 
B. Theoretical Framework 
As has been noted by many researchers and observers, fundamentalist movements are an 
inseparable part of human history, particularly at the end of 20th century and the 
beginning of the 21st century. 16 This period has been referred to as "the era of religious 
revivalism". Some intellectual figures such as Mark Jurgensmeyer, 17 Karen Armstrong,18 
and even Samuel Huntington19 have convergent opinions about this phenomenon. Some 
research on fundamentalism concludes that the existence of such movements is a 
worldwide development resulting from modernism and secular ideas. This includes 
colonialism, the emergence of nation-states, and secular governments which are followed 
by cultural-religious oppression and social-economic disparity. 
In the Islamic context, the emergence of fundamentalism is a response to the 
backwardness faced by the Muslim community, which according to fundamentalists is a 
result of ignoring the fundamental ideals of Islam. The fundamentalists believe that 
Islamic society has lost its vital role and acted more as a group of people continuously 
dictated to and dominated by the West. On the other hand they argue that this situation 
has been supported internally by the existence of pro-western elements in Muslim society 
16Fundamentalism itself is neither the exclusive preserve of a unique phenomenon nor is it monopolized by 
a certain religion. To mention some examples, the existence of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka, Evangelism in the 
United States, the Ultra-Orthodox Neturei Karta Jews in Jerusalem, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in 
India, Khalsa Sikh communities in Punjab, and Al-Jkhwan Al-Muslimun and Al-Qaedah in the Islamic 
world. This proves that in every religion there are some minorities that tend to be the followers of 
fundamentalism. 
17 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
18 Karen Amstrong, The Battele For God, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2000). 
19 Samuel P Huntington, "Clash of Civilization?", Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3, Summer 1993. 
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and by Islamic traditionalists who are indifferent to the ummah 's degradation. This 
degradation is seen as both worldly and spiritual. The worldly (duniawi) is characterized 
by the existence of poverty, corruption, intellectual stagnation, political instability, and a 
backward civilization. The spiritual (ukhrmvi) is characterized by the existence of 
received so-called un-Islamic values such as secularism, materialism, and westernization, 
blended with Islamic values, and the absence of an ideal to implement Islamic values. 20 
For these reasons, the biggest ambition of this group is to return to Islam totally in the 
way of thinking and the way of life, as well as to make Islam an alternative to responding 
to the challenge of this current era. 
In the Islamic historical context, however, the fundamentalist movement is also 
related to the emergence of the Islamic purification movement as a response to the 
development of human history, which has brought a consciousness about the importance 
of returning to the "true Islam". This purification movement itself began with Ibnu 
Taimiyah (1263-1329), and was continued with the emergence of the Wahabism 
movement in the 18th century, and the thought of Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1897), 
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rasyid Ridha (1865-1935), the latter of whom 
initiated the salafism movement.21 The emergence of fundamentalist group in the 
20 Synthesized from Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990). 
Richard T. Antoun, A1emahami Fundamentalisme, Gerakan Islam, Kristen, Yahudi, (Surabaya: Pustaka 
Eureka, 2003). Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945, (New York: Routledge, 
2005). Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity, An Intellectual Transformation, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), p.162. R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Islamic Revival: Catalyst, Categories, and Consequences" in 
Shireen T. Hunter, (ed.), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism, (Washington: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1988). Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God, (New York: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1989). Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: the Response of the Shi 'i and Suni 
Muslim to the Twentieth Century, (London: McMillan Press, 1982), p.8. Tarmizi Taber, "Anatomi 
Radikalisme Keagamaan dalam Sejara11 Islam", in Bahtiar Effendy and Hendro Prasetyo, eds., Radikalisme 
Agama, (Jakarta: PPIM-IAIN, 1998). Ahmad S. Moussalli, Moderate and Radicallslamic Fundamentalism, 
The Quest.for Modernity, Legitimacy and the Islamic State, (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1999). 
21 See Said Amir Arjomand, "Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism", in Martin E. Marty and 
Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalism Comprehended, (Chicago: The UCP, 1991), pp. 179-182. 
Azzyumardi Azra, "Fundarnentalisme Isla1n, Survey Historis dan Doktrinal", Pergolakan Politik Islam dari 
Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post .A!fodernisme, (Jakarta: Paraniadina, 1996). For the Salafism 
movement as can be indicated from the name which mean the pious ancestor (salaf as salih ), this group has 
orientation to replicate the way of life of the first generation of Muslims, through the strict approach in 
understanding and implementing Islam. Even though they initial existence tend to be cultural movements, 
by focusing their movements in education to spread Islamic values in society; in the end in Indonesian case 
by endorsing the implementation of syari 'ah at all dimension of life including the state level some group 
have also a tendency to become political group with the legal-formal orientation in their movements. On 
the salajj; phenomenon, see Jamhari and Jajang Jalrroni, eds., Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004), Muhammad Adlin Sila,"Gerakan Salafi Sebagai Gerakan Islam Politik di 
5 
twentieth century globally, cannot be separated from its role models such as Hasan Al-
Banna (1906-1949), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), and Abul A'la Al-Mawdudi (1903-1979). 
Through the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat i-lslami (Islamic Community) movements, 
Al-Banna, Qutb and Mawdudi offer a "new paradigm" for Muslims which constitutes a 
belief that Islam is a divine gift that can become a "third alternative" after Capitalism and 
Marxism. 
Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is not something new. Tracing back to the 
past, Islamic fundamentalism at least from the 19th century, as evident by the emergence 
ofthePaderi group inspired by Wahabism in the West Sumatra;22 and at the beginning of 
the independent era as represented by the existence of the Darul Islam movement from 
1945 until 1962 under the Soekarno Regime.23 In the New Order era, fundamentalist 
groups were forced underground. Some Islamic groups set forth their own fundamentalist 
demands as a response to this new repressive regime. 24 These groups often committed 
violence, whether in self-defense or for aggressive purposes. 25 
With the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, fundamentalist groups proliferated. The 
re-emergence of fundamentalism, especially at the beginning of the reform era, is a result 
a variety of factors. In the national context, such factors included the disappointment at 
the existence of a secular system that is seen as disadvantaging the Islamic communities, 
particularly for the communities who was suppressed by Soeharto regime; the emergence 
Indonesia", in Dialog, edition I, 2004. Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, Local Jihad: Radical Islam and 
Terrorism in Indonesia, (Canberra: ASPI, 2005), pp. 13-14. 
22 Deliar Noer regards this Paderi group as "Kaum Muda", the main objective of which was to eradicate 
un-Islamic customs and establish Syari 'ah. This movement was opposed by "Kaum Tua" which tried to 
defend traditional customs. De!iar Noer, Gerakan }.{odern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 
1996), p. 7. See also Muhammad Aldin Silla, "Gerakan Sala.ft Sebagai Gerakan Islam Politik di Indonesia", 
Dialog, edition 1 year 2004, pp.35-36. On the Paderi War, see Helius Sjamsuddin, Perang Paderi, (Jakarta: 
Mutiara 1982). 
23 Such a conclusion can be seen in Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia'', South East Asia Research, 10, 2, pp. 117-154. Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, eds., 
Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004), pp. 15-17. On Daru1 Islam 
movements, see Cornelis van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: the Daru/ Islam in Indonesia, 
(The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1981). 
24 Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: GIP, 1996), pp. 262-278. 
Bruinessen, ibid, pp. 32-42. JantJwi and Jaja...11g Jahroni, (eds.), pp. 17-19. Abuddin Nata, Peta Keragaman 
Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia, (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2001), pp. 23-24. 
25 On the self defense attitude see for example Bambang Siswoyo, Peristiwa Lampung dan Gerakan 
Sempalan Islam, (Jakarta: UD Mayasari, 1989). See also Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Informasi, 
Tan.Jung Priok Berdarah, Tanggung Jawab Siapa? Kumpulan Fakta dan Data, (Jakarta: GIP, 1998). 
Meanwhile Jihad Command group, Ali Imron and Warman terror can be categorized to "aggressive group". 
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of new form of Islamic politics which appears more attractive and Islamic rather than the 
established Islamic mainstream and organizations, particularly for young pious Muslims; 
and the opportunity provided in the post-Soeharto political situation for new interest and 
political groups to exist. The global Islamic fundamentalist movement and networks also 
contributed in influencing existing fundamentalism, leading to the creation of a number 
of non-governmental organizations and political parties to deliver their interests.26 
In its development, however, like any other religious and political streams, 
fundamentalism has many variants or models of implementation, leading to the 
emergence of diverse institutions, which then take a place both in the cultural and 
political realm. Several scholars have argued that fundamentalism generally evolves into 
many forms. This development actually illustrates the existence of differences at the 
discourse level as well as in the context of action and political tactics of this group. 
Therefore, this development indicates that fundamentalism is not monolithic. 
According to Ahmad S. Moussalli, the term Islamic fundamentalism has to be 
understood as: 
" ... an umbrella term for a wide range of discourses and activism which tends 
to move from a high level of moderate pluralism, and thus inclusive 
democracy, to extreme radicalism, intolerant unitarianism and thus exclusive 
majority rule. While some fundamentalist groups are pluralistic in terms of 
inter-Muslim relations and relations between Muslims and minorities, other are 
not. Again, while some fundamentalists are politically pluralistic but 
theologically exclusive, others are accommodating religiously but direct their 
exclusivist programs to the outside, the West or imperialism. Even at the 
scientific level, Western science and technology are argued for by some 
fundamentalists as Islamically sound, while others exclude theme because of 
their presumed un-Islamic nature. More important, while most fundamentalists 
call for pluralistic democracy and argue for it as an essentially Islamic point of 
view, the radicals brand it as m1belief'. 27 
26 M.H Hafez, "Explaining the Origins oflslamic Resurgence: Islamic Revivalism in Egypt and Indonesia", 
The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies; Fall, 1997; 22, 3. Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal, 
Pergaulan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002). Anthony Bubalo and 
Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, lslamism and Indonesia, (Alexandria: Lowy Institute 
for International Politcy, 2005). Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalisms in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?", in 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2004, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004). S. Yunanto, et.al, Gerakan Militan Islam di 
Indonesia danAsia Tenggara, (Jakarta: The Ridep Institute-Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002). Imam Tolkhall 
and Choirul Fuad, (eds.), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi, (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama 
and Diklat Keagamaan-Departemen Agama RI, 2002). RM Burrel, (ed.), Fundamentalisme Islam, 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1995). 
27 Ahmad S. Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, 
Legitimacy and Islamic State, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), pp.68-69. 
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In this connection, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby state that the ways 
and means that are used by fundamentalist in pursuing power and of enforcing the 
mandate are many, "run along a spectrum of possibilities from radical to 
accommodationits". 28 In line with this conclusion, Bassam Tibi admits that 
fundamentalists are not necessarily fanatics and they can be dialogue counterparts.29 As a 
response to this fact, some analysts of fundamentalism have created a multi-part typology 
of this movement. 30 Moussalli uses moderate fundamentalism to describe one of types of 
fundamentalist groups, the term which is used in this sub thesis. But before further 
exploring the meaning of this term, it is necessary to discuss the reasons for the use of the 
term fundamentalism. 
1. The Term of Fundamentalism 
The meaning of the term fundamentalism is still contentious. As a term that was used in 
the beginning to describe the Christian fundamentalist movement in the United States,31 
this term is not only regarded as inappropriate to be applied in the Islamic community, 
but also considered to have a subjective, negative connotation. Some scholars regard the 
28 Martin E. Marty and Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalism and State Comprehended, (Chicago: The 
UCP, 1991), p. 6. 
29 Bassam Tibi, "Kaum Fundamentalis Jadikan Islam sebagai Ideologi Politik'', interview in Tashwirul 
Afkar, No. 13/2002, p. 119. 
30 Munson for example divides fundamentalism into "traditionalistic", "mainstream", and "radically 
ideological", in Henry Munson, Religion and Power in Morocco, chapter 6, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993). Meanwhile, Dekmejian divides the fundamentalist into: (1) Gradualist-adaptionist (2) 
Revolutionary Shia, (3) Revolutionary Sunni, and (4) Messianic-Primitivist. Dekmejian argues the 
"Gradualist-adaptionist" group is the majority which "in their quest for the eventual establishment of an 
Islamic order, this group show its willingness to operate inside the legal system, put forward gradualism, 
flexibility, and readiness to adapt their ideologies and program to modem conditions", see in Dekmejian, 
op. cit, pp. 10-14. Meanwhile Arjomand divides fundamentalist groups into, (1) Scriptural Pre-modern, (2) 
Scriptural Contemporary, (3) Political Pragmatic, (4) Political Ideological Constitutionalist, (5) Political 
Clericalist and (6) Political Revolutionary Sectarian, in Arjomand, op. cit, 193. 
31 Sponsored by two oil businessmen, Milton and Lyman Stewart, at the beginning of 20th century 
Protestant Evangelic groups spread fundamentalist teachings through a publication which was entitled "The 
Fundamental: A Testimony of Truth". The core of the teachings were: the birth of Jesus from Virgin 
Marry; the resurrection of Jesus from the dead; tl1e inerrancy and infallibility of the holy book; redemption 
from sin by the death of Jesus Christ; the direct creation of the world, and humanity, ex nihilo by God; and 
re-emergence of Jesus at the end of time. In 1919 the World Christian Fundamentals Association was 
established which fortified the existence of this group. The fundamental became "fundamentalists" after 
Curtis Lee Laws added "ist" in 1920 and declared tliat tl1e fundamentalist as one who "ready to do battle 
royal for the fundamentals". See Malise Ruthven Fundamentalism, (New York: Oxford University, 2004 ), 
pp.10-13. 
8 
term of fundamentalism as political by loaded, judgemental, subjective and prejudicial.32 
Thus they argue this term cannot be used to describe a real condition in the context of the 
Islamic community, and that it is a particularistic or not universal term. 33 Another 
scholar, Ruthven, compares the attitude of Christians and Muslims towards modernity 
and to some extent sees a problem in the use of the term fundamentalism for Muslims, 
since the Muslim fundamentalist actually does not reject modernity. 34 Because of such 
problems, Seyyed H. Nasr regards this term as misleading. 35 
However, not all scholars reject the use of the term fundamentalism. According 
to Marty and Appleby, fundamentalism is an accurate term in explaining the emergence 
of a universal political ideology in the twentieth century. Its adherents, from many 
religions, actually share similar characteristics or have typical fundamentalist impulses, 
while there are also some variants and tendencies within this group.36 In line with such a 
perspective, for Tibi, fundamentalism is a universal term because the symptom of this 
phenomenon can be found in all world religions. Based on this situation, therefore, the 
term is appropriate as a base for cultural comparison.37 Yusril Ihza Mahendra considers 
that even though the term fundamentalism is derived from the West, similar to 
"modernism", it can be regarded as a neutral term in the academic context and as a tool of 
analysis; fundamentalism is the most correct term compared to other terms. 38 Dekmeijan, 
32 Esposito argues the term fundamentalism as burdened by Christian prejudice and Western stereotypes, so 
that academically this tenn is not a satisfactory tool to analyse the phenomenon of Islamic revival in the 
twentieth century. Esposito and also Mohammad Natsir regard this term as not applicable to Islamic 
movements since Muslims in principle are motivated to implement their fundamental religious teaching as 
the main reference of life, therefore for Natsir there is a serious semantic problem in this term when it is 
applied in Islam. John L. Esposito, Ancaman Islam: Milos atau Realitas?, (Bandung: Mizan, 1994), pp. 17-
18. M. Natsir in Ahmad Watik Pratiknya, (ed.), M. Natsir Pesan Perjuangan Seorang Bapak, (Jakarta: 
DDII-LABDA, 1989), pp. 35-36. 
33 Juergensmeyer, op. cit, pp. 4-6. 
34 Ruthven, op. cit, p. 28. 
35 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Present Tendencies, Future Trends", in Marjorie Kelly, Islam: the Religious and 
Political L?fe of a World Community, (New York: Praeger, 1984 ), pp. 279-280. 
36 According to Marty and Appleby, fundamentalists around the world show shared communalities and 
family resemblance at the global level. Thus, this situation makes the term fundamentalism applicable in 
academic life. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, "Introduction", in, Marty and Appleby, eds., 
Fundamentalism Observed, (Chicago: The UCP, 1991), p. 2-4. See also the origins and good comparison 
among fundamentalists between religions in Gabriel Almond, Emmanuel Sivan and R. Scott Appleby, 
"Fundamentalism: Genus and Species'', in Marty and Scott Appleby, ibid, pp. 399-424. 
37 Bassam Tibi, Ancaman Fundamentalisme Rajutan Islam Politik dalam Kekacauan Dunia Baru, 
(Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 2000), p. 22. 
38 Yusril ll1Za Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai 
.Afasyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-lslami (Pakistan), (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p. 9. 
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comparing fundamentalism with other terms, also argues the term al-usuH)ya l 
Islamiyya (Islamic fundamentalism) is the most appropriate word to describe the ne 
Islamic revival phenomenon since it connotes a search for the fundamentals of the faitl 
the foundation of the Islamic community and polity (umma) and the bases of legitimat, 
authority (shar 'iyyat al hukm)".39 
Similar to some opinions above, I regard the term fundamentalism as an 
objective term that can be used in analysing the contemporary phenomenon of political 
Islam. As will be mentioned later, fundamentalism has a comprehensive and established 
definition and set of characteristics. Moreover, compared to other terms such as "radical" 
this term has some advantages. Fundamentalism is broader than the term "radical", so it 
can be exercised to analyse both the "radical" and "moderate" groups in this area of 
thinking. Furthermore, the term fundamentalism is in line with PKS' s thinking and 
attitudes, even PKS dislike the description fundamentalist being applied to the party. As 
will be explained in the ne.x"i chapter, PKS has grown and developed in the tradition of a 
fundamentalist perspective and is influenced by the thinking and actions of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Al-Banna. This influence and its political thinking differentiates PKS 
significantly from more "local" and modernist political parties in the Reformasi era, such 
as PBB which is commonly regarded as the continuum of the Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi), Islamic party created in October 1943 as a body to 
represent all Indonesian Muslims and was banned by Soekarno in August 1960, or PPP, 
which generally has a significant modernist faction and implements a modernist approach 
in its political life. 
2. The Characteristics of Islamic Fundamentalism 
Islamic fundamentalism comprises a number of characteristics. Even though scholars 
offer many definitions and understanding from various points of view about Islamic 
fundamentalism, they tend to agree on a number of values that can be regarded as the 
main characteristics of this thinking. Fundamentalists believe Islam is a comprehensive 
teaching and see the Al-Qur'an and Hadith as authoritative sources for Muslims that 
39D k .. . .:;; e meJian, op. cit, p. v. 
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cover politics, economy, social and cultural norms.40 Within this belief, fundamentalists 
consider that Islam is perfect and a totality,41 and syari'ah is a set of eternal and 
comprehensive rules. 42 This opinion is mainly related to their perspective about the 
concept of Tauhid (the Oneness of God) as a basic principle for human kind in 
conducting relationship, not only at the level of ibadah (relation between God and 
humans), but also at the muammalah (social intercourse) level, of which political 
activities become a part.43 Strong commitment to Tauhid also becomes a basis to consider 
that the deterioration of Islamic civilization is caused by Muslims deviating from this 
fundamental value. 44 As a consequence, fundamentalists believe Islam is a 
comprehensive ideology and arranges all aspect of human activities in every level of life 
including that of the individual, society and state.45 
Moreover, fundamentalists criticise traditional Islamic practices which are 
considered to be full of innovations and fictions, and regard Al-Qur' an and the Sunnah as 
the foundation of Islamic Law and as a final teaching. To the fundamentalist, their 
justification mainly lies in the text. Even though this attitude does not prevent the 
possibility of having a practical interpretation for something that requires ijtihad 
(independent reasoning), hermeneutic and liberal studies are rejected by this group.46 
40 Jan Hjarpe, "Politiek Islam" (Stockholm: Skeab Forlag, 1983), p.42 in Mahendra, ibid, p.17. 
41 Pusat Penelitian Kemasyarakatan dan Budaya UPI, Fundamentalisme Islam Quo I/adis?, End Year 
Seminar, unpublished, (Jakarta: IPSK-LIPI, 2002), p. 3. 
42 Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 124-
126. Mahendra, op.cit, p. 18. 
43 Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism The ideological and Political Discourse ofSayyid 
Qutb, (Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1992), pp. 213. 
44 Based on this perception sometimes the fundamentalists refuse the leadership of the ulama (Islamic 
scholars) in Islam who, in their opinion, have mixed up and confused Tauhid and non-Tauhid teachings; 
and also on the other hand resist the leadership of the secular elites in the government. Moussalli, lvfoderate 
and radical... op.cit, p. 32-33. 
45 Ahmad Ruma.di, "Akar-Akar Teologi Fundamentalism Islam", in "Islam, Radikalisme dan 
Demokratisasi",Jurna/ Demokrasi dan Ham, Vol.3, No.l, January-April 2003, p.71. 
46 In tenns of avoiding the henneneutic mechanism in interpreting Islamic teaching, the study by Karyono 
concludes that the fundamentalist movement basically is inclined to literal interpretation which rejects a 
hermeneutic model of interpretation as their main characteristic. Moreover, this movement also regards 
Islamic texts, Al-Qur'an and Hadith, as a source of law which demands formalization when implemented. 
Karyono, op. cit, p.103. Rumadi, ibid, p. 71. Moreover Marty states that as an ideology, fundamentalism has 
four characteristics of rejection namely (1) "oppositionalism" or resistance toward things that are regarded 
to have a potential to endanger religion, such as secular and materialistic values, (2) the rejection of a 
hermeneutic model in interpreting religious texts, (3) the rejection of pluralist interpretation and the use of 
rationalism in understanding religion, (4) the rejection of historical and sociological development of 
human civilization by placing the first adherents of the religion or the classical era as a main reference of 
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Richard Antoun claims that the fact that fundamentalists believe that Al-Qur' an and the 
Sunnah are the final sources which explain many problems clearly, causes this group 
generally to avoid hermeneutics and use a literal approach in interpreting scripture.47 
Thus this group tends to avoid and even conceal any kind of discussion about religious 
matters particularly for some fundamental problems. Furthermore, in their attempt to 
create a genuine Islamic society, this group gives high appreciation for the early historical 
period of Islamic society, especially the Medina period and the lifetime of the Prophet 
Muhammad. 48 In essence, they regard the precedent of the prophet's era as an ideal 
reference for Muslims in creating civilization. 49 Thus all political thinking and the socio-
cultural life that prevailed in this era is the main reference for all activities especially 
those that are related to political life. 
Furthermore, this group has a strong desire to develop the idea of Islamic 
universalism within the framework of the spirit oflslam as an alternative and solution for 
Muslims and the world, as well as to reject materialism and secularism. This is because, 
. apart from their belief in the comprehensive role of Islam in the human civilization, they 
consider that un-Islamic influences have harmed Muslims. Therefore, returning to Islam 
by obeying God's law in every aspect of life is a main prerequisite for re-establishing 
Muslim dignity and piety. With the spirit of the alternative way, this movement, 
particularly the radicals, rejects any kind of "inauthentic" interpretation of Islam. 50 In 
order to become an alternative intellectual movement, fundamentalists are also obsessed 
with creating a modern and comprehensive system, theory and thinking based on Islam, 
in every segment of life, not only in terms of social activities but also in technology. 51 
Thus we can also see the emergence oflslam as an alternative to traditional Islam and the 
secular point of view. 
the ideal society. Martin E. Marty, "What is Fm1damentalism? Theological Perspective", in Hans Kllilg and 
Jurgen Moltmann, (eds.), Fundamentalism as a Ecumenical Challenge, (London: 1992), pp.3-13. 
47 Antollil, op. cit, pp. 41-61. 
48 According to Moussalli, fundamentalists regard the Prophet's era and the first four caliphs in Medina as 
an ultimate type for Muslims, Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism ... op.cit, p.215. 
49 Azyumardi Azra, op. cit, pp. 109-110. 
50 Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism ... op.cit, p. 216. 
51 This group considers that through strengthening science and technology, Muslims would be able to avoid 
pressure of the westernization and secularization. See Moussalli, ibid, p. 217 and Rumadi, op.cit, p. 71. 
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Fundamentalists also have a commitment to heighten piety at every level of 
human life, not only at the level of the individual but also at the society and state level. 
Fundamentalists believe that faith must be developed together within society, becoming a 
collective responsibility and not just an individual matter. 52 Therefore it is an obligation 
for Muslims to develop Islamic values through dakwah (religious propagation) for 
Muslims at every level of life. Based on this proposition, Azyumardi Azra regards 
fundamentalists as the extreme part of revivalism, where the main objective of this 
movement is to transform Islamic values not only for individual Muslims but also to the 
social and communal entities. 53 In order to manifest their orientation to transform Muslim 
society to the ideal shape of civilization, this group not only endorses militant and 
revolutionary attitudes, but also the consensus way. Although this commitment can be 
adopted to the system, according to Antoun, it is common that in order to develop a 
fundamentalists' way oflife toward a broader scheme such as society and state, in the end 
this movement sometimes challenges the existence of the established cultural and current 
system.54 
In addition, the fundamentalists focus on changing the structure of the state and 
society in order to establish an Islamic order, or as they see it, "a divine order". In order 
to establish a "divine order" or ethical state, this group often turns to politics. Therefore, 
it is understandable if fundamentalists are also concerned with political activities in order 
to struggle for developing a system that is in line with Islamic law and that they as 
consequence reject an "un-Islamic" system. 55 In this regard, according to Tibi, 
fundamentalism is essentially a form of Islamic politics, where the adherents of this 
thinking employ Islam as a medium and symbol of their political movements in order to 
achieve their goals, mainly to establish the order of God and resist the secular order 
which separates religion and politics. 56 According to Johannes J. G. Jansen, the belief 
about the relation between Islam and politics in the end becomes a main way to maintain 
Islam as political ideology which not only rejects secularization in politics but also all the 
52 Moussalli, Moderate and Radical ... op.cit, p.45. 
53 Azra, ibid, pp.107-108. 
54 Antoun, op. cit, pp. 95-126. 
55 Pusat Penelitian Kemasyarakatan clan Budaya LIPI,op.cit, p. 3. 
56 T.b. . 61 1 1, op.cit, p. . 
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negative impacts ofwesternization. 57 In this regard, fundamentalists principally believe in 
the inextricable and strong relations between religion and politics, whereby religion is a 
guiding norm of political behaviour and objectives. As a consequence, Islam is then 
interpreted as a political ideology that demands political awareness and formalization of 
every Islamic teaching in every Muslim life. 
Specifically in terms of politics, Fazlur Rahman argues that fundamentalist 
groups, similar to the modernists, acknowledge the role oflslam in politics. Nevertheless, 
in contrast to the modernists, these groups are essentially eager to revitalize the existence 
of the Islamic communities of the past. The fundamentalists regard the historical 
experience of the Islamic community, mainly at the start of Islam, as the only 
authoritative condition for Muslims. 58 Moreover, the fundamentalists put forward a 
political system which is based on Islamic law. As such, the demand for the 
establishment of an Islamic political system or Islamic constitution is one of the 
consequences. Related to this perspective, fundamentalists do not reject but rather believe 
in the existence of an Islamic state and the Caliphate. An Islamic state as it was in the 
Prophet Muhammad's era is regarded as an ideal system simply because to them Islamic 
law was comprehensively implemented. 59 In addition, based on the spirit of 
acknowledging the sovereignty of God, the fundamentalists tend to be wary of, or even 
reject, the concept of the sovereignty of the people as embodied by democracy, 60 even 
though they also reject a dictatorship. 
From the above definitions and meanings, we can conclude that fundamentalists 
are a group who believe in Islam as a comprehensive teaching and regard Al-Qur' an and 
the Sunnah as the foundations of Islamic Law as well as the final and fully-fledged 
teaching. This group also gives high appreciation to the early historical period ofislamic 
society, has a commitment to construct piety at every level of human life, and a strong 
eagerness to develop the idea of Islamic universalism within the framework of the spirit 
of Islam as an alternative and solution, as well as rejecting materialism and secularism. 
This group also focus on the effort to change the structure of the state and society. In 
57 Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism, (New York: Comel University Press, 
1997). 
58 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, (Bandung: Ganesha, 1984), p. 338. 
59 Moussalli, A1oderate and Radical ... op.cit, p. 39. 
60 Mahendra, op.cit, p. 244. 
14 
terms of politics, they believe in the comprehensive role of the Islamic syari 'ah and the 
existence of the Islamic political system such as the institution of shura (Islamic 
consultation), an Islamic state, and caliphate. 
3. Moderate Islamic Fundamentalist 
Moderate Islamic fundamentalism as a term is not something new. Moussalli, in his 
attempt to explain the variety of fundamentalist movements, concludes that there are two 
models of fundamentalism, namely radical and moderate Islamic fundamentalism. 
Radical fundamentalism is a movement supported by a minority, has an exclusive nature 
and rigid attitudes. On the other hand, the moderate fundamentalists are to some extent, 
open to dialogue and demonstrate the intention to accept the Western system and political 
thinking as long as these are useful to support their larger goals and are not in opposition 
to Islamic teaching. 61 Thus Moussalli concludes that "while radical fundamentalism 
proves resistant to dialogue and cooperation with the regimes and the West in genera( 
moderate fundamentalism is open to dialogue and compromise". 62 
According to Moussalli, moderate fundamentalism is a phenomenon in Islamic 
political thinking which has arisen as a response towards new political developments in 
the Islamic political world. The arguments presented by Moussalli actually state that 
fundamentalism as an ideology has some teachings and interpretations that can be utilized 
by its adherents to legitimize their moderate thinking and actions. In relation to this, 
Moussalli regards moderate attitudes as basically a reflection of ideological interpretation 
in order to implement such ideology in the real world. 63 
Moussalli regards moderate fundamentalists as a group which aims to establish 
the Islamic system or God's Governance (hakimiJya), based on Islamic law and with 
fundamentalist characteristics. Nevertheless, their moderate approach in developing these 
fundamentalist characteristics leads this group to accept popular government, honour 
pluralism, propose tolerance and believe in gradual and adaptive development. The 
strong commitment to Tauhid, for example, brings moderate fundamentalists to the 
61 Ahmad S. Moussalli, "Modern Islamic Fundamentalism Discourse on Civil Society, Pluralism and 
Democracy", in Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East, (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1995), pp. 
80-81. 
62 Ibid, p.118. 
63 Moussalli, Moderate and Radical ... op.cit, p.104. 
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conclusion that equality must be the spirit of the government which obliges them to give 
priority to the voice of the people. Tau hid also is a basis in respecting the differences 
among human beings. Further, the spirit of returning to the true Islam by understanding 
Islamic teaching as directly based on the Al-Qur'an and Hadith texts, or purification, 
provides this group with legitimate values to reject the hegemonic role of the "old" 
leaders and Islamic scholars who not only have brought misleading interpretations about 
Islam and Tauhid, but have also taken an advantage from their special position in the 
. 64 
society. 
Moreover, moderate fundamentalists believe that shura is a proper norm for 
Muslims to conduct a consultative government. To the moderate fundamentalist, shura is 
often translated as a concept which is in line with the concept of a social contract in 
building the government. 65 In this way, according to Moussalli, moderate fundamentalists 
also believe that society has a right to participate in the decision-making process and has 
the freedom to develop themselves. 66 Furthermore, their belief in the glorious era of the 
Prophet in Medina convinces moderate fundamentalists to follow the path of honouring 
pluralism and tolerance for the whole society, as this is one of the important political 
messages from that time. 67 This is fundamentally related to the governmental system of 
the Prophet which was based on the Mitsaqal Madinah (Medina Charter)68 as a perfect 
example for honouring pluralism and tolerance. 69 Related to such an opinion, Moussalli 
regards the commitment of this group to the Islamization process as the reason for them 
to propose tolerance in social life. These in the end become a basis for the moderate 
64 Ibid, pp. 41 and 182. 
65 Ibid, p. 184. 
66 In relation to the existence of the state, by quoting Al-Banna's, Mousalli argues that for moderate 
fundamentalist, the government policy and regulations have to be coherent with the people interests and the 
context where the society exists. Hasan Al-Banna, "Din wa-siyasah" (Beimt: MakThabat Huttin, 1970), pp. 
40-45 in Moussalli, "Modem Islamic ... ", op.cit, p. 99. 
67 Moussalli, Moderate and Radical ... op.cit, p.39. 
68 On the text of Medina Charter, see in Munawir Sjadzali, Islam dan Tata Negara. Ajaran, Sejarah dan 
Pemikiran, (Jakarta UI Press, 1993), pp. 10-15. 
69 Because of this spirit, the Prophet's government in Medina to some extent is regarded as too modern for 
Arabic society in that time. Robert N. Bellah says that "There is no question but that m1der Muhammad, 
Arabian society made a remarkable leap forward in social complexity and political capacity" in Robert N. 
Bellah, Beyond Belief Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World, (New York: Herper and Row 
Publisher, 1970), p. 150. 
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fundamentalist to behave inclusively and reject revolutionary methods m spreading 
Islamic ideals. 70 
In addition, the commitment to creating Islam as an alternative ideology 
encourages moderate fundamentalists to establish an Islamic order which pays homage to 
the existence of human morality, including justice and liberation. 71 This order is 
formatted as an alternative for the secular regimes in the Islamic world which are seek as 
still committed to the dictatorship and repressive attitudes. In this context, according to 
Moussalli when the world is divided into dar al-Islan1 (the realm of Islam) and dar al-
harb (the realm of war), it essentially means a division between a morally backward but 
materially advanced society, as opposed to a potentially morally advanced but materially 
backward world. For this reason, the fundamentalists sometimes take part in conducting 
popular government and in movements to fight against authoritarian regimes. Moreover, 
related to this, the humanitarian aspect the Islamic order is aimed at addressing social 
concerns as reflected by concrete solutions toward humanitarian problems. 72 
Apart from being a phenomenon in the realm of political thought, moderate 
fundamentalism is also a phenomenon in the political arena. In this context, for some 
scholars the moderate tendency introduced by fundamentalist groups is actually related to 
their attempts to be accepted and involved in society, which in the end will bring them 
advantages. According to such a point of view, the moderate nature of such 
fundamentalist groups is mostly related to their strategy of struggle which is to basically 
win over political interests.73 Related to this, Steve Bruce states that the will to 
demonstrate a moderate attitude is a logical choice for fundamentalists to gain support for 
their actions in a situation where in essence they live as a minority in the secular 
community. 74 Also their bad experiences under an obstructive political system in the end 
70Moussalli, Moderate and Radical ... op.cit, p.85. 
71 Ibid, pp. 185-186. 
72 Ibid, p.186. 
73 Some political studies that focus on the relations between political party, election, power struggle, and 
voting behavior conducted by political scientists using the behavioral approach show this phenomenon. See 
Dennis Kavanagh, Political Science and Political Behaviour, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 
pp.76-112. Anna Triandafyllidou, The Social Psychology of Party Behaviour, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1997). David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition, (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976). Stephen C. 
Shadegg, How to Win an Election, The Art of Political Victory, (New York: Taplinger Publishing, 1964 ). 
74 In relation to the political context, Steve Bruce indicates that where the fundamentalists group exist 
within a national system that is basically secular, this group faces many alternatives to survive. Bmce then 
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endorse Islamic parties to be more flexible and accommodative toward the situation and 
adopt some political agendas which actually had been rejected by them before. 75 
Furthermore, Mahendra believes that the eagerness to achieve a higher position 
in the national political constellation - especially if they believe such achievement is 
possible - will push the fundamentalists to enlarge their attitude of compromise toward 
others. 76 Related to this, Sachez-Cuenca regards the desire to be more realistic in order to 
achieve a better position in political life, rather than just acting as an opposition, as 
leading to a softening of rigidity in interpreting ideology which eventually causes the 
emergence of moderate attitudes. 77 The moderate attitudes of fundamentalists in terms of 
politics are sometimes critically regarded as a strategy to cover their real agendas. 
Brumberg regards such attitudes, in the context of fundamentalist movements in Middle-
East, as a "utilitarian utopianism". He concludes that when the political situation is 
calculated as not accommodative, reformist fundamentalists will adopt a moderate 
attitude. But after the political climate changes, this group will tend to show their real 
objectives. 78 
Apart from their tendency to cover their "hidden agendas", the attitudes 
developed by moderate fundamentalists in the political realm show their willingness to 
concludes that the alternatives to use compromise and moderation are the most realistic option for the 
fundamentalists in order to implement their ideals. Moreover he believes that such an option in the end will 
push fundamentalists to build relationships >vith various groups of people from different backgrounds, to 
gain maximal support for their political agendas. This relationship, however, eventually will cause doubt 
particularly among the first followers of this group. Steve Bruce, "The Moral Majority: the Politics of 
Fundamentalism in Secular Society", in Lionel Caplan, Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, (London: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), p.180. 
75 Saban Taniyici, "Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey, Islamist Welfare Party's Pro-EU Turn", in 
Party Politics, vol 9, no.4, pp.463-483. In line with such phenomenon, according to Ramadan and Azra, a 
similar situation also happened to Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun in Egypt after the death of Sayyid Qutb. See 
Abdel Azim Ramadan, "Fundamentalists Influence in Egypt", in Marty and Appleby, op. cit, pp. 164-182. 
See also Azra, op. cit, pp. 117-123. 
76 Mahendra, op. cit, p.32 
77 In relation to the interplay between ideology and political interest within political parties, Sanchez-
Cuenca regards that the softening of the rigidity in interpreting ideology causes the emergence of moderate 
attitudes. He states that this attitude is actually a response from the desire to be more realistic in order to 
achieve a better position in the political life, more tl1an just as an opposition. This situation is supported by 
the emergence of the moderate and reformist elites who hold transformative and constmctive ideals will 
also support the party to take adaptive attitudes toward the political system. See in Ignacio Sanchez-
Cuenca, "Party Moderation and Politician's Ideological Rigidity", in Party Politics, Vol 10, No.3, pp. 325-
342. 
78 Daniel Brumberg, "Rhetoric and Strategy, Islamic Movements and Democracy in Middle East", in 
Martin Kramer, ed., The Jslamism Debate, (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and Africa 
Studies-Tel Aviv University, 1997), pp. 22-30. 
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put forward compromise, behave in a tolerant manner and adopt popular attitudes in 
appealing for public attention. In a more open political system, fundamentalists are forced 
to compete for votes and, if in power, to rule amid diverse interests as well as to move 
beyond the promises of slogans to the solution of problems. This group, like secular 
political parties, will be challenged to adapt or broaden their ideology and programs in 
response to domestic realities and diverse constituencies and interests. 79 
4. The Characteristic of Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism 
In connection to the above discussion, this research considers the characteristic of 
moderate fundamentalists are as follows: First, belief in the values of fundamentalism as 
a basis of thinking, consisting of some of the characteristics mentioned above including 
the intense obsession to establish a universal Islamic political system based on the Al-
Qur'an and Hadith as an alternative ways in creating better life for Ummat. Second, 
moderate fundamentalism, however, interprets fundamentalist values from a moderate 
perspective. As consequence, moderate fundamentalists are willing to open dialogue by 
using common language and discourse, including talk about modern political themes such 
as nation-state and democracy. 
Third, at the practical and surface level, this group implements moderate 
methods as a consequence of their methodology, as well as strategic choices based on the 
political situation faced. Moderate fundamentalists tend to propose compromise and 
cooperative attitudes towards other party, so long as these can bring them to their ideal 
political objectives. Moreover this group tends to follow a strategy of adaptation from 
within the system - by joining the parliament and government through the constitutional 
ways and the rules of game in the country - and tends to ignore extreme and violence 
ways to achieve political goals. They also have a tendency to implement democracy, 
since democracy can be used to support their existence as well their ideals in order to set 
up a kind of popular or people's government based on Islamic values. 
Fourth, in the context of political activities, in order to be accepted more in 
society and due to previous experiences of failure, moderate fundamentalists focus more 
on the gradual improvement of the spiritual development of the society and individual 
79 Esposito, op. cit, p.61 and Moussalli, 1vfoderate and Radical ... op. cit, pp. 69-70. 
19 
traits, towards the establishment of the ideal social order, and tend to avoid ideological 
matters. Based on this attitude a gradual approach is understandable and even acceptable 
for this movement. It can thus be understood, as Marty contends, that 
''\Vhen fundamentalists play politics to influence the policies of the state, in 
other words, they are necessarily involved in compromise and 
accommodation. Political involvement may alter the exclusive, dogmatic, 
confrontational mode of the fundamentalists to such degree that the word 
fundamentalism or its cognate is no longer appropriate". 80 
The moderate fundamentalist approach can be seen in PKS. From within the 
fundamentalist tradition, this party freely implements tolerance, pluralism and democracy 
in its activities. Moreover in proposing moderate strategies, has also tended to focus on 
the pragmatic and "secular problems'', rather than ideological matters in their political 
activities particularly at the surface level, within 7 years of its existence. This mixture 
between fundamentalism as a basis of thinking and moderate perceptions and attitude as a 
political response will be elaborated in the next chapters. 
C. Objective 
In this sub-thesis I will argue that PKS is a moderate fundamentalist in nature. It is called 
fundamentalism because this party essentially has a strong tendency to follow and apply 
the basic ideology, assumptions and main objectives of Islamic fundamentalism. On the 
other hand, at the surface level or their political activities, attitudes and statements, PKS 
performs in a moderate way, for example by abiding by constitutional guidelines, 
acknowledging democratic government, using non-violence, committing to develop an 
inclusive political approach, and proposing gradual approaches in implementing Islamic 
political ideals. Moreover, this party also demonstrates their moderate attitudes and 
opinions about the relation between state and religion, implementation of syari 'ah, an 
Islamic state, caliphate and democracy. In this context moderate fundamentalism offers 
another path in observing a new phenomenon in the Islamic political movement in 
Indonesia, which has different characteristics from the traditionalists, modernists and also 
from radical fundamentalists. The study of PKS in the framework of moderate 
fundamentalism is expected to contribute to understanding the political thinking and 
80 Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms Comprehended, pp. 2-3. 
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behaviours of PKS in Indonesian politics well as the phenomenon of fundamentalism in 
the Ref ormasi era. 
This sub-thesis elaborates the political thinking and behaviour of PKS, from 
1998 to 2005. It is divided into five chapters. In the next chapter, the focus is on PKS's 
origins in Indonesia as well as groups that have influenced it. This second chapter also 
discusses the basic concepts of PKS' s thinking in general, which demonstrates the 
fundamentalist aspect of this party and the basis for their moderate attitudes. The third 
chapter mainly elaborates on PKS' s political thinking, including the party's 
understanding of the relation between Islam and the state, the status of syari 'ah in the 
legal system, the existence of the nation-state and Pancasila as a national ideology, and 
the problems related to the caliphate and democracy. The next chapter explores PKS's 
political actions particularly around the issue of the amendment of Article 29 of the 
National Constitution in the annual parliamentary meeting MPR, its political cooperation 
and PKS's stance in regard to building a clean government, social awareness and 
rejecting the violence that spread around the country. In this chapter PKS will be 
analysed as a political institution which is seeks to attract voters and win the power 
struggle in order to implement its interests. To achieve these political objectives, PKS is 
actually required to develop a strategic approach in its political actions. The last chapter 
is the conclusion, which restates the main arguments of the previous chapters and 
provides a prospect of PKS in Indonesian politics. 
In general, this thesis also compares moderate fundamentalists to radical 
fundamentalists and the modernists in order to give clearer explanations about the 
characteristic of PKS' s political thinking and actions, particularly in the third and fourth 
chapter. For this reason, however, it is important to note that the modernists mentioned in 
this sub-thesis are representing the general opinions of this group. This is because there 
are some groups within this mainstream who have different opinions in particular and 
specific cases. For this reason, the modernists are represented by some prominent figures 
and political organizations such as M. Natsir, M. Amien Rais, Yusril Mahendra, PBB and 
PPP. As a basic principle, the modernists81 believe that Islam arranges political life in 
81 The appearances of the modernist in the 19th century was a response to the traditional groups which in 
the modernists' opinion had implemented unislamic traditions and weakened the tradition of rational 
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broad terms, rather than in detail. Modernists regard the precedent of the Prophet's era in 
the ih century as binding only in terms of principles and thus it is necessary for Muslims 
to reinterpret Islamic history and try to be objective regarding the past. In line with this 
spirit, modernists tend to put forward a contextual interpretation of Islam and are willing 
to adopt modern political forms and thinking. 82 By believing in such political idealism, 
modernists tend to concern themselves with the essence rather than the form of the 
system, such as an Islamic State, let alone a Caliphate. The willingness to adapt to the 
modern system also allows modernists to be free in supporting the existence of the 
nation-state and democracy. However, the spirit of imitating the modern idea generates 
accusations, mainly from the fundamentalists, that modernism is an attempt to westernize 
Islamic teaching and Muslims. 83 
The radical fundamentalists in this sub-thesis consist of some Islamic social 
organizations such as the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), the now defunct Communication 
Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet (FKASWJ), 
Laskar Jihad and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI). These organizations have a 
range of visions and specific objectives. However, while there are some differences in 
perspectives and approaches, and nothing that formally unites all parties or organizations 
into the specific groups, each new fundamentalist Islamic organization on the national 
political scene to some extent demonstrates similar actions and opinions. In general these 
groups share similar fundamentalist point of view and objectives with the moderate. 
Nevertheless, by having a tendency to develop a textual approach and rigidity in 
interpreting Islamic teachings, radical fundamentalists tend to put forward the spirit of 
thinking; and on the other hand penetration of Western Powers into the Muslim world. Principally the 
modernists demand two main interests; first, they call on Muslims to return to Al-Qur'an and the Sunnal1 
and second, they have developed the tradition of freedom of thought based on ijtihad (independent 
reasoning), in order to have a proper response towards the development of human civilization in the 
modern era. See Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), p. 40. A. 
Mukti Ali, Beberapa Persoalan Agama Dewasa Ini, (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1988). Fachry Ali and and 
Bachtiar, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam, (Jakarta: Mizan, 1986), p. 64. Anwar Harjono, "M. Natsir, 
Sumbangan dan Pemikiram1ya untuk Indonesia", dalamMedia Dakwah, 1416H/1995, pp.110-111. 
82 These three characteristics are the main principles of the modernists, which according to Rahman have 
led to confrontation with secularists and the fundamentalists. Ralunan, op.cit, p. 336. For more on the 
characteristics of the modernists, see Mahendra, Afodernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, 
(Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), pp. 29-31. Umaruddin Masdar, Afembaca Pemikiran Gus Durdan Amien Rais 
Tentang Demokrasi, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999), pp. 53-54. Anders Uhlin, Oposisi Berserak, Arus 
Deras Demokratisasi Gelombang Ketiga di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Mizan, 1998), p. 74. 
83 Esposito, Ancaman Islam ... op.cit, p.135. 
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resistance (particularly towards the West), be reluctant to open dialogues with regards to 
pluralism and tolerance as well as developing the spirit of jihad in terms of offensive 
action in relation to establish enjoining good and forbidding evil. This group also believes 
in the urgency of implementing Islamic laws to change the current system radically and 
to some extent put forward emotional and illegal actions as a reflection of distrusting 
such system. 84 
D. Methodology 
This research uses two methods: an analysis of the existing literature, and field research. 
The literature study covers fundamental thinking as stated in the statutes and rules of 
association of the party, which can be measured as a yardstick in exploring the 
ideological stance of PKS. However, it needs to be understood that the statutes and rules 
of association are not free from strategic political interests such as seeking sympathy and 
recognition from many people and groups, whether they are from the grass roots or 
government. Therefore, Anggaran Dasar and Anggaran Rurnah Tangga (the statutes and 
rules of association of a party, AD/ ART) do not necessarily reveal the entire nature of its 
political ideology comprehensively. In that context, besides analysing the statutes and 
rules of association, which are the technical and political-formal fai;:ade of the PKS, this 
thesis also elaborates upon the substance of PKS's political thinking from other literature 
provided by the party. 
The field research method is used to provide first-hand information and data 
about some of the main issues in order to support argumentation in this research and also 
as a tool to confirm some of the problems and issues related to the PKS's substantial 
political thinking and actions. For this reason, this research generally explores some 
groups within PKS, that is the party's elites, including members of the central board of 
PKS, members of the legislative body at a national or local level; and also ordinary party 
members, who do not have organizational position in the party and do not have 
governmental position at any governmental levels. By researching these groups, I have 
84 On these characteristic see Moussalli, Islamic Fundamentalism. Jamhari and Jahroni, eds., op.cit, p.7. 
Horace M. Kallen, "Radicalism" in Edwin R.A. Seligman, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XIII-
XIV, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 51-54. 
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aimed to analyse in detail the characteristic of thinking, motives, v1s1ons, mission, 
policies and actions of PKS. 
This research was conducted in Jakarta and also some political strongholds of 
PKS support such as Depok, Bekasi and Tangerang, as well as in Lampung. Jakarta can 
not be neglected because of the existence of some important interviewees in this 
province. Depok, Bekasi and Tangerang were chosen because these are potential areas for 
PKS for more PKS support, based on the result of the 2004 election. Lampung was 
chosen because not only was there was an increase in the vote gained by PKS and PKS 
cadres hold important position in the government as a local leader in the Local 
Governmental Election 2005, but also because this area is relatively distant from the 
capital city and representing the area outside Java, which is expected to be able provide 
some genuine, local and pure political perspectives and ideals about PKS 's thinking and 
behaviours. 
24 
CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORY AND BASIC THINKING OF PKS: 
THE ROOTS OF MODERATE FUNDAMENTALISM 
This chapter will present a brief historical overview of PKS as well as examine its 
basic thinking and activities. Specifically, the first part of this chapter \vill provide a 
concise description of the relationship between PKS and the Tarbiyah movement, the 
nature of PKS as a cadre party and its understanding of dakwah and politics, and the 
influences of Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood, IM) and Hasan al Banna. 
The second part will address the roots of PKS' political thinking, particularly the 
concept of Islam as perfection and dakwah as the basis for moderate attitude. The 
purpose of this chapter is firstly, to show that, since its inception, PKS has been 
influenced by moderate fundamentalist perspectives, and secondly, to provide a 
background for my further analysis of PKS's thinking and behavior. 
A. Brief Biography of PKS: An Overview 
1. Historical Background 
The existence of PKS cannot be separated from the dakvvah movement, initially called 
usroh 1 and later on popularly known as Tarbiyah. 2 The birth of this movement can be 
1 Usrah in this context means "the strong protective shield for its members", or "the group which has a 
commitment to educate". This term sometimes also means "family" and "relatives". This term derives 
from IM and has been adopted by dakwah activists, particularly those involved in Training for Dak-wah 
Mujahid (LMD). However, over time this term has fallen into disuse by activists, along with the 
negative connotation of this term as an effect of the political situation at that time. Further, LMD which 
used this term in essence did not use the same methods and material from IM, \Vhich made usrah 
eventually become just name. Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transfonnasi 20 Tahun 
Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002), p.88-93. Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, ldeologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004), 
pp.136-139. 
2 According to Siddiq, this group initially did not use the "Tarbiyah" term for the group's name, 
because at that time they focused their attention on the performance of the movement rather than the 
name, which is in line with the concept of Islamiyah qoblajam 'iyah (Islamization before organization). 
However, over time this term became a familiar label for the group which implemented the method of 
Tarbiyah from IM. Mahfudz Sidiq, K4lvLMI dan Pergulatan Rejonnasi, Kiprah PolitikAktivis Dakwah 
Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi, (Solo: 
Era Intennedia, 2003), p. 84. Tarbiyah itself means "The ideal way in interacting with the fitrah 
manusia (human nature), both directly (by words) and indirectly (by good attitudes), for creating a 
transfonnation to the better condition". For a more detailed explanation about the meaning of Tarbiyah, 
see Arifinto, ed, Tarbzyah Berkelanjutan, (Jakarta: Tarbiyatuna, 2002). Ali Abdul Halim Mahmud, 
Perangkat-Perangkat Tarbiyah Ikhwanul A1uslimin, (Solo: Era Intem1edia, 1999). 
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traced back to the 1980s when a number of dakwah activists, mostly young Muslim 
scholars who just finished their studies at universities in the Middle East,3 sponsored 
mainly by Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Predication 
Council, DDII), 4 introduced a new method of dakwah into Indonesia. 5 This method, 
derived from and inspired by the teachings of Hasan Al-Banna6 and IM has had a 
significant impact and distinguishes Tarbiyah from other Islamic movements, which 
generally tended to adhere to the Islamic mainstream variants, either Islamic 
traditionalism or modernism. 7 
The education and dakwah method ofIM, which became a backbone for this 
movement, was spread by dakwah activists during 1980s, \vorking mainly inside 
campuses. The role of alumni of Middle Eastern universities - particularly Hilmi 
Aminuddin8, senior Islamic dakwah activists who \Vere inspired by the daklvah 
method and actions of IM9 and young dakwah campus activists, were crucial to this 
attempt Latter on the dissemination of books written by the leading figures ofIM also 
played a key role in supporting the development of this movement. 10 At that time, 
3 Such as Islamic University of Madinah Al-Munawarrah, Saudi Arabia; University of Ibnu Saud, 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; University of Al-Azhar, Egypt There are also cadres who did not continue their 
studies abroad such as Aus Hidayat Nur, and graduates from Western universities such as Nunnahmudi 
Isma'iL 
4 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The lvfiddle East, Islamism and Indonesia, 
(Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), pp. 58-59. See also p.124. 
5 Damanik, op.cit, p. 97. 
6 Hasan Al-Banna is not a new figure to the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Al-Banna's thinking and 
IM had been knmvn since the 1950s and influenced several Islamic groups. One of Masyumi's 
members K.H Bustami Darwis was taught by IM in 1930s. :Sabili, No.3/IX, I Agustus 2001. However, 
in tenns of the method, only the Tarbiyah group has implemented Al-Banna's method comprehensively 
by regarding his method as a "perfect guidance" and has even used it as an identity for the group. See 
Damanik, ibid, p. 98. 
7 This can be seen, for example, from the statement of the senior activist of this group Hilmi 
Aminuddin who stated that "this group is not referring to either Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama nor 
other Islamic groups". Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Da 'wah Gerakan Islam, (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Tarbiatuna, 2003), pp.153-154. 
8 Hilmi Amunidin, who is also popularly known as Ustadz Hilmi, an alumnus of Madinah University, 
is a figure of dakwah who actively spread the teachings of IM at the beginning of 1980s by 
approaching universities students and intellectual groups in some areas in Jakarta. Muhammad Adlin 
Sila, "Gerakan Salafi Sebagai Gerakan Islam Politik di Indonesia", Dialog, edition I, 2004, p.41. 
9 These Islamic scholars and activists were inspired by the dak1vah method and movement of IM; for 
example Buya Malik Ahmad, an ex-member of Masyumi who had directly interacted with IM. Ahmad 
provided some advice to Nur about the Tarbiyah method of IM. Meanwhile, groups of Tarbiyah in 
campuses sometimes received training from Buya Ahmad, Hilmi Aminuddin and Rahmat Abdullah, a 
dakwah activist who graduated from Asy-Syafiiyah, Jakarta, who before he died was honored as 
"Syaikh at Tarbiyah" by Sabili Magazine. Furkon, ibid, pp. 131-132. 
10 Abu Ridho or Abdi Sumaithi who then became an important figure in PKS is one of the dahvah 
activists who played an important role in the translation of IM' s books, which became the main 
guidance for Tarbiyah activists. Other figures involved in translation activity are Rahman Zainuddin 
(who now is Professor in the Political Science Department of FISIP UI) and Nabhan Hussein. 
Meanwhile the prominent figures whose books are translated and popularly known by Tarbiyah activist 
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although a number of the first generation of Tarbiyah activists had connections with 
other dakwah organizations, including Training for Dakwah Mujahid (LMD) 11 a type 
of central institution for dakwah campus activists, they in the end used the dakwah 
method of IM. Thus Tarbiyah was deeply influenced by the method of IM and its 
fundamentalist values from the beginning, differentiating it from LMD and its usroh 
groups \vhich were inspired more by Indonesian Islamic perspectives and influenced 
mostly by the ideals of Islamic modernism. 12 
The paradigm of IM for Tarbiyah, that will be explained latter, m short 
means firstly, regard Islam as a perfection and a commitment to cultural movement as 
\Vell as a political movement in order to develop Islamic civilization, and secondly, 
believing in gradual change from the individual toward a more comprehensive and 
complex change at the state level. The first belief asserts that politics is part of a 
Muslim's life and is a means of dakvvah for Tarbiyah activists. On the other hand, the 
second commitment inspired Tarbiyah to be gradualist both in terms of improving 
individual piousness and achieving its political aspirations. With this political 
consciousness, from the beginning Tarbiyah activists have seen their role as a 
conducting dakvvah by using politics as one of the main tools In other words, gradual 
change tmvard an Islamisation of political life, \vhich is a characteristic of moderate 
fundamentalism, is one of main values of this group. 
This paradigm is to some extent similar with the concept of the relations 
between dakwah and politics of M. Natsir, the ex-leader of Masyumi. However, in 
contrast to Natsir' s Islamic modernism, the final aim of this relationship is not just the 
are Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sayid Hawwa, Fathi Yakan, Musthafa Mansyur, Zainal Al-Ghazali 
and Yusuf Al-Qardhawi. Damanik, op.cit, p. 95-97. 
11 LMD is a training institute which aims to provide dahvah cadres from the intellectual community in 
order to spread new understandings about Islam to society from campuses. This institution which was 
established in Salman Mosque of ITB in 1974 under the leadership of Imadudin Abdurrahim, a cadre 
of DDII and Indonesian Hajj Pilgrimage (PHI). Over time, this training institute recruited Mosque 
activist students from many universities and generated Islamic study groups in some campuses. For 
more detail on the activities ofLMD, see Damanik, op.cit, pp. 68-87. 
12 By considering the existence ofimaduddin Abdurahim, the leading figure of LMD, who was one of 
"disciples" of Natsir and in 1968 was a also the coordinator of Indonesian Haji Travel (PHI), a kind of 
campus activist training group under DDII supervision, it was a logical implication if LMD was deeply 
influenced by Natsir's modernism. The indications of modernism influence can also be observed by the 
existence of the modernist figures, in the position of advisor such as Natsir, Rasyidi, Oesman Raliby or 
field coordinator such as A.mien Rais, and AM Saefuddin behind the dakwah campus movement 
during I 970s- l 980s where LMD was part of this program. In terms of LMD' s usroh, Damanik shows 
that such institution was basically different with the Muslim Brotherhood's usroh since the former one 
only imitated the general ideas of the complexity of the "genuine" usroh concept. In this regard, 
Furkon indicates that even though LMD successfully created enthusiastic dakwah activists, this 
organization was actually not quite success in providing a concrete dakwah development method. This 
weakness was filled by Tarbiyah group. 
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creation of a masyarakat madani (civil society) or a Pancasila-state based on the 
spirit of Islamic values, but also, in the view of Tarbiyah, must end with the 
establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. This point of view will be explained later on 
Chapter III. This IM paradigm was proven to be accepted by the dakwah activists. It 
could also unify dakwah activists from different background, from not only 
modernists but also traditionalists group. 13 This situation made Tarbiyah movement is 
kind of "melting pot organization" and more unlikely to be categorized within the 
dichotomy of traditionalists or modernists. 
From Campuses to Natio1tal Politics 
In the politically repressive conditions of the New Order, 14 Tarbiyah chose to develop 
its organization mainly inside campuses, specifically in the "secular campus" 
mosques. 15 In the atmosphere of the l 980s-l 990s, this choice was both strategic and 
ideological. The campus mosques were a strategic choice, because the New Order 
gave flexibility to the mosques on campus in conducting their activities, based on the 
assumption that such institutions had little ability to harm the regime. 16 On the other 
hand, ideologically, for Tarbiyah, the campus mosque \Vas an ideal medium to 
disseminate their paradigm, which emphasizes the spirit of Islam as perfection and 
solution, to young idealistic Muslim intellectuals searching for a life based on 
"genuine Islam". Tarbiyah through its existence in campus mosque aimed to provide a 
foundation for cultivating activists' understanding and enthusiasm of Islam, before 
conducting their Islamic missions for the society and the state in the future. 
The repressive political conditions coincided with the dakwah stage of 
Tarbiyah, wfach at that time was still mainly focused on the internal development of 
campus study groups (halaqoh). Therefore, the choice to remain outside Indonesian 
13 This situation can be seen from, for example, the "Islamic organization background" of the PKS' 
founders. Rahmat Abdullah as well as Nurmahmudi Isma'il had NU background. On the other hand 
Hidayat Nur Wahid and Anis Matta were brought up by Muhammadiyah tradition. 
14 This happened not only basically because the New Order saw that Islamic community would 
potentially become an disturbing factor for the process but also the regime was still suspicious of 
Islamic communities, and considered them as a threat (right extremists). On this unconducive situation 
see Allan Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia", (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 
1972), pp. 297-299 in, Din Syamsuddin, Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Logos Wacana 
Ilmu, 2001 ), p.63. Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gema 
Insani Press, 1996), p.240-262. 
15 Such as in Salman in Institute of Bandung Technology (ITB), Arief Rahman Hakim in University of 
Indonesia (1JI), Al-Ghifari in Institute of Bogor Agriculture (IPB), and Salahuddin in Gajah Mada 
University (UGM) and A.fanarul Ilmi in Institute of Sepuluh November Technolgy (ITS) . 
16 Damanik, op.cit, p.42. 
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politics during the 1980s up to 1998 was not only caused by the repressive political 
conditions, but was also a consequence of the dakwah stage. During the 1990s, 
consistent with the concept of gradual expansion, Tarbiyah (together with its 
exponents based outside campus) extended their activities beyond campuses to the 
wider community. In this context, dalnvah entered a new phase, moving from the 
level of individuals and family (milnvar tanzimi) towards a higher stage, which is 
dakwah in the society (mihwar sya'bi). Tarbiyah activists founded social and 
educational institutions and publishing houses which some of them \vould became the 
main political socialization tools for their party. 17 
Over time, Tarbiyah's political consciousness encouraged it to engage with 
national politics. Before 1998, some dakwah activists in Student Senates had led some 
demonstrations against controversial government policies. 18 Hmvever, its first direct 
political experience as a solid group in the national political arena was in 1998 
through the student organization Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union 
(KAMMI). This organization was set up by Tarbiyah cadres from many campuses as 
a response to the uncertain situation in the last months of the New Order. 19 Along 
with other Reformasi elements, KAMMI was eventually successful in bringing dO\vn 
the regime. 
It can be inferred from KAMMI's platform and six guiding principles,20 
which place Islam as the movement's ideology and emphasize the spirit of "Islam as a 
solution", that the spirit of fundamentalism was the foundation for KAMMI's critical 
attitude toward the com1pt and authoritarian regime. Therefore, Islamic 
17 Some activists, particularly those of the first generation, then founded institutions such as magazines 
(Sabili, Saksi, Ummi and Anida), publishers (Gema Insani Press, Era Intermedia, Robbani Press, Al-
Kautsar, Tarbzvatuna and Asyamil), study groups, (Nun;l Filwi and Studi dan Irrformasi Dunia Islam 
Kontemporer), Islamic foundations for Islamic studies and boarding schools (Yayasan Haramain and 
Al-Hikmah). 
18 In 1996 Selamat Nurdin, Tarbiyah activist who in that time was the Chair of Student Senate of UI 
(1996-1997), led a demonstration in front of the Supreme Court (MA) to support Adi Andojo's 
initiative to eradicate collusion in the JVIA and protest the proposal of the Supreme Court Judge 
Soerjono to suspend Adi Andojo as a judge. Students believed that the proposal was a part of attempts 
to protect collusion inside the MA. Suara Pembaruan, 20 July 1996 and Kompas, 20 Juli 1996. 
19 The main aim of this movement was basically to struggle for the interests of the people, which in 
essence meant to replace Soeharto and bring about reform. On KAMMI and its activities, see Andi 
Rakhrnat and Mukhamad Najib, Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus, (Jakarta: Purimedia). See 
also Sidiq, op.cit, pp. 118-169. 
20 The six principles are: (1) The victory of Islam is the fighting spirit of KAMMI, (2) Iniquity is an 
eternal enemy for KAMMI, (3) Islamic solution is an offer of KA.l'vfMI, ( 4), Progress is KA.l'vfMI'S 
tradition of struggle, (5) leadership of Muslims is a strategy of struggle of KAMMI, (6) Brotherhood is 
a social characteristic. ofKA.MMI. On the explanation of this principles, see Sidiq, ibid, , pp. 212-218. 
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fundamentalism cannot be ignored as the element of the Islamic society which 
supported21 the Indonesian democratization process. 
The collapse of Soeharto's regime in 1998, which was followed by political 
liberalization,22 paved the way for Tarbiyah to full enter the political arena. Based on 
its political consciousness and interests, Tarbiyah not only used this ne\v opportunity 
to influence the policy making process, but also created a party to formally promote 
its paradigm in the Indonesian political system. This choice not only reflected 
Tarbiyah's a strong comn1itment to being involved in politics, but also, as a moderate 
fundamentalist group, showed a willingness to acknowledge and enter the current 
"non-syari 'ah-based political system". 
After going through internal debates23 that were mainly about the 
appropriate time for the group to enter the political arena, 24 Tarbiyah managed to set 
up a party. On 9 August 1998, Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, PK) was formally 
established in Jakarta, \vitnessed by thousands of people, most of whom were 
Tarbiyah activists. 25 PK regarded itself as the Dakwah Party, as it was using the 
political party as a tool for dahvah. As a dahvah party, PK was considered by its 
21 lfolin believes that Islamic groups-particularly the modernists, neo-modernists and tranformists-
are supportive elements of Indonesian democratization. In his opinion, however, lfolin does not 
recognize other elements within Islamic groups, including the fLmdamentalists, as a potential group to 
support this process. Se Andres Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave of Democratization": The 
Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World, (London: Curzon Press, 1997). 
22 On the meaning of liberalization process and its effects, see Guillenno O'Donnel, Philippe C. 
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for 
Democracy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
23 A number of Tarbiyah activists regarded this situation as a chance to expand their struggle to 
establish Islamic ideals through formal politics. These Tarbiyah activists considered this new political 
situation as an entry point to the new phase of dakwah. They believed that after years of successfully 
surviving as an m1derground movement, it was now the time for this group to come to the surface and 
spread dakwah more openly to all Muslims. However, not all elements of Tarbiyah viewed this 
situation in the same way. For the group that did not agree with this, Tarbiyah activists should be 
consistent with the previous program which stated that the next level would begin in the year 2010. 
This group also believed that internally Tarbiyah was not ready "to struggle" at the level of real 
politics, particularly due to a lack of human resources, political networking and financial capacity. This 
situation inevitably triggered internal arguments. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Anis Matta, Ihsan Tanjlllg were 
actually part of those who disagree. On the other hand Rahmat Abdullah was an advisor for the party 
establishment. Interview \;vith Akmal Burhanuddin, 20 November 2005; interview with Kamarudin, 20 
November 2005. 
24 This polemic was solved by internal polling which conducted to observe the eagerness of Tarbiyah 
activists to enter a new phase of dak:wah and, as a consequence, to have their ow11 party. There were 
5,800 activists who participated in this polling 'Nith 68% of them agreeing to establish a party. 
Damanik, op.cit, p.229. 
25 Some observers noted that the declaration of PKS in Al-Azhar Mosque was attended by thousands 
people, Republika reported around 50.000, Republika, 10 August 1998. This occasion, at that time, 
impressed many people, because of the appearance and nttitude of the participants of this declaration, 
who performed good manner, wore mainly white dress for man and long white veil for all woman 
participants and even brought their children. 
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members to be more than just a political machine related to political articulation and 
the policy-making process, but also as a moral institution. In this normative spirit, 
according to one of its founders, Mutamrnimul Ula, PK would use the parliament as 
"mimbar dakwah" (a podium for preaching).26 Over time, PK (and later PKS) has 
tried to maintain this moral basis for the party, although some party elements have 
tried to move the party tmvards more pragmatic policies in order to maintain its 
position inside the government. 
After 5 years of existence in Indonesian politics, in 2003 PK formally 
declared itself to be part of PKS. As the party which is principally a continuation of 
PK,27 PKS is expected to continue PK's political objectives. The 2004 election 
brought about a new political position for PKS. PKS gained 45 seats for its cadres in 
Parliament, and also placed Hidayat Nur Wahid, the President of the party, as the 
Chairperson of MPR for the 2004-2009 period and gained three ministerial posts in 
the Yudhoyono Cabinet. 28 PKS candidates also \Von local government level elections, 
in some regions. Considering the historical fact where only the "Islamic mainstream 
parties" that can exist and have political role, PKS's achievement has a special 
significance for the existence of fundamentalist party in Indonesia. This situation also 
challenges the stigma about the limited role and political capability of fundamentalist 
groups both in national and local political life. 
PKS as a"Cadre" Party 
The existence of PKS in Indonesian politics has attracted the attention of many 
peoples. One of the focuses of attention has been PKS 's the spirit of struggle and the 
discipline of its cadres, evident both before and after the general election. These 
special characteristics of PKS are related to its cadrerisation process and the role that 
ideology plays in its internal workings. 
Different to most other political parties in Indonesia, which tend to be, in 
Duverger's terms, "mass parties",29 PKS is an open or inclusive party that sets strict 
26 Sapto Waluyo, Kebang/dtan Politik Dakwah. Konsep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
di A1asa Transisi, (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2005), p.31. 
27 "Sejarah PK Sejahtera", www.pk-sejahtera.org. See also "Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dideklarasikan 
bersama Partai Keadilan", Kompas, 21 April 2003. 
28 PKS's cadres who hold these position are Anton Apriantono for the position of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, M. Yusuf Ansyari as the Ministry of Housing and Adyaksa Dault as the State Ministry of 
Youth and Sport. 
29 Maurice Duverger, "Caucus and Branch, Cadre Parties and Mass Parties", in Peter Mair, (ed.), The 
FVest European Party System, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 37-45. 
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standards for cadrerisation of its members. Although according to PKS's official 
document is open to any Indonesian citizen, the party requires aspiring cadres to pass 
set training courses. Cadres must have passed through the training and shown their 
commitment by participating in party activities. 30 
For internal purposes, this cadrerisation process is aimed at creating 
individuals who have high commitment to developing Islamic values and who are 
ready to undertake dakwah missions. PKS believes that individuals are the basis for 
the dissemination of its mission. Therefore, PKS conducts selective and tiered 
cadrerisation t0 maintain the quality of individuals. For external purposes, this effort 
is related to PKS 's eagerness to put forward its best cadres to hold public positions. In 
this respect, PKS emphasizes moral quality - besides political capability and cadres' 
acceptability to the electorate - as one of the main requirements of cadre selection for 
public office. In that way, PKS cadres are expected to not only provide quality input 
in policy making, but also to have a high level of moral commitment. 
PKS has established itself as an ideological party, whereby goals and 
political activities are formulated based on doctrine, in this case, that of Islam. 
Although, at the practical level, pragmatic interests are inevitable, the role of Islam as 
the source of understanding and motivation, as \Yell as dakwah interests (which will 
be explained further in the next sections), are the main foundation of PKS' 
perspectives and political activities. 
The combination of PKS 's cadrerisation process and its ideological basis has 
tended to create an "ideological organizational hierarchy". Cadres' understanding of 
Islam as their way of life and the quality of their adherent to syari 'ah play important 
roles in determining their political career in the party. Cadres who occupy elite 
positions generally have a high level of Islamic comprehension and commitment to 
the implementation of the Islamic teachings. Therefore, PKS' elites, mainly in the 
Party Consultative Assembly (MPP), the top figures of the Central Committee Board 
(DPP) and Central Syari'ah Council (DPS), in general are the pre-eminent cadre in 
terms of their understanding and commitment to Islam. This shows that the party's 
spirit and its cadrerisation are inseparable. The implication is that those who are 
3° For comprehensive and detailed explanation of the cadrerisation of PKS, see Tim Departemen 
Kaderisasi DPP PK Sejahtera, A1annjemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, (Jakarta: DPP PK Sejahtera and 
PT S yaamil Cipta Media, 2004). 
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organizationally at the peak of the hierarchy of Tarbiyah' s activities can naturally be 
the party's elites. 
The participation of the main figures of Tarbiyah, such as Hilrni Aminuddin, 
Rahmat Abdullah, Abdi Sumaithi (Abu Ridha), and Aus Hidayat to name a few, in the 
central board of the party, reveals a parallelism between the Tarbiyah movement and 
PKS. This phenomenon is different from NU and PKB or Muhammadiyah and PAN, 
\Vhereby the formal separation from the political party is obvious. At a glance we can 
see that PKS does not beliern in separating the social-cultural movement and political 
moYement. PKS under special considerations, however, does not limit the possibility 
of "politicians", \vho are considered to be vote getters and have proper political 
experience and experts in particular issues, to join the party. 31 On the other hand, not 
all Tarbiyah elites are, (or for some internal reasons "dictated to"), active in the 
party's organizational committee, considering their role in maintaining dakwah duty 
in the commm1ity. 32 
The party's elites are very highly regarded. The decisions made by elites 
become a kind offatwa (religious command) that must be implemented by all cadres. 
This is typical of fundamentalist parties, which demand obedience from their 
member. 33 The duty of cadres to obey the PKS leadership is exemplified in this 
exiract of a speech made to cadres by PKS President Tifatul Sembiring: 
"The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without loyalty, the 
enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the enjoyment of 
obedience will not exist without sacrifice, and the enjoyment of sacrifice 
will not exist without sincerity (keikhlasan)". 34 
However, even though the internal relations of the party tend to emphasize 
obedience to the command of the elite, the party still allows dialogues. These 
dialogues mainly occur at "technical level", such as in policy implementation and 
election processes for example, in the election of PKS' presidential candidates, and to 
some extent in selecting MPP members and legislative members. 
The central role of elites creates and the creation of the spirit of obedience 
helps ensure efficiency in implementing the party's political programs. Instructions to 
31 Interview with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 2005, 17 November 2005. However, after they agree to 
be member they have to join party's trainings. Interview with Akmal Burhanuddin in Jakarta, 20 
November 2005. 
32 These figures including Ihsan A_rlansyah Tanjung and Daud Rasyid Sitorus now concentrate more 
tarbiyah development outside party. 
33 See Mahendra, op.cit, p. 307. 
34 See in Nur Hasan Zaidi, "Resepsi PKS", Republika, 30 Juli 2005. 
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help people in a particular area can be rapidly responded by the party's cadres. The 
rules were also, for example, able to command on PKS MPs to reject any kind of 
bribery. The central role of the elite also maintains the spirit of cohesion and the 
prevention of internal conflict. This is shown by the ability of PKS to maintain party 
unity, and emerge as the party that does not experience significant internal conflicts. 
However, the central role of the party elites also has a negative 
"commanding" effect. This is related to the ability of the highest institutions of the 
party to enforce their will without check, even if such will is at odds with the majority 
of PKS's members. This is reflected, for instance, in the case of Bahan Bakar Minyak 
(petroleum, BBM), that will be elaborated in chapter IV, ·whereby the party's elites 
are considered to have performed a political maneuver opposed by the majority of 
cadres. Therefore, party oligarchy, as stated by Robert Michels,35 has the potential to 
develop in religious-based ideological parties such as PKS. 
This hierarchical system is a reality that must be faced by anyone who 
wishes to join PKS. As a consequence of this cadrerisation and hierarchical system, 
PKS, in general, is not suitable for a politician ;vho wants to quickly gain cadre status 
and advance swiftly through the ranks. There is an opinion to transform PKS into a 
mass party in order to gain more cadres. However, throughout the seven years of its 
existence, PKS has consistently tried to maintain the quality of its cadres rather than 
quantity. The party has chosen, instead, to expand pengajian (Al-Qur'an recital) and 
social activities empowered and sponsored by PKS members to introduce PKS to the 
society and create as many sympathizers as possible. 36 On this strategic basis, PKS 
social programs now and then will be very important for PKS. 
Although PKS has emerged as an ideological party that has a tight 
cadrerisation system, as a moderate fundamentalist group, this party is flexible 
enough to interact with the life outside the party. Even though PKS declares their 
party to be an Islamic party, the sense of ''secular themes" and their problem-solving 
agenda can be seen in their official documents and activities.37 From its mission 
statement that emphasizes the struggle for justice and welfare, it can be inferred that 
from its inception, PKS has tried to use common and contextual language in order to 
35 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, (New York: Freedom Press, 1962). 
36 Interview with Maulana in Jakarta; 1,vith Arkeno in JaJ;:arta 
37 As mentioned in PK's AD/ART, this party considers itself as a party with the characteristics of 
"moralist", "profossionalism", "patriotism", "moderateness", "democracy'', "reformism," and 
"independence". Se/,,ilas Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: DPP PK, 1998), pp. 27-39. 
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gain widespread acceptance. 38 In this regard, as will be discussed in the chapter IV, 
this attitude is related to the PKS dakwah and political strategy. PKS is of the opinion 
that dakvvah and efforts to gain sympathy can only be delivered through language and 
symbols that are understood by common people. This differentiates PKS from the 
radical fundamentalists who seem to have antipathy to modem political discourses, 
wfoch eventually alienates them from the rest of the society. However, for some 
people, PKS's attitude towards accommodating "secular ideals" in their political 
agenda is considered to be a "double standard strategy" aimed at fulfilling PKS's 
pragmatic interests and covering its real objectives. 
Dakwah Party: Moral Commitme11t and its Limitations 
As previously noted, the cadres of PKS have high level of political mrnreness. This 
does not cause this group to focus on po\ver accumulation only. PKS gives meaning 
to politics and political activities as being related to the improvement of the quality of 
life and morals of the society by seeing politics as a medium to develop dakvvah. On 
this ground, during its seven years of its existence in the national political arena, PKS 
has committed to trying to create moral government and social awareness. PKS' s 
cadres, have shown their concern with clean government and social and humanitarian 
problems, which will be explored later in chapter four. This party's eagerness to 
improve the quality of life and morale of the society is reflected by their social and 
moral commitment before and after the general election. This differentiates PKS from 
other political parties, including other Islamic parties, which tend to use social 
activities as "political commodities" and only intensively approach the people right 
before the general election. 
The party does, however, have its critics. Some observers argue that this 
party, with its extended political capacity after the 2004 election, has not in fact 
performed at its maximum capacity to struggle for the people's interests as has been 
promised. Amir Piliang, a political observer from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), for example, criticizes PKS' performance in DKI Jakarta 
Province, by arguing that despite PKS's majority in the legislative body, it has not 
38 The mission of this party is "to establish civil society in Indonesia, to encourage the existence of the 
Islamic community in Indonesia, to struggle to create justice and welfare for the people of Indonesia, to 
enhance professional attitudes in maintaining and managing the state's problems and to provide a 
positive contribution for the world's civilization". "Anggaran Dasar PK", www.keadilan.or.id. See also 
in "Jati Diri Partai Keadilan", in Sahar L Hassan, Kuat Sukardiyono and Dadi MH. Basri, eds, Memilih 
Partai L~lam, Visi, Misi dan Persepsi, (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 1998), p.58. 
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provided any significant change for the people. 39 Meanwhile Syamsuddin Haris, a 
researcher from Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), who has evaluated the 
inconsistent attitude of PKS members in relation to their commitment to care for poor 
people, regards PKS as being similar to other parties. 4° Furthermore the concept of the 
Dakwah Party still gives its cadres the opportunity to be flexible and even pragmatic. 
PKS's moderate response to the BBM case policy of the Yudhoyono Government '''as 
in stark contrast to the demonstration conducted by PKS during the previous 
government as a political response to the same policy. This has prompted people to 
assume that PKS is actually just politicizing dakwah for its own interests. 
From the critical points above, we can see that the attempts for moral 
improvements conducted by PKS have not always been successful. The shortage of 
experienced cadres in the political field, as a result of the acceleration to enter the 
political arena in 1998, is one of the variables that has caused this phenomenon. On 
the one hand, this shortage generates the presence of "untested" politicians who are to 
some extent naive and politically over confident. This causes resistance toward PKS's 
moral reform agendas, mainly from senior politicians in the Parliament and policy 
makers \vho are generally still dominated by New Order perspectives. As a result, 
PKS sometimes becomes a "public enemy" or at least an isolated group in struggling 
for its moral cause in the Parliament. This situation has occurred mainly at the local 
government level, such as in DKl Jakarta and Depok. 
On the other hand, this shortcoming of experienced cadres causes difficulty 
in implementing dabvah politics in the context of the Indonesian political situation, 
wfach is often dominated by the pragmatisms, mismanagement, and moral hazards. In 
this case, the concept of dakwah politics sometimes gives an opportunity for its cadres 
to be flexible and loosen their idealism. In this context, even though PKS is a cadre 
party, it cannot be entirely independent from the actions of some of its cadres who put 
forward their own political interests and deviate from party's policies, as happened 
during the local election in Depok. 41 This situation has also triggered tensions at the 
grass roots level, where some idealist groups have begun to be impatient with the PKS 
39 Amir J. Piliang, "Manusia dan Politik PKS", Media Indonesia, 27 July 2005. 
40 Syamsudin Haris, "Menagih Komitmen PKS", Kompas, 25 November 2005. 
41 Saleh Matapermana the PKS Member of Parliament in DPRD Depok supported the Major Candidate 
from Golkar Party, Badrul Kamal, during the 2005 Depok Local election. In that time actually PKS 
proposed Nurmahmudi Isma'il, the former President of PKS as Major Candidate from PKS. The Local 
Committee Board of PKS then dismissed Matapennana's party membership. 
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political actions which they regard as insensitive. Thus both situations prompt 
inefficiency and inconsistency for PKS in carrying out its ideals. 
The above study underlines several points. Firstly, PKS is a party established 
by Tarbiyah groups who believe in politics as a medium for dakwah and Islamic 
ideals. Secondly, PKS emphasizes the empowerment of cadrerisation that prioritizes 
moral quality and understanding of Islamic teachings by utilizing methods used by the 
Muslim Brotherhood, (wfoch will be discussed in the subsequent chapters). Hierarchy 
in PKS is so strong that it has implications for its cohesiveness and ability to effect its 
political ideals. All these characteristics different~ate PKS from other Islamic parties 
that have pragmatic reputations and do not pay much attention to cadre 
empowerment. These characteristics also indicate the Islamic fundamentalist nuance 
within PKS. However, this does not mean that PKS has emerged as a non-
compromise radical group. Albeit with some weaknesses have surfaced, (as w·ill be 
explored in Chapter IV), PKS has been an example of an ideological party which 
commits to Islamic missions, through democratic, inclusive, and anti-violent \Vays. 
2. The Influences of Hasan Al-Banna and IM on PKS 
PKS regards itself as a continuation of Tarbiyah as a congregation. 42 With this 
condition, it is noteworthy that the idealism, vision, and mission developed by this 
Tarbiyah group must also be developed by the party. The influence of IM on the 
Tarbiyah group in PKS shows the influence of moderate fundamentalist ideas and 
actions since the beginning of its existence. 43 This influence can be seen in at least 
three major areas: ideology, organization, and activity. 
In terms of ideology, PKS has adopted the basic concepts of IM about Islam 
as a comprehensive religion which manages all dimensions of human life including 
politics. 44 In fact, this party believes that Islam is actually state and politics, which has 
a main role to create a good order for humankind based on syari 'ah. This Islamic 
order is believed to be the best solution not only for Muslims but for human 
civilization.45 Meanwhile, the mission of Muslims related to this ideal is to prepare 
42 This view is based on the concept of al-hizab huwa al-jama 'ah wa al-jama 'ah hiya al-hizb (the party 
is congregation, the congregation is party), which is adopted from IM. 
43 Ahmad Moussalli regards Hasan Al-Banna and IM as example of moderate fundamentalism. 
44 Mahfadz Siddiq, Pemikiran dan Manha.f Politik Ikhwanul Muslimin, (Bekasi: Masdar Ilmu Agency, 
2003), pp.11-15. 
45 Through Al-Banna's point of view, the activists of Tarbiyah then consider that most Muslims in 
Indonesia basically do not have a proper understanding yet of the their own religion and Islamic 
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themselves - both as individuals and as part of a community - to carry out their duty 
as a tool of the implementation of Islamic ideals. Furkon comments that by adopting 
this thinking, PKS in essence has the potential to be "a twin ofIM in Indonesia". 46 For 
this objective, Tarbiyah and PKS implement the methods of cadre building of IM 
which in general cover the formation oflslamic personality (at the cultural level) and 
the formation of the characteristics of the movement's activist (at the structural 
level).47 
In the organizational context, the influence of IM can be observed from the 
caderisation process, which still uses the method of Tarbiyah groups as a framework. 
In this case, like Tarbiyah, PKS implements gradual formation of cadre which is not 
only in order to categorize the level of cadres but also to evaluate their understanding 
and commitment toward the ideology and party platform.48 This mechanism actually 
shows the characteristic of a cadre party which requires comprehensive understanding 
to the party vision and mission. Moreover, in terms of organization, this group 
implements the Tarbiyah model with all of its necessary forms including liqo (study 
group), daurah (intensive study), rihlah (physical activity), and mabit (night activity 
to improve spirituality).49 Meanwhile, in terms of the materials of organization, PKS 
principally uses the materials used in Tarbiyah groups as main reference during the 
formation of cadres, wfoch emphasize that Islam is a totalistic and comprehensive 
teaching, and that the obligation of every Muslim is to struggle for the establishment 
of syari 'ah. 50 
The influence of IM on political activities can be seen from the commitment 
of PKS to the model of gradual and constitutional political change. Furkon argues that 
this is related to their commitment as a "dakwah party",51 where dakwah itself 
requires a gradual reform. In real politics, this requirement, which \vill be elaborated 
movement should be capable of becoming involved in their life and give an Islamic solution for their 
problems. Thus, under the jargon "Back to Islam" and "Islam is the Solution", IM's ideals become the 
spirit and motivation of this movement. 
46 Furkon, op.cit, p.185. 
47 Mahfudz Siddik, "4 Tahun Kiprah Partai Keadilan: Sejarah, Pandangan dan Peran Politiknya dalam 
Membangun Indonesia di Era Reformasi", in supplement, Saksi, 25th edition/IV, I 7 September 2002. 
See also Damanik, op. cit, pp. 109- I 2 l. 
48 Darnanik, ibid, p. I I 7. Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadi lan Sejahtera ( 1998-2003), minor-
thesis for undergraduate, (Depok: Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political 
Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, 2004), pp. I43-I44. 
49 Hurriyah, ibid, pp. I87-188. 
50 The biggest proportion of the books used in this process are ·written by the prominent figures of IM 
or at least contain their ideals, see in Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah 
Anggota Pemula, (Jakarta: DPP PKS Departemen Kaderisasi and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2005). 
51 Furkon, op.cit, p. I86. 
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in the next chapter, eventually featured a spirit of moderate, anti-violent, prioritized 
adaptive approaches and support for the democratic government. Meanw-hile, the 
political attitude of IM in supporting democracy (as a resistance to an authoritarian 
regime), endorsing patriotic spirit (as a reflection of the spirit of anti-colonialism), and 
having a deep concern with the situation in the Islamic world (particularly related to 
the Palestinian people's struggle for independence) has also inspired the political 
agenda and characteristics of PKS. This can be seen in their official documents, which 
state their "moderate", "democratic", "patriotic" characteristics and are oriented to 
international matters, particularly in the Islamic \Vorld; and their activities both inside 
and outside the parliament, including involvement in a number of organizations and 
demonstrations for Muslim solidarity. Furthermore, the social activities of IM which 
show- sensitivity toward unfortunate people,52 has inspired PKS to carry out social 
work, which to some extent makes this party different from other Islamic political 
parties in Indonesia. Even though during its existence PKS has been able to develop 
certain thinking in Indonesian contexi, the influence of Al-Banna and Muslim 
Brotherhood is apparent. 
8. Thought World of PKS 
The thought world of PKS consists of a combination between a perspective that 
regards Islam as a perfect teaching and a gradual approach to dakwah. This section 
discusses PKS' doctrine which shows the fundamentalist aspects of this party under 
the banner of Islam as Perfection and some dakwah principles on which its moderate 
perception and attitudes are based. This basic thinking shmvs fundamental influences 
on the political thinking and actions of PKS. 
1. Islam as Perfection 
The basic thinking of PKS is about Islam as perfection (syumuliah). Based on this 
perception, PKS believes Islam is a comprehensive ideology which comprises all life 
dimensions and can be used as an alternative ideology and solution for human life. In 
this doctrine, PKS regards Islam as more than a teaching about everything related to 
the judgment day and the relations bet\veen God and His creations. Instead, to PKS, 
Islam is "a perfect life system, a comprehensive package-deal which will reconstruct 
52 See Moussalli, op.cit, p.83-84. 
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the entire aspects of life of the Muslim community wherever they are". s3 Such 
recognition can be clearly seen in the statutes of the party where it is written that 
Islam is a set of complete and total beliefs on which all human activities depend. s4 
According to Almuzammil Yusuf, PKS Member of Parliament who also one 
of PK founders, PKS understands syumuliah as a doctrine about Islam as the way of 
life and solution for civilization; as a religion of individual and society which is 
relevant to societal matters; and as a religion of the worldly and the eternal that is 
concerned "'~th profane and sacred matters.ss Moreover, based on this doctrine, PKS 
disregards any concept that separates worldly and religious life. This means PKS 
rejects secularism as the best way to create ideal condition for humankind. 56 By 
upholding this doctrine, PKS regards Islam as an integral teaching, which unifies the 
idealism of religion and practice, well as places Islam as a main reference and an 
ultimate goal for all activities, including political activity. 57 
In relation to the perfection of Islam, PKS has based itself on the belief in 
the comprehensive function of tauhid in life, both as private and social guidelines, 
and the perfection of syari 'ah within Al-Qur'an and Sunnah as its main reference. ss 
For PKS, tauhid is a lesson about a divine commitment of humans towards God. In 
relation to this, every Muslim is obliged to make God an indispensable condition and 
regard Him as the only source of values for their life. s9 With this understanding, PKS 
believes that every Muslim should acknowledge the existence of the one God and 
53 Balda, Ridho, Wahono, op.cit, p. vii. 
54 It is stated that "Islam is a universal system of living which entails all aspects of life. Islam is a state 
and homeland, government and community, moral and power, blessing and justice, culture and 
constitutions, science and judiciary, material and natural resources, efforts and prosperity, jihad and 
dakwah (religious proselytizing), soldiers and thoughts, beliefs and acts of devotion. Muslims have an 
obligation to comprehensively implement such cores of Islamic teachings and its universality. Islam is 
a system of life that covers religion, politics state, and society". See Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai 
Keadilan, Jati Diri Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 2002). Such point of view is 
essentially is a repetition from the perspective of Hasan Al-Banna about Islam in politics which states 
that "Islam in comprehensive meaning covers \Vorship, faith, state, nation, ethics, moral, materials, 
tolerance, assertions, cultures and constitutions. You have believed in the truth of Islam as a religion 
and state, government and society, mushaf (the handwritten notes that constitute the Al-Qur'an) and 
arms and as a witness of God for all nations in the earth". See this statement in Hasan Al-Banna, 
Risalah Pergerakan Ikhwanul Muslimun, Ji.lid 2, (Solo: Eramedia, 2001), p. 67. See also similar 
statement in Siddiq, Pemikiran dan Manhaf .op.cit, p.12. 
55 Hurriyah, op.cit, p. 110. 
56 Abu Ridha, op.cit, p.45. 
57 Balda, Ridho, Wahono, op.cit, p. viii. 
58 On the relation between Syari'ah and Al-Qur'an and Hadith, see Muslih Abdul Karim, "Penerapan 
Syariat Islam pada masa Rasulullah SAW', in Bukhori Yusuf and Iman Santoso, eds., Penerapan 
Syariat Islam di Indonesia antara Peluang dan Tantangan, (Jakarta: Globalmedia Cipta Publishing and 
Pusat Konsultasi Syariah, 2004), pp. 24-25. 
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"Manifesto Politik PK", in http:/hvww.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hall/5557/manifesto.html. 
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refuse every belief which is contradictory to it. Moreover, by regarding ~ 
source of all values, the concept of tauhid becomes a centre for the thi~  
activities of Muslims, which according to PKS actually also has relevanc~ ~ ~ 
~ 
life.60 Thus, PKS believes that the commitment of humans to God is not o~=- ~~ ~ 
to the vertical relations of worship but also covers horizontal relation~ ~---
humankind and all creations. The member of Party Consultation Assembl_ ~-~ ~ ~~~ 
Abu Ridha states that the system. which is based on tauhid consists of cone""~·~ ~~'t. 
are relevant to create a social ideal, that 1s, comprehensive pros):::).~ ~ ~ -..l 
humankind.61 Meamvhile in terms of the Al-Qur'an and Hadith, both are r~~ ,.._:.- ~~"--~ 
comprehensive teachings,62 which according to member of PKS MPP Sa.J. :i._ ~~ . 
Al-Jufri: ~ ~ ~~ 
"Which consist of not only ''peta (the map) of the world" which sec~~ ~~ ... 
humans from the cmrning tricks of worldly life, but also "the map ~ ~ 
eternity" which saves humans from torture in the hereafter". 63 ~ 
Moreover, PKS believes that the legacy of the life of the, 
l:::a. 
Muhammad in the Medina era, including the political and legal legacy, is ~ ._...~.b4 
guidance for Muslims that can be used as a main reference in develof:>i b~~ ~l:' ~ ~ -----~ 
political thinking and actions, as well proving the perfection of Islam at th~ .....,. ~ t:~ ~l-
~ l:-q_ ~-l:-t-
level. 64 In addition, according to Ridha the distancing of Muslims from th~ h-... ~t:j ~ 
~ ... .._~~ ql_ 
of the Prophet is one of the determinant factors for the regression of their lif~ t: ~q_ 
~q ~~ q_.:s,,,._~s 
Islam as all Altemative and Solutiou 
The notion of perfection is a basis for PKS believing Islam is a comprehensi v-~ 
life that can be developed as an alternative ideology for the develoD:tQ_:fl.J.,. C}:f' 
civilization.66 According to the General Secretary of PKS Anis Matta,, l l:l.t C}:f' 
~Iq_ 
civilization is a part of the dakwah mission which in essence is: ll:ti<:: 
" ... to reconstruct the thinking and personality of Muslims, to be able te> 
think, feel and act in line with the wishes of God and based on Islalllic 
references. Then to bring this new Muslim, with their new a\vareness, ill. 
60 "Jati Diri Partai Keadilan", op.cit, p.34. 
61 Abu Ridha, Saat Dakwah A1emasuki Wilayah Politik, (Bandung: Syaamil, 2003), p.26. 
62 Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Menerapkan Syariat Islam dalam Bidang Sosial Budaya dan Pendicli , 
YusufandSantoso,op.cit,p.142. 'la:t:l." . 
63 Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, "Pengantar", ibid, p.15. ' lti. 
64 Karim, op.cit, pp. 23-36. 
65 Another factor is the West's invasion, Ridha, op.cit, p.7. 
66 
"Manifesto Politik PK", in http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hall/5557 /manifesto b.t 
. llll 
to reality in order to make transformation towards in every aspects of life 
- including culture, social system, laws and institutions - to be based on 
the desires of God". 67 
Ridha believes that the establishment of this civilization will replace old and 
untruthful man-made ideologies and their civilization, since the ideology of 
secularism and materialism, w-hich has led the life of the people to annihilation and 
created godless leaders, is actually in a critical situation today. 68 Furthermore to create 
this civilization, according to Matta, Muslims must implement gradual steps, from 
developing a tenacious group, creating supportive elements in society, up to creating 
Islamic groups at the policy making level.69 PKS believes that returning society to the 
guidance of God needs a transformation process at all levels of life, by consistently 
spreading Islamic values either at the individual level or at the social and state 
level". 70 Therefore Islamic civilization is actually an alternative civilization where 
Islamic laws become the basis of life and the constitution as well. 
Another implication of the belief Islam as perfection is the notion that Islam 
is the solution for humanity. In this regard, PKS believes that "a nation will be freed 
from any horrifying disasters, when the nation purifies its faith only to God and to 
believe consistently in all of God's rules". 71 
The significance Islam as the solution, therefore, is based on the belief that 
Islam can deal \vith problems which are caused by the secular and materialistic way of 
life, which has brought humans, particularly Muslims, to unhealthy competition, 
causing injustice, greed, and indifference \vhich end in moral degradation and a 
damaged system. 72 The spirit of Islam as a solution is also related to the belief that 
Islam improves all dimensions of life, from matters of state ideology, politics, law, 
economics, even through to the banking sector.73 This belief provides the rationale for 
PKS to conduct social mvareness actions in order to solve people's practical 
problems. 
67 Anis Matta, Afenikmati Demoftyasi Strategi Dakwah Aferaih Kemenangan, (Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 
2002), p. 8. 
68 Ibid, pp. 19-22. 
69 Ridha, op. cit, p. 9-11. 
70 
"Kebijakan Dasar PK", in www.keadilan.or.id. See also in Buku Anggaran Dasar Partai Keadilan, 
(Depok: Dewm1 Pimpinan Daerah Partai Keadilan Kota Depok), p.35. 
71 Ibid, p.35. 
72 Ridha, op.cit, p.6-7. 
73 Jufri, "Pengantar", op.cit, pp.18-22. 
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Islam as Political Ideology 
In believing in the comprehensive role of Islam, PKS considers that Islam offers 
political guidance for its adherents. 74 According to PKS, Islam recommends guidance 
that must be projected as an ideology of struggle for establishing an ideal society. 75 In 
this capacity PKS not only regards Islam as a medium to understand real politics, but 
also as a basis for political movement and activity. Based on these reasons, the vision 
and mission of Islamic politics, according to PKS, are to create an Islamic order 
which guarantees the implementation of Islamic values throughout society. 
Specifically the vision of an Islamic party for PKS is "to revive divine Islamic values 
and cope with the hegemony of materialism". 76 Meanwhile the mission of the Islamic 
political party is to free Muslims from the occupation of foreign powers, establish an 
Islamic state based on Islamic law and eventually to establish a caliphate. 77 In this 
regard, the political vision and mission of PKS requires a government based on 
authentic Islamic teachings, as a medium to establish syari 'ah. As a consequence, for 
PKS the relation between Islam and politics is inextricable, whereby the establishment 
of an Islamic order based on Islamic law becomes a main part of it. 78 According to the 
Chair of PKS Faction in DPR Mahfudz Siddiq the true understanding of Islam will 
bring Muslims to the conclusion that "Islam is the politics of God on earth". 79 
Moreover, the relation between Islam and politics is also related to the 
attempt to spread Islamic values to the whole world. According to PKS, politics is a 
coherent outcome from the implementation of God's teachings through syari 'ah so 
that every Muslim can play their role as the proxy of God to conduct the enjoining of 
good and forbidding of evil. 80 Accordingly, this belief should be a source of 
inspiration for every Muslim to actualize the universality of Islam in the field of 
74 "Jati Diri Partai Keadilan", op.cit, p.34. 
75 "See "Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan", Buku Anggaran Dasar ... op.cit, p.45. 
76 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, op.cit, p.53. 
77 Ibid, p.54. 
78 Wahid indicates that the relation between Islam and politics is inherent. See Hidayat Nur Wahid, 
"Menerapkan Syariat Islam di Bidang Sosial, Budaya dan Pendidikan", in Yusuf and Santoso, op.cit, p. 
148. 
79 Mahfudz Siddiq, Membangun (Kembali) Politik !slam, (Depok: November 2002), presented in 
Kuliah b1formal Sosial Politik Islam (Social Politics Informal Course of Islam), which was hold by the 
Forum Studi LYlam (Fomm of Islamic Studies), Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of 
Indonesia, in Depok November 2002. Meanwhile Hilmi Aminuddin stated that "Islam is the policy of 
God on earth'', in "Peran Muslimah dalam Pemenangan Pemilu", in Sri Utami and Nursanita Nasution, 
eds., Muslimah Menuju Era Siyasah, (Jakarta: DPP PKS Bidang Kewanitaan, 2003 ), p. 108. 
80 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, op.cit, p.3. 
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politics. 81 Nevertheless, in this context, it is understood that the political field is the 
arena for the conflict of interest behveen Islamic dakwah and other political interests. 
Thus politics is needed as media of struggle for Muslims in providing motivation, 
protection, security and the facility to establish Islamic ideals. 82 In these 
circumstances, PKS believes that Islamic communities have to have an adequate 
understanding of politics and eagerly join politics to fight for their interests as the 
manifestation of this interest. 83 This awareness is an indicator of a good Muslim. 84 
A H oiistic Approaclt to Islamisation 
PKS' understanding about Islam also motivates this party to have commitment in 
developing Islam as the way of life at every level of life. PKS believes that the 
Islamization process is an authentic obligation for every Muslim. 85 According to PKS, 
the application of Islam in human life demands a holistic approach which covers 
matters from the creation of individual piety, a good family and society up to the 
establishment of the state based on syari 'ah (Picture 1). This is in line with the 
essence of Islam which demands a total submission to divine values and integration 
between private and social life. PKS believes that reform at the state level is the 
continuity of the creation of piousness at the individual level. Thus, the significance 
of individual development relates to an individual's responsibility to develop their 
country. 86 
Based on this view, it can be understood then if PKS emphasizes the quality 
of the individual as a main stepping stone or in other words as a central tool for social 
and cultural transformation. 87 In this regard, PKS has adopted a number of phases in 
reforming civilization and implementing Islamic teachings, where the individual 
development period is a starting point for the family and societal developments, 
81 "Jati Diri Partai Keadilan", op.cit, p. 35. 
82 Zainal Abidin, "Menjadi Politisi Dakwah", in Sitaresmi S. Soekanto and Navis M, Tarbiyah 
Menjawab Tantangan, Refleksi 20 Tahun Pembaharuan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Robbani Pres, 
2002), p. 72. 
83 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, op.cit, p. 9. 
84 It is said that "to become a politician is an indicator for the perfection of a Muslim", ibid, p.6. 
85 "Manifesto Politik PK", in 1t1nv.keadilan.or.id See also such statement in 
http://wvvw.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hall/5557/manifesto.html. 
86 According to PKS "considering that the state development needs good quality of the people, 
individual development becomes a certainty. This is because every individual, as a tool of the society 
and the state, has a responsibility to carry out social and political duties for achieving common 
interests, enhancing human civilization, and establishing the trnth, freedom, justice and deliberation". 
See "Manifesto Politik PK'', in www.keadilan.or.id. See also such statement ·in 
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Hall/5557/manifesto.html. 
87 Ridha, op.cit, p.v. 
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which eventually become a basis for state reform through the existence of an Islamic 
state. 88 The popular slogans among Tarbiyah activists like "qum daulah fi 
shudurikum, wa qum fil ardhikum" ("uphold the state in your heart, then it will be 
upheld on your earth") or "ashlih nafsaka wad 'u ghairoka" ("conduct devotion on 
yourself, before persuading other people")89 describe the significance of reform at the 
individual level before the state. 
Picture 1 
The Islamization Stages according to PKS 
Individual 
Family 
Society 
State 
Source: Nandang Burhanudin, Penegakan Syariat 
Islam Afenurut PK, (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 2003), p.110 
The creation of the state, however, does not stop the Islamisation process90 . 
This is because the main function of the state is to maintain the devoutness of the 
entire people. PKS believes that an ideal Islamic order should set up a political 
structure \vhich is not only capable of managing public matters properly, but also 
capable of enforcing devotion at the individual level comprehensively. 91 As a 
consequence, the essence of the holistic approach can be seen as an attempt to carry 
out Islamisation which is related to the effort to build an Islamic civilization in order 
to ensure Islamic values are used as guidance and to return Islamic identity to all 
88 For a explanation of this phase, see Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dalc.vah Gerakan Islam, (Jakarta, 
Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), pp. 143-144. 
89 According to Burhanudin tl-iis slogm1 is derived from Syaikh Hasan Al-Hudaibi, the second mursyid 
(leader) ofll\1, op.cit, p.107. See also Aminuddin, ibid, 143. 
90 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Hantoni Hasan in Bandar 
Lampung, 22 November 2005; with Amri Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005; with Prihandoko in 
Depok, 6 December 2005; with Akmal Burhanudin in Jakarta, 20 November 2005. 
91 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, op.cit, p.19. 
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Muslims. 92 In this context, as part of dakwah, PKS has an interest in taking a role in 
educating and helping Muslims at every level of life. 
2. Dakwali: The Basis for a Moderate Attitude 
Besides the thinking on Islam above, PKS has developed thinking which in practice 
supports this party to develop a moderate approach in their attitude and actions. This 
shovvs that PKS's moderate attitude is not merely developed in order to respond to the 
political situation being faced, which is acknowledged by Tarbiyah activists to be a 
matter that needs flexibility, 93 but also because PKS has "a space" in the contexl: of 
their tl:1inking that can justify their moderation. 
Tlie Prillciple of Dakwah 
The main basis for developing moderate attitudes is the essence of dakwah. To PKS, 
dakwah demands a method which is in line with the spirit of the epoch. According to 
Ridha, good dah·vah should be in proportion to the demands and problems faced by 
modem society which also mean it must have a wide-ranging understanding about 
real contemporary challenges. 94 In other vvords, the implementation of dakwah has to 
follow the real situation of the people, be concerned with the context of the society, 
and avoid an exclusive approach. 95 Related to this attitude Aminuddin says that "the 
good dakwah is the dakwah that uses understandable language by the object of 
dakwah ". 96 Regarding the importance of contextualization and the avoidance of 
exclusiveness, dakvrah in essence should be flexible (al-murunah al-waqi 'iyah) and 
tolerant (al-suhulatul mutasamihah).97 
Moreover, the essence of dakwah also teaches a gradual process. This is 
related to the belief that the ideals of Islamic dakwah have a long journey and should 
be passed step by step,98 not only as a consequence of the complexity of the agenda 
that should be solved but also in line with the resolution of God which essentially 
92 Ridha, op.cit, p.17. 
93 Abidin, op.cit, p.77. 
94 Ridha, op.cit, p.5. 
95 Aminuddin,Strategi Dakwah ... op.cit, pp.37-38. 
96 Ibid, p. 62. 
97 Ibid, pp. 90-92. 
98"Jati Diri Partai Keadilan", op.cit, p.35. Wahid and Zulkieflimanysah realized that "PKS's aspirations 
is a journey of thousands miles, which begins with a single steps through establisihng political party 
(PKS)", see in Hidayat Nur Wahid and Zulkifliemansyah, "The Justice Party and Democracy: A 
Journey of a Thousands Miles Starst with a Single Step", in "Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in 
Indonesian Islamic Politics", Asia Program Special Report, No.110, April 2003. 
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operates on the principle of the gradual and the proportional. In relation to these 
principles PKS believes that: 
"Every attempt that tries to separate political achievements from this 
principle will face destruction and so can even be categorized as a crime 
against humanity and the universe. Therefore the principles of the 
gradual and the proportional have to be part of every act of the party in 
any sense". 99 
This principle has become the basis for PKS to implement its objectives 
moderately by implementing a step-by-step method and rejecting a revolutionary 
approach, or, ultimately, radical ways. 
Furthermore, related to the principle of a gradual approach, PKS believes 
that good dakwah should be in line \Vith recent developments in society. In this regard 
the party should have "consciousness about momentum" that is happening in 
society 100 which means it must be willing to observe current conditions in society 
holistically in order to develop a proper approach for society. For example, in the 
authoritarian context, dakwah should be more careful and implement "the under 
ground model" of the Prophet's dahvah in the Mecca period, while in a context of 
openness dakwah should take this as an opportunity to openly spread Islamic values 
by creating social institutions that can enhance dakwah activities. 101 Thus the 
consciousness about momentum in the end becomes a basis for the consciousness for 
adjusting bet\:veen real conditions in society and the model of dakwah. Accordingly, 
in the current Indonesian situation where constitutional democracy has become a 
popular rule of the game for most Indonesian people, including the Islamic 
community, PKS cannot avoid this circumstance. According to Matta: 
"The transformation of Tarbiyah from dakwah movement to a political 
movement through PKS has an aim to respond the interest of Islamic 
community legally and constitutionally". 102 
The essence of dakwah becomes the basis for performing peaceful and 
gradual change and rejecting unconstitutional ways in struggling for the interests of 
Islam Additionally, based on this dakwah principle, PKS has the foundation to 
develop a flexible political model, without having to sacrifice its ideals. 
99 See the explanation on al-tadarruf wal al-tawazun (gradual, balance and proportional) as one of the 
characteristics of PKS, in "Kebijakan Dasar PK", in Bulw Anggaran Dasar Partai ... op.cit, pp.41-42. 
100 
".Tati Diri Partai Keadilan", op.cit, p.35-36. 
101 Ibid, p.36. 
102 Matta, op.cit, p. 20. 
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Tlie Tsawabit wa Mutghayyirat Doctrines 
Related to the principles of dakwah, another basis for PKS's moderate attitude is the 
tsawabit wal mutghayyirat doctrine which teaches two aspects in Islamic teachings, 
namely tsawabit (the fundamental aspect) and mutaghayyirat (the dynamic aspect). 
Tsawabit matters are related to things like beliefs, worship and ethics, and all matters 
that have been arranged in detail and clearly in the Al-Qur'an and Hadith. In general, 
this aspect is related to Islamic Law which is regarded as absolute and everlasting. 
Meanwhile, in the context of mutaghaxvtrat, this doctrine is related to matters that are 
not clearly stated in the Syari 'ah, known also as furu ' (branch) matters, including the 
problems of conveying Islamic teachings and the strategy of dakwah. 103 PKS believes 
that in the doctrine of mutaghayyirat, Islam essentially gives its adherents the 
opportunity to develop a contextual and dynamic approach to conducting religion, so 
that the implementation of Islam is not obstructed by technical matters. Moreover, 
regarding the second doctrine, to PKS, Islam essentially encourages Muslim to 
implement ijtihad for some technical and dynamic matters. 104 
In terms of politics, by implementing the doctrine PKS on the one hand 
acknowledges fundamental matters or the ideology of Islamic politics which is 
summed up in their political mission. On the other hand, PKS recognizes that outside 
of ideological matters or at the dynamic level, Muslims are allowed to adopt political 
techniques from elsewhere, so long as this mechanism is not clearly stated textually in 
the Al-Qur'an and Hadith, is not in conflict with Islamic law and can possibly provide 
benefit for the community105. Thus PKS believes that "there are matters in politics 
that should be adjusted to contemporary time and places in order to provide 
improvement for humankind". 106 Accordingly, the belief about the existence of a 
dynamic aspect in Islam actually enables PKS to conduct contextual and moderate 
interpretations of some Islamic teachings and to accept technical thinking, including 
the acceptance of democracy as a political mechanism for the nation and political 
cooperation with other groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim 
103 Shalah Shawi, Prinsip-Prinsip Gerakan Dakwah Yang Mutlak dan Relatif, (Solo: Era Intermedia), 
pp. 43-45. 
104 Mahfudz Siddiq, "Tsawabit dalam Manhaj Gerakan Ikhwan", in ibid, pp. 192-193. 
105 Hurriyah, op.cit, pp. 123-124. 
106 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, op.cit, p.75. 
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The explanation above shows that the basic doctrines of PKS are in line with 
moderate fundamentalist characteristics. These doctrines are the basis for PKS in 
developing its political thinking and actions in Indonesia. The follo\\ing chapter 
focuses on the political thinking of PKS which shows not only the influence of this 
basic doctrine but also mainly the characteristics of moderate fundamentalism. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IDEOLOGY OF PKS: A GRADUAL ISLAMIZATION 
This chapter explores several political themes namely: the relations between Islam and 
the state; the status of syari'ah in the legal system; the concept of nation-state and 
Pancasila as the national ideology; and the problems related to ideals about the caliphate 
and democracy. This will situate the political ideology of PKS and measure the 
characteristics of the moderate fundamentalist perspective. This chapter compares PKS' s 
political thinking since 1998 with those of the modernists and the radical fundamentalists. 
The basic thinking of PKS becomes a foundation for the political thinking which 
indicates a gradual approach in its political point of view. 
In general, PKS 's political thinking understands state-related matters as 
inseparable from religion. Islam and its laws are seen as providing total guidance for the 
state's activities. The ideal state, therefore, is a state based on Islamic law. Islamic Law 
should be enacted in every aspect of human life, not only at the state level but also within 
society and the family and at the individual level. Thus PKS believes that the existence of 
the nation state and Pancasila, as a national ideology in Indonesia, is in essence, 
temporary, since Islam offers a better ideology for the ummah. Even though PKS has not 
put forward a concrete caliphate system during its 7 years of involvement in the national 
political arena in Indonesia, it believes the caliphate is a means to maximise the 
implementation of Islamic teaching. However, democracy is believed to have similar 
values to Islam and can be exploited to develop the role of Islam within the state. PKS 
also sees that democracy is widely accepted by society. Nevertheless PKS still believes 
that shura (consultation) is the best decision making model for Muslims. 
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A. Relation between Islam and the State 
In the relations between religion and state in Indonesia, there are at least three groups of 
Islamic political thinking. 1 First, one group believes Islam has clear and detailed concepts 
in matters of politics and the state. This view holds that the relations between religion and 
the state are integrated and is based on the belief that Islam is a perfect and complete 
religion that deals with every aspect of human life, including political affairs. This group 
also thinks the ideal political system is that of the time of the Prophet Muhammad and 
Khulafa Rasyidin (the righteous caliphs) era. Therefore, they propose that an Islamic 
State be re-established. The second group believes that Islam offers a clear prescription 
regarding religion and the state and that Islam is an individualistic religion restricted to 
the private sphere. They are often secularists who consider the best political system to be 
a western one, whose function has already been proven effective. Meanwhile the third 
group believes that Islam has relevance to state matters but that Islam only gives general 
guidance, but not detail. As a consequence Islamic communities are urged to find the best 
form of a system by still considering ethics and values in the Islamic statehood. PKS can 
be identified as belonging to the first group that stresses the close relations between Islam 
and the state. However, this does not make this party ignore reality and the socio-cultural 
background of Indonesia. 
1. The Role of Islam in the State 
In PKS's opinion, the moral message of Islam implies relations between Islam and the 
state are inextricably linked.2 This is related to the notion of Islam within Tarbiyah 's 
main doctrine, as syumuliyah (holistic teachings). 3 In this regard Islam is considered as 
"more than just ritual but also as a commandment that arranges all human activities both 
as an individual and a member of society". 4 One PKS document states: 
1 Munawir Sjadzali, Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran, (Jakarta: UI Press, 1990), pp. 
1-2. M. Din Sjamsuddin, "Usaha Pencarian Konsep Negara dalam Sejarah Pemikiran Politik Islan", Ulumul 
Qur'an, No.2, Vol IV, 1993. 
2 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Jdeologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda 
Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004), op.cit, pp.185-187. For PK's opinion about relation between 
politics and dakwah please see for example, Abu Ridha, Untm1g Wahono, Syamsul Balda, Politik Dakwah 
Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: DPP PK, 2000). 
3 For more detail about syumulzyah see, Syumuliyatul Islam, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiyatuna, 2002), pp. 30-
42. 
4 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
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"Islam is a universal system of living which entails all aspects of life. Islam 
is a state and homeland, govenunent and community, moral and power, 
blessing and justice, culture and constitutions, science and judiciary, material 
and natural resources, efforts and prosperity, jihad and religious 
proselytizing, soldiers and thoughts, beliefs and acts of devotion. Muslims 
have an obligation to comprehensively implement such cores of Islamic 
teachings and its universality. Islam is a system of life that covers religion, 
politics state and society".5 
Thus PKS believes that Islam offers political guidance for its adherents. As a 
logical consequence of this point of view, the state, as a part of human life and a political 
reality, becomes a part of Islamic teachings. PKS therefore rejects secularism or the 
separation of state life from religious matters. 
Moreover, PKS considers the relevance of Islam in the state is related to 
ideological and constitutional matters. This is because, according to senior party figure 
Abu Ridha, Islam consists of values and laws that can be and have to be implemented in 
the state formally. 6 Thus PKS emphasizes that Islamic teachings, from the Al-Qur'an and 
Sunnah, can be used as the spirit of the state and the basis of its laws and constitution. 
Ridha states that "the purpose of God in revealing the Al-Qur'an to the Prophet 
Muhammad is to be used as dustur (constitution) and as the highest rule by human 
kind". 7 Based on this point of view, PKS believes that to establish a "negara religius" (a 
religious state) based on Islam teachings is a true obligation for every Muslims. 8 The 
implications of this point of view, PKS believes in the formalistic role of Islam and its 
laws in the state and has a tendency to strive for creating a formal Islam by using Islam as 
an ideology for state matters. 
2. The Function of the State 
In PKS's point of view the state has some primary obligations, especially to guide its 
citizens by protecting their faith and enabling them to attain happiness not only in this 
world but also in the hereafter and therefore has a significant role in education and 
5 "Jatidiri Partai Keadilan", in Sahar L Hassan, Kuat Su.1-:ardiyono and Dadi M.H. Basri (eds.), Memilih 
Partai Islam, Visi, Misi dan Persepsi, (Jakarta, Gema Insani Press, 1998), p.34. 
6 Abu Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p.73. 
7 Ibid, p.73. 
8 From transcript of interview with Almuzzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 2004. I am grateful 
to Hurriyah for making these available. 
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promoting Islamic teachings. This education also covers religious matters in keeping with 
the example of Muhammad in Medina. 9 Irwan Prayitno, a PKS MP, stated that 
'The state has a right to conduct religious education in society and even has 
to support the obligation of its population to read the Al-Qur' an and wear the 
headscarf so far as these kinds of policy are supported by the whole 
society". 10 
This perspective is rooted in the education model of the Tarbiyah movement 
which attempts to conduct continuous education for individuals, the family, society, and 
the state. This process must be continued even when an ideal state, which is an Islamic 
state, has been established. 11 The main function of the state is in fact to protect the 
development of Islamic teachings at every level of human life in order to implement 
. ' h h . 1 12 syan a . compre ens1ve y. 
In relation to moral education, according to Siddiq, the function of the state is 
actually related to the formation of Muslim identity. By giving Muslims a proper 
education about Islam, it is hoped the state will provide a proper understanding about the 
true characteristic of Muslims. Siddiq adds that this function is connected with making 
Islam a symbol of identity for every Muslim, so that Muslims behave properly as 
individuals and as citizens inside national system and in their relation with other citizens. 
Given this function of the state, PKS believes the role of religion, as mentioned by 
Bellah, 13 as a set of identity and instructions for maintaining the existence of the social 
system. 
In view of these functions, therefore, PKS generally believes that the state plays 
a strategic role in implementing the moral values and teachings ofislam effectively. Even 
though PKS believes that society is able to conduct dakwah (religious propagation) and 
dahrah itself can be practiced with or without the existence of state, the existence of the 
state along with its apparatus, as an element of dakwah, will properly assist this process 
by stipulating policy that can protect and foster the dah.·vah activities. Based on this belief 
9 Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p. 54. 
10 Interview \Vith Irwan Pravitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005. 
11 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005, and with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 
November 2005. 
12 Interview with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November 2005; with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 
November 2005, and with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005. 
13 Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief Essays on Religion in a post-Traditional World, (New York: Harper 
and Row Publisher, 1970), p.11. 
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the state is one of the most important pillars to support the strength of a religion. 
Therefore, a state is a prerequisite for the continuation oflslam on earth. 14 However, PKS 
takes into consideration the current situation in making Islam the foundation of a state 
and in making the state into an institution that fosters the Islamic interests. In the situation 
where the Indonesian society in general has not been fully supporting the existence and 
function of Islam in a state, PKS considers that the roles of Islam in the state focus on 
universal matters, such as humanity, justice and social awareness; in the national 
framework. 
3. Comparison 
The political perspectives of PKS demonstrate a similar point of view with the radical 
fundamentalist group. To this group, Islam is unique and such uniqueness is a result of its 
function in societal life and activities. According to the Indonesian Mujahidin Council 
(MMl), Islam teaches Muslims both as individuals and as a part of a community, from 
matters of individual improvement to matters that are related to community life. 15 Based 
on these basic perceptions and the faith that Islam has a set of laws that in the practical 
context can be clearly used to give direction and form the basis of managing the state, 
radical fundamentalist groups clearly believe that Islam has to be used as a formal 
foundation of the state. 16 Such principle is clearly reflected by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's 
statement which says: 
"According to the example of the prophet Muhammad, Islam must be 
wedded to the government, to the nation, it must take in the law of the state -
this was the example of the prophet. It must not be purely a personal matter. 
Don't follow the police, don't follmv the nation, don't separate Islam from 
nation, that is \vrong". 17 
14 Abu Ridha, Amal Siyasi Gerakan Politik dalam Dakwah. Seri Tarb(vah Siyasiyah 04, (Bandm1g: Syaamil 
Cipta Media, 2004), pp. 35-36. 
15 Ika Rochjattm Sastrahidayat, "Syari'ah Islam Menuju Indonesia Sejahtera", in Bulletin Risa/ah 
Mujahidin, 06/March 2001, p.5. 
16 Irfan S. Awwas, the chairman of MMI states that: "Islam regulates all dimensions of humankind, 
including society, economics, and politics. From this point, we as Muslims believe that Islam has a 
conception about bersatunya agama dan Negara (the integration of religion and state)". K.hamami Zada, 
Islam Radikal Pergulatan Onnas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia, (Bandm1g: Teraju, 2002), 
pp.102-103. 
17 See such statement in Breck Batley, The Complexities of Dealing With Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, 
A Case Study of Jemaah lslamiyah, (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, 2003), p. 87. 
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Moreover, according to the radical fundamentalists, a separation between state 
and religion is intolerable and absurd. In fact they believe that Islam with all of its 
tendencies and purposes is both a religion and a state. As stated by the LJASWJ that 
"politics is a main part of Islamic teachings and Al-Qur'an and Sunnah have to be the 
Judge". 18 
On the other hand, the modernists believe Islam has relevance for state 
problems and political life. This is related to the obligation for Muslims, to create a high-
quality system for humanity in God's favour. Attempts to make such a system in Islam 
are actually regarded as a part of ibadah (the religious service), particularly in the 
"horizontal" context or in terms of social relations among human kinds. 19 However, in 
general PKS also has a similar point of view about the function of the state with many 
modernists. Arnien Rais for example states that a government guided by Islamic has a 
double function: that is, first, to guarantee the implementation of Islamic teachings; and 
second to ensure the fulfilment of the people's needs. Thus the state has an obligation to 
fulfil the two basic needs of the people, that is material and spiritual, and Islamic values 
have to be the guidance in attaining these needs. 20 
However, even though both the modernists and PKS believe in the 
inextricability of Islam and the state, modernists emphasize that these relations do 
actually not have to be realised in the formal context. This is because Islam does not 
provide detailed regulations for such relations. According to them, what Islam offers for 
Muslims in politics is principally an obligatory recommendation to create a system that is 
based on the spirit of Islam such as justice, equality and consensus. 21 Moreover, most of 
the modernists do not see any kind of fixed or fonnal shape for the political system that is 
mentioned in the Al-Qur'an or the Sunnah. As a result, the modernists consider that Islam 
only offers some general rules in politics and provides freedom for its followers to be 
18 Zada, op. cit, pp.103-104. 
19 See Mohammad Natsir, Agama dan Negara dalam Perspektif Islam, (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 2001), p. 
78. Amien Rais, "Arti dan Fungsi Tauhid", Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta, (Bandung: Mizan, 
1996), pp. 15-16. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Modemisme Islam dan Demokrasi: Pandangan Politik 
Mohammad Natsir", in Islamika No. 3, (Bandung: Mizan dan MISI, 1994), p. 68. See also the role of 
religion in state in Amien Rais, "Beberapa Catatan Kecil Tentang Pemerintahan Islam", in Salim Azzam 
(ed.), Beberapan Pandangan Tentang Pemerintahan Islam, (Bandm1g: Mizai1, 1984). 
20 Atnien Rais, Cakrawala Islam, p.54. 
21 Ibid, p. 55. 
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creative in their political life. Thus for the modernists when Muslims have successfully 
brought the spirit of Islam into the political context, they have essentially fulfilled their 
obligation. 
PKS' s point of view on the relationship between Islam and the state indicates 
the formal approach to conducting Islamic teachings. In this context, the state becomes an 
"independent institution" with its own interests as "the servant of ideology". In such 
perspectives, PKS's thinking on the state is close to the model of the organic state,22 
rather than a pluralist or Marxist state (where the state is the committee for certain 
classes). In relation to the organic state, the state has the right and obligation to encourage 
every citizen to strive for their common objective, which in the PKS context is to 
establish and implement Islamic teachings at every level of life towards reviving the 
caliphate. Apart from PKS's gradual approach to implementing its objective, in an 
extreme circumstance, the presence of an organic state gives opportunity for the state to 
have a comprehensive and interventionist role in the name of "common ideals", and on 
the other hand, weakens the existence of civil society and minority groups. Although 
PKS believes in the consultation process in managing the state, the tendency to support a 
"strong and interventionist state" in PKS 's point of view cannot be neglected. 
B. The Role of Syari'ah Islam: Towards "an Islamic State". 
The struggle to implement the Islamic Syari 'ah in Indonesia has been an aspiration 
within some sections of society since before the establishment of the republic. This was 
evident in the debate between the Indonesian founding fathers over the content of the 
1945 constitution. 23 At present, the desire of some groups to apply Islamic Syari 'ah at the 
constitutional level, by incorporating the 'seven words' of the Piagam Jakarta (the 
Jakarta charter), and at the local regulation in several provinces, municipalities, and cities 
22 The idea of an "organic state" derives from Hegel's concept on an ideal state. This kind of state brings 
the people to the ultimate condition, where the spirit or God (the ideal) will have fully unfolded itself in the 
universe. This kind of state has an obligation to intervene people's life to ensure the establishment of the 
ideal situation in the future. Based on its objective, the organic state -vvorks for its own interest and different 
from the Marxian and Pluralist State, the organic state is an independent body and not a committee for 
other interest, either bourgeoisie class or the majority of the people. On the concept of the organic state, see 
Alfred Stepan, The State and Civil Socie(v, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). 
23 On this debate, see Moh. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 1-11, (Jakarta: Jajasan 
Prapanca 1959). Endang Saefuddin Anshari, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945, (Bandung: Pustaka-
Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981 ). 
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are reflections of this aspiration to formalize the syari 'ah in Indonesia. 24 Therefore, the 
role of syari 'ah in politics and the state in the end is inseparable from the debate about 
the existence of the Islamic state as the concrete realization of Islamic Syari 'ah formally 
and comprehensively. With its moderate fundamentalism PKS puts forwards the total 
implementation of the Islamic syari 'ah at every level of life as an ideal type for Muslim. 
In the context oflndonesia today, however, PKS favours the gradual approach in syari'ah 
implementation and does not think of the establishment of the Islamic state as something 
urgent. 
1. The Position of Syari'ah in the State and Its Implementation 
PKS believes that syari'ah is nothing less than true guidance for every Muslim. To PKS, 
God's law defines the proper relations between humans and God (hablum min Allah) and 
the relations between humans (hablum min al-nas). 25 Therefore, Muslims cannot 
disregard the role of syari'ah in their life. Moreover, PKS believes that upholding 
syari'ah is a logical consequence of being a Muslim. In one of the party's principles, al-
syari'ah (constitution), it is stated that "upholding Islamic syari'ah, obedience and 
commitment to it, is the obligation of every Muslim as the consequence of a Muslim's 
belief'. 26 Ridha stated that 
"Upholding the Islamic Syari 'ah for us is not only related to the political 
discourse, but also an actualization in every part of our life, individually, 
'all d l' . 11 " 27 soc1 y, an po it1ca y . 
Hence, syari'ah in PKS's op1mon has relevance in daily life, while in the 
political context PKS believes that syari'ah has universal values and is full of solutions 
which will bring happiness to the people. 28 With regard to this, according to Al-Jufri: 
24 On the attempts of syari 'ah implementation at the local governmental regulations, see Taufik Adnan 
Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syariat Islam dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria, (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Alvabet, 2004), pp. 82-100. On some of organizations that support such attempts, see Imam Tolkhah and 
Choirul Fuad, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi, (Jakarta: Badan Litbang Agama and Diklat 
Keagamaan, Departemen Agama RI, 2002). Lili Romli, Partai Politik Islam Era Reformasi dan Piagam 
Jakarta Dalam Sidang Tahunan AfPR 2000, Thesis, (Jakarta: Faculty of Social and Political Science, 
Universitas Indonesia, 2001). "Menggapai Syariah Tanpa Darah", Forum Keadilan, No.39, 31 December 
2000. 
25 
"Prinsip Kebijakan" dalam Buku Anggaran Dasar PK, p.39. 
26 Ibid, p.39. 
27 From transcript of interview with Abu Ridha by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 14 April 2004. 
57 
"A leader or a government that will get help from Allah is a leader or a 
government that obeys Allah's rules. Constitution, government regulation, 
ministerial decision etc made by Government must be in line with the Laws 
ofGod".29 
Even though PKS does not mention m their AD/ART that syari'ah must 
become the state's constitution, it believes that syari 'ah must be implemented in daily life 
so in the end it will become a part of the Indonesian law and regulations. Therefore, the 
formalization of syari 'ah will happen eventually, considering that the constitution is the 
umbrella for Indonesian regulation.s. 
According to PKS, if syari'ah is implemented completely, it will bring salvation 
to human kind. This is because syari'ah has universal values that can be accepted by 
everyone. 30 PKS is also of the opinion that if this syari 'ah is properly implemented, it 
will not discriminate against other religious adherents. 31 PKS argues that if the Muslims 
take power and implement syari'ah, the principle of justice for all will guide them and the 
basic rights of every citizen, including those of non-Muslim, will be guarded.32 The 
PKS's cadres argue that the history of Islamic rule in the past reveals minority rights 
were respected and also demonstrates the existence of non-Muslim officials in the 
government so that there was harmony for all people. 
Such arguments cannot, however, answer non-Muslim concerns, given that 
syari 'ah also introduces the concept of zimmi, 33 which has the potential to reduce their 
political right to be elected as a leader of the state and thus to some extent induces 
discrimination. This opinion also finds difficulty in the matter of honouring "deviant 
28 In the official document PKS states tliat "a nation will be free from every horrible disaster if tliat nation is 
able to purify their belief to Allah and consistently realize His Laws", see in "Kebijakan Dasar Partai 
Keadilan" in Buku Anggaran Dasar PK, p.35. 
29 Salim Segaf Al Jufri, "Pengatar'' in Bukhori Yusuf and Iman Santoso, Penerapan Syariat Islam di 
Indonesia antara Peluang dan Tantangan, (Jakarta: Globalmedia Cipta Publishing and Pusat Konsultasi 
Syariah, 2004), p.22. 
30 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 
December 2005. 
31 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Menyelamatkan Bangsa Platform Kebijakan Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Al-I'tishom, 2004), p.128. 
32 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. 
33 Zimmi is a non-Muslim person (or a group of people) who conduct a peace agreement (zimmah) with 
Muslims inside a Muslim territory, and therefore has the right to self determination, including carrying out 
their religious obligations, equality before the law and to hold position as state officer, as a reflection of 
their political and civil rights. In the prophet era the zimmi included the Jews and Christians (the People of 
the book). 
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groups", such as Ahmadiyah, in the Islamic community, whereby PKS tends to limit its 
perception of the universality of syari'ah by supporting the ban on such groups. 
With regard to the implementation of syari'ah, PKS, following the principle of 
al-tadarruj (gradualism), considers this implementation to be a stage by stage process 
that requires an understanding of the contemporary situation. This means that the 
implementation of syari'ah must be in line with the level of Islamic understanding of the 
society. From this standpoint, PKS believes that the development of Islam is related 
closely to the effort of dakwah development, whereby an intensive model of 
communication and a pattern of flexible dakwah development is needed. Therefore, 
according to PKS: 
"A commitment is a manifestation of al-istimsak (finnness) to al-haq (truth), 
determination and believing fully to Islam as a straight and comprehensive 
teaching that has to be upheld in every aspect of life by still keeping the 
flexibility as a characteristic of Islamic syari'ah as well as considering the 
aspect of formal legality that is in line with syari'ah".34 
With regard to such thinking, PKS thus believes that the implementation of 
syari'ah should not be implemented hastily. For PKS, syari'ah has to be internalized 
properly first in the heart of every individual Muslim. This argument is in line with the 
party's principle namely qum daulah fl shudurikum, lVa qum fil ardhikum (establish a 
"state" first in your heart, and it will become established in the world). This means also 
requiring the readiness of every Muslim before creating syari 'ah at a state level which 
requires a very long time and serious efforts before it can be manifested. PKS believes 
that the establishment of an Islamic state will be useless if the people are basically not 
ready to uphold and support such a system. 35 
2. The Islamic State Issue 
The emergence of the term "Islamic state" is basically critical response of the Islamic 
people to the world-wide development of the nation-state concept. This concept 
originated from the West as a result of the division of the world based on nationalism and 
sovereignty over geographical territory. The reaction towards the nation-state concept in 
34 BukuAnggaran Dasar PK, p.39. 
35 See Anis Matta's point of view in Furkon, op.cit, p.236. 
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Islamic community is related to the nature of Islam which never limits the area for the 
Islamic people based on a nation. The development of ideas about an "Islamic state" has 
caused long-running contention in Indonesia. Indonesia experienced a long period when a 
fierce struggle occurred between proponents of an Islamic state and advocates of a 
Pancasila state. 36 This ideological tension was "formally" overcome by the acceptance of 
Pancasila as the sole principle in the 1980s. That acceptance was not instant. It had to 
undergo a long debate and resistance from the Islamic organizations and parties. 37 Over 
time this "national acceptance" has proved to be artificial. There are some segments in 
the Islamic groups that still reject this New Order's effort to unify ideologies in 
Indonesia. In this Reformasi era, the Islamic state issue has re-surfaced. 
Regarding the issue of an Islamic state, PKS tends to avoid contentious 
terminology. 38 This is because they believe that Islamic society has not completely 
accepted this "Islamic state" term. PKS believes that for the current situation, the 
important thing is to create Islamic teachings that can be accepted by all Muslims, which 
means implementing syari 'ah based on a moderate interpretation that accommodates 
most Muslims and also the real conditions of Indonesian society. The attempt to 
implement an Islamic State today would trigger unproductive and sensitive protracted 
debates among people in this country. 39 For these reasons, PKS believes that the essence 
of the state is far more important than the form it takes. According to Siddiq 
"What is believed by PKS, in tenns of the implementation of Islamic 
teachings, is actually not in the context of the labelling, but how to ensure 
36 The terms "Nasionalis Sekular" (secular nationalist) and "Nasionalis Islam" (Islamic Nationalist) are 
used Deliar Noer to explain two models of political thinking in Indonesia, namely those who believe in 
secular ideology and those who believe in Islam. These tenns are appropriate to avoid biased connotations 
about the real situation in Indonesia, for instance, the perception that the nationalist attitude is only related 
to the non-Muslim groups and Muslims in Indonesia are not or anti nationalist. See the use of these tenns in 
Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980). On the Muslim 
struggle to establish a state based on Islam or an "Islamic State", see Adnan Buyung Nasution, The 
Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of The Indonesian 
Konstituante 1956-1959, (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992). Ahmad S. Maarif Islam dan Politik: Teori 
Belah Bambu Afasa Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965), (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996). Ahmad S. 
Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985). Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas 
Politik Nasional: 1945-1965, (Jakarta: Grafitti Press, 1987). 
37 Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), 
pp.264-275. Deliar Noer, "Islam dan Politik: Mayoritas atau Minoritas ?",in Prisrna, No.5, Talrnn XVII, 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988). 
38 Interview with Mallfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005; with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 
2005. 
39 Furkon, op.cit, pp. 234-235 
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that the values, teachings and conceptions of Islam can be performed in all 
aspects of state life".40 
Matta stated that whatever the name, as long as the essence of the state is in line 
with Islamic values such as justice and equality then that is enough. Furthermore, in 
Matta' s opinion some urgent and real problems such as how to create a better system of 
education, economics or defence are more important and pressing than a discussion about 
the name and "shape" of the state.41 In this context, to Matta, the existence of such an 
Islamic state is related to the problems of restoring the state condition from the bad 
condition to a better and more Islamic one. 42 
This kind of opinion is also held by the second President of PK Hidayat Nur 
Wahid who says that the words "Islamic State" are not prominent. The important thing, 
according to him, is to make Islamic values present in the every day life of all Muslims, 
so that every Muslim can focus their potential on doing something useful and prevent 
crimes being committed toward anything and anybody and not waste their time in 
pointless debates. 43 Thus, rather than trying to establish an Islamic state, the main 
concern of PKS is actually to create a just and prosperous state.44 
However, it is interesting to note this does not mean that PKS has ceased trying 
to implement an Islamization process at "the higher level", which means the global level, 
if conditions permit. This is because to PKS the improvement of Islamic practice and 
beliefs should not end with the individual, family or society, but must be continually 
developed within the state and even the world. 45 As a consequence, PKS' s political focus 
is to continuously develop a system based on Islamic concepts and the enforcement of 
syari 'ah in Indonesia, 46 with the establishment of an "Islamic State" as its final goal. 47 
According to Yusroh: 
40 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005. 
41 Matta argues that "during his leadership in Medina, The Prophet Muhammad never used the term 
"Dau/ah lslamiyah" ("Islamic State"), in fact he simply calls his state "A/-j\1adinah Al-Munawarrah ", ibid, 
p.233. 
42 Ibid, p.240. 
43 Ibid, p.234. 
44 Ibid, p.240. 
45 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 
November 2005; with Anui Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005; with Ahmad Syaichu in Bekasi, 6 
December 2005; with Ahmad Burhanudin in Jakarta, 20 November 2005. 
46 Buku AD PK, pp. 45-46. Interview with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005. 
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"This process will not be stopped because we hope for the enforcement of 
Allah's power on earth. Because we know that every faith acknowledges that 
if the Islamic people commit to the value of Islamic teaching, Islam can not 
only protect the Islamic people but also protect Allah's other creatures. So, 
amar maruf nahi munkar is not limited to upholding daulah (state), but also 
to upholding the caliphate, whereby in the end, the rahmatan lil alamin is 
really felt". 48 
Moreover, if syari 'ah legalization is PKS' s political goal, then an Islamic state 
is m essence an unavoidable goal. If a country has made syari'ah its law, then this 
country will necessary become an Islamic state. On the other hand, as stated by Ridha, 
the existence of the Islamic state is needed to enforce syari'ah because it is impossible to 
expect a total implementation of syari'ah in the secular state.49 PKS also believes that the 
existence of the state of Medina is a perfect example of the Islamic state in its real 
meaning. Ridha believes that although the term "Islamic state" is not used, the formation 
of Medina offers a framework for implementing Syari'ah. 50 Moreover, taking an example 
from the state of Medina, according to Ridha, is essentially a duty of every Muslim and it 
will not properly happen without the existence of the Islamic state. 51 
However, in this effort to establish an Islamic state, PKS values gradual, 
tolerant and democratic approaches. Siddiq stated that in principle: 
" ... if some Islamic elements have various opinions, they can fight for those 
opinions. However, if there is an Islamic political power that fights for the 
establishment of an Islamic order in the constitutional manner and is able to 
manifest that based on agreed universal values, the other Islamic elements 
(which have different approach, opinion and idealism, author) must accept it. 
Therefore, while differences are still possible, we \Vill coexist with those 
elements". 52 
Even Ridha admitted that the willingness of the people determines the existence 
of an Islamic state: Ridha said: 
"The establishment of an ideal state fully depends on the willingness of 
majority of the society that inhabit this state because the establishment of a 
47 Ridha claims that "so long as the Islamic state still does not exist, it is obligation of every Muslim to 
establish it", in Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p. 37. 
48 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. 
49 Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p.32. 
50 Ibid, p.31. 
51 Ibid, p.35. 
52 From transcript of interview with Untung Wahono by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 15 April 2004. 
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state is a result of common consensus. Meaning, the Islamic state cannot 
necessarily be established if its citizen does not fully desire it". 53 
In summary, PKS's view the Islamic state issue can be seen as an attempt to 
uphold Islam through formal channels as well as raising awareness in society about the 
nature of Islam. This attempt defines PKS elites as politicians and dakwah conveyors 
carrying out the mission of awakening Muslims. Based on the shadow of the past and 
future interests to develop Islamic dakwah, the party's elites are trying to respond to the 
existence of the Islamic state contextually. However, if we look deeper, the effort to 
implement ~yari'ah is obviously a stepping stone to formalise Islamic teaching at the state 
level. Therefore, essentially, even though PKS makes no mention of an Islamic state in its 
AD/ART, it does not mean that PKS rejects the existence of such an Islamic state. 54 
3. Comparison 
Similar to PKS, modernists believe that essentially syari 'ah provides direction in life for 
every Muslim to achieve peace and happiness in this world and the hereafter. 55 Thus, in 
principle, the modernists and PKS share a similar view about the connection between 
syari'ah and Muslim activities. However, the modernists also generally understand that 
not all human activities are arranged in detail in syari'ah. 56 To the modernists, syari'ah is 
essentially flexible and should be implemented by considering the current situation faced 
by the ummah. Therefore, the meanings of syari 'ah, in the end, can be multi-
interpretative and contextual so that in the political context, the terminology of syari'ah is 
basically beyond fixed laws and generates many opinions and perceptions. For the 
53 Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p. 30. 
54 One of the interviewees says that fact that we can not find the words "Islamic state" in AD/ART of PKS 
is just a matter of pelembutan bahasa (euphemism). In fact in some other formal documents we can see the 
words like "daulah Islamiyah" and "Caliphate system", see for example in the explanation the principal of 
(Al-Mustaqbaliyah) the future orientation, in "Basic Policy of PK 2000-2005" in Buku AD/RT PK Masa 
Bhakti 2000-2005, (Depok, DPD Partai Keadilan), p.43. 
55 About the role Syari'ah Islam, see for example, Abdul Asri Harahap, PPP: Sintesa Nasionalisme dan 
Religiusitas, (Jakarta: Integritas Dinamika Press: 2004), pp. 137-170. 
56 To the modernists God actually provides Muslim with the freedom to develop a method of thought that 
must be in line with Islamic teachings, but also rational and objective. In developing such a method, 
Muslim is actually permitted to use the common ideas of their time. In other words, essentially for most 
modernists it is possible for Muslims to implement "a synthesis system" made up of many different 
currents of political thought, including from Western vie\-vpoints. See Amien Rais, "Wawasan Islam 
tentang Ketatanegaraan", Cakrawala Islam, pp. 51-52. M. Natsir, op.cit, pp. 85-88. 
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modernists, in terms of politics, syari'ah offers many universal values, rather than a 
detailed set of arrangements. 
With regard to the idea of establishing an Islamic state, the modernists believe 
that the attempt to establish such a state must be understood as an attempt to create an 
institution filled with the spirit oflslam. As mentioned previously, for the modernists, the 
form of the state does not matter; as long as such state is based on the spirit oflslam, then 
it can be regarded as an "Islamic State". 57 
Furthermore, modernists believe that the establishment of a formal Islamic state 
is not actually an obligation for Muslims. To the modernists, the establishment of an 
Islamic state is not urgent because in essence it is simply the creative idea of some 
Muslim scholars based on their interpretation of Islam. 58 Furthermore, the form of a state 
is not clearly mentioned in Islamic teachings. As the result, Islam gives freedom to its 
followers to set up an appropriate form of a state. Further, according to the modernists, it 
would be difficult for modern-days Muslims to re-create a form of state based on one 
from the seventh century. 59 
In addition, in the Indonesian context, the establishment of an Islamic State 
would face many obstacles mainly because Indonesia is a plural society and because of 
various "internal" interpretations about this concept among Muslim scholars. Thus 
according to Rais the Islamic state is not an appropriate model for Indonesia, given its 
diversity. 60 In fact most of the modernists reject the idea of returning the 'seven words' of 
the Jakarta Charter to the constitution, which would potentially legally allow the state to 
conduct Islamic Syari'ah formally. 61 Meanwhile, for some Islamic parties, United 
Development Party (PPP) and Crescent Star Party (PBB), that proposes the idea that the 
57 According to Rais "without using an Islamic label but taking the essence of Islam, we can demonstrate 
that we are able to build a fair economic system, an honest legal system, a non-feudal education system -
that's what Islam wants. So it is easy. I will not emphasize the label, but the vision. Because it is possible to 
create a state without an Islamic label that is, in fact, more Islanlic". See Idy S. Ibrahim, A mien Rais 
Membangun PolitikAdiluhung, (Bandung: Zan1all WacanaMulia, 1998), p. 90. 
58 Mahendra, lvfodernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, op.cit. p. 204. 
59 Amien Rais, "Beberapa Catatan'', op.cit, p. 44. 
60 Tempo Jnteraktif, 11 January 1999. 
61 See Umar Basalim, Pro Kontra Piagam Jakarta di Era Reformasi, (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 
2002), pp. 174-254. 
64 
main aim of such an effort is to straighten the Indonesia history62 and actually nothing to 
do with and Islamic state.63 In the MPR Annual Meeting, PPP stated that 
'The proposal for the return of the seven words is not intended to create an 
Islamic state, instead for strengthening Indonesian nationality in the 
framework of united stated based on Pancasila".64 
PKS does not, however, totally accept the perspectives that only give priority to 
substantial aspects. The emphasizing of cultural aspect, to PKS, should not obscure the 
importance of establishing syari 'ah at the constitutional level. PKS, which is a part of the 
formal and cultural movement, believes that someday Islamic Syari 'ah should be 
manifested concretely in the national constitution. Thus, in terms of the role of syari 'ah 
in the state, the thinking of PKS in this matter is in line with the understanding of the 
fundamentalists, who believe in the role of Islam in the state. 
Radical fundamentalists consider that only Syari'ah Islam as a divine law which 
is decreed by God can be used in every aspect of life. According to M. Thalib, the leader 
of MMI, the existence of the almighty syari 'ah can not be compared to secular laws. 65 
Thus, it is a must for every Muslim to implement it totally and also reject any kind of 
"man-made laws". In the Indonesian context the implementation of syari'ah is seen as 
possible, because by its nature syari'ah can be implemented universally especially for a 
country in which Muslims are in majority, like Indonesia. Moreover, MMI believes that 
the implementation of Islamic Syari 'ah is an obligation and the ultimate struggle for 
Muslims, as a reflection of their true devotion to God and a serious attempt to find a 
solution for life's problems.66 According to LJASWJ, the now defunct radical 
fundamentalist group, any Muslim who rejects the imposition of syari 'ah has essentially 
quit from Islam. 67 Furthermore by establishing syari 'ah as a foundation of the state, 
62 This is in particular regarded to the Soekarno's testimonial that stated UUD 1945 (the Indonesian 
Constitution) was actually imbued by the Jakarta Charter. To some e:xient these groups see the restoration 
of the Jakarta Charter as a correcting attempt for historical betrayal of Indonesia's Islamic struggle, Greg 
Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?", in Southeast Asian Affairs 2004, 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p.4. 
63 Romli, op.cit, p. 206. 
64 See in Basalim, op. cit, p. 184. 
65 Zada, op.cit, p. 121. 
66 "Rakyat Aceh Darussalam dikhianati Durahman Wahid", in "Risalal1 Mujal1idin", Edisi 02/23 Ramadhan 
1421/21December2000M, pp. 1-2 in Zada, ibid, p. 122. 
67 Muhammad Umar As-Sewed. "Syariat Islam di Hujat", dalam "Buletin Laskar Jihad Ahlul Sunnall Wal 
Jamaah", Edisi VII/June/2001, p. 4, in ibid. p. 122. 
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according to Habib Rizieq Shihab the chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), 
society has established an Islamic state.68 In line with this opinion MMI believes that 
Islamic state is a state that implements Islamic Law formally. On the other hand, a state 
that is not using Islamic Law is not an Islamic State, even though its institutions use 
Islamic names. 69 
However m contrast to PKS who believe syari 'ah should be implemented 
gradually from below and who take this sensitive issue "carefully", radical 
fundamentalists do not take into account such an approach. Through their textual and 
literal understanding of Islam, the radical fundamentalists refuse to comprehend and 
interpret syari'ah in a substantial way. To them, every dimension of humankind has been 
clearly explained in the Al-Qur' an and Sunnah, and the words of God are clearly stated. 
What all Muslims need to do is simply follow every single word of God's teachings. 70 
Further, difference between PKS and the radical fundamentalists can also be seen in the 
concept of the stages of implementation. To the radical fundamentalists, syari 'ah has to 
be established as a constitution first, and then implemented gradually to all people. 71 This 
perspective is different from the belief of PKS which regards the Islamization of the 
constitution as the final target of a long process. 
By emphasizing the readiness of the "non-state elements" before syari'ah is 
established at the state level, PKS believes in the importance of a cultural approach in 
achieving Islamic objectives. As a political party, the combination of formal and cultural 
approaches provides PKS with a "holistic approach", which will influence its actions 
towards social problems. In the broad sense, this approach makes the rigid dichotomy 
between cultural and formal approaches become more difficult to uphold, particularly in 
the Indonesian Islamic political movement. This is not only related to the essence of the 
"cultural approach" that can be "a political expression" in responding to certain political 
situation, like happened in the New Order era,72 but also the existence of the group that 
combines both approaches in attaining their ideals, as attempted by Tarbiyah and PKS in 
the Ref ormasi era. 
68 Ibid, p.114. 
69 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas by Zada, in ibid, pp.112-113. 
70 Ibid, p. 122. 
71 See in Zada, ibid, p.124. 
72 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 102-140. 
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C. The Existence of Nation-State and Pancasila as a State-Ideology 
The idea of nation-state emerged for the first time in the 1 i 11 century as a political 
reaction to what was seen as the Pope's excessive power. At that time, England, France, 
and Spain, had become nation states, while other countries were moving in the same 
direction and the Roman church failed to maintain its position as a single and universal 
authority. 73 As an impact of modernization, however, the true meaning of the nation state 
and nationalism emerged in 13th century74. After the French Revolution in 1789, the idea 
of the nation state was dominated by secular thinking, which in the end successfully 
eliminated religious norms within the state,75 together with the extensive development of 
the spirit of secularization in Europe during that time as an impact of enlightenment.76 In 
the secular context this is when the nation state emerged to become an institution whose 
legitimacy was achieved based on secular nationalism, which was determined by the 
people's will rather than religious values or ethno-nationalism. 77 
The idea of the nation-state, with the spirit of separation between religious life 
and the state, spread all over the world including to the areas that are inhabited by a 
Muslim majority. This development was supported by imperialism and colonialism. 
According to Yusuf Qardhawi, the Western colonial powers that occupied previously 
Muslim territory more or less succeeded in planting the idea of the secular nation-state.78 
This foreign concept of nation-state has created polemic among Islamic political thinkers. 
Various opinions emerged in the Islamic world in response to this 
development.79 One group rejects the concept of the nation-state. For this group, the 
73 Surwadi Wiriatmadja, Pengantar Hubungan lnternasional, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tinta Mas, 1967), p. 59 
74 John Breuilly, "The State and Nationalism", in Montserrat Guibemau and John Hutchinson, (eds.), 
Understanding Nationalism, (Cambridge: Politiy, 2001), pp. 32-53. 
75 McKay Hill Buckler, A History of Western Socety, Vol C. From The Revolutionary Era to the Present, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995), Chapter 21. William Doyle, the Ancient Regime, (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 4. 
76 Rene Remond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe, (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 1999). 
77 See Richard T. Antoun, A1emahami Fundamentalisme Gerakan Islam, Kristen dan Yahudi, (Surabaya: 
PustakaEureka, 2003), p. 16. 
78 YusufQhardawi, Fiqh Negara, (Jakarta: Robbani Press, 1997), pp. 3-4. 
79 Related to this matter, in one of his letters to Muhammad Roem, Nurcholis Madjid agreed with the 
opinion of Fathi Osman who says that "out of many responses to the concept of the nation-state in the 
world of Islamic political thinking, the Muslim groups' response are actually in between two extremes 
points of view, namely between those who totally agree with it (represented by Ali Abdur Raziq) and those 
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bonds of society must be based on belief, and nationalism is nothing more than ashabiyah 
(the notion of ethnicity) or tribalism that is deplored by Islam. The second group 
comprises those who believe that the concept of the nation-state based on nationalism is 
not contrary to Islam. For this group, nationalism is something functional that improves 
the life of a population. Nationalism in that meaning will not be interpreted as ashabiyah. 
This group even thinks that the notion of territorial nationalism is still related to 
sunatullah (historical fact based on God's will). Besides that, nationalism according to 
this group is related to the anti-imperialism principle but not chauvinism. Those who 
belong to this group among others are Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Mohammad Natsir, 
Nurcholis Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and M. Amien Rais. 
Over time, a new view emerged in Indonesia coming most notably from the 
Tarbiyah whose members believed that the nation-state should not be discarded. The 
nation-state is a reality of human historical processes that should be respected and 
accepted by Muslims. However, this group also believes that the nation-state is not a final 
concept, arguing that Muslims also must take into account not only national borders but 
also the universal one. Based on this notion, this group believes that the nation-state is a 
part of a long Tarbiyah process, from the individual level to the state level towards an 
ideal form of a state, namely a state that is not based on territorial nationalism but also 
religious brotherhood. In this connection, the section below will cover the main 
discourse, namely PKS' s stance on the existence of the nation-state and Pancasi la as an 
Indonesian ideology. 
1. Nation State: A Medium of Islamization and Stepping Stone. 
PKS considers the existence of nation-state is an unavoidable condition. 80 Based on that, 
in PKS official documents, the party acknowledges the unity of Indonesia. PKS regards 
their acceptance of the nation-state as related to the implementation of the teaching of 
"local dakwah" (mahliyah) as an addition to "global d.akwah" (alamiyah). According to 
who completely reject it (represented by Sayyid Qutb and Maududi). See Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-
Surat Politik Nurcholis Madjid - Muhammad Roem, (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1997), p. 26. 
80 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. According to Untung Wahono the position 
of PKS's political thinking-which can be seen in the doctrines, official documents and education material 
of the party - basically acknowledges the existence of the nation-state, although the problems related to the 
attempts to establish leadership in the Islamic World are also part of PKS's political thinking, interview 
with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005. 
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Untung Wahono, one of the PK declarators and PKS MP, the term patriotism was born 
from the aspect of locality; it means that we appreciate the things that we have achieved 
from our own dakwah. In this connection, according to Wahono, PKS regretted the 
separation of East Timor and various conflicts in several Indonesian areas. 81 
Further, according to Mustafa Kamal, member of PKS MPP and PKS MP, 
PKS' s acceptance of the nation-state concept is also related to the philosophical 
foundation of the gradual Tarbiyah development. The existence of the nation-state is 
regarded as an inevitable stage towards a higher one. In this context, the nation-state is 
essentially a medium for the Islamic people to carry out Islamization. Therefore, its 
existence should be responded to well, as a means to prepare the Islamic community to be 
able to accept deeper Islamic values. In other words, in the view of the Tarbiyah 
movement, the existence of a nation-state is a medium to manifest the spirit of Islam as a 
blessing for humankind. 82 
In connection to the nation-state, PKS acknowledges patriotism and a respect 
for pluralism. Patriotism is considered as a part of PKS' s basic principles. In its official 
documents, PKS admits that its existence is to realise Semangat Proklamasi (the Spirit of 
Proclamation) and preserve sovereignty and unity. 83 In terms of pluralism, PKS 
acknowledges it as a part of God's will. Thus, PKS's official document contains an 
acknowledgement of the existence of Indonesia as a plural nation that consists of more 
than one religion (five official religions) and hundreds of ethnic groups.84 Furthermore, 
PKS states that pluralism is an inevitable reality. PKS believes the pluralism of 
Indonesian people is a blessing of God and a reality that has to be honoured. 85 To PKS, 
the main role that they have to play is reworking plurality as a uniting factor for 
Indonesian society. With this standpoint it is not surprising that the issue of creating 
national unity has become one of the PKS' s national political agendas. 86 
81 Interview with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005. 
82 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. 
83 "Piagam Deklarasi Partai Keadilan", http://keadilan.or.id/ pk/profil.php?op. 
84 In the Basic Principals it is stated that "National unity is a fundamental principle for developing a nation 
which is naturally heterogeneous. Toward such principles various communities inside the nation can be 
united, in the spirit of fraternity and togetherness. Prinsip Dasar Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: DPP PK, 1999). 
85 "Jatidiri Partai Keadilan'', op.cit, p.52. 
86 On this agenda, see in Seki/as Partai Keadilan (Jakarta: DPP PK, 1998). 
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In order to implement Islam as a universal value in the framework of the nation-
state, PKS asserts that its main interest is to propose a state that can serve the interests of 
all Indonesian people, regardless of their religious and ethnic background. It is also stated 
in the Basic Principle of the party that as a party with commitment to missionary 
endeavour, the purpose of PKS is to create a new Indonesia, which is able to provide 
justice and prosperity, in God's favour, for all citizens. 87 PKS also emphasizes that 
justice, equality, and balance are basic principles that are highly respected by PKS. 88 
Even though PKS gives a positive opinion about the nation-state, PKS like other 
fundamentalist groups does not consider the nation-state as a final institution. PKS 
basically believes that the secular state based on the rationale of nationhood will 
eventually wither away. This view is based on the idea of stages of dakwah that must 
continuously be developed until the world's Islamic civilization is formed. Therefore, the 
existence of a nation-state is a stepping stone for the next stages. 89 It is said in the PKS 's 
general policy that the final goal of dakwah is the enactment of Allah's religion on earth 
and the establishment of an Islamic state in the caliphate system.90 
In the context of modem politics nowadays, PKS argues that there is no nation 
on earth that is immune from the effect of globalization. 91 They also take the example of 
the international role of the United States as a nation-state today, which in their opinion 
has become and can be regarded as a kind of caliphate in the sense of its global role.92 
Therefore, one day, the same kind of nation-state can be created. According to Matta, the 
emergence of cross-nation-state communities or regional groupings can be considered as 
a modem caliphate prototype. It need not only occur in the non-Muslim countries like 
87 Anggaran Dasar danAnggaran Rumah Tangga PK, (Jakarta: DPP PK, 1998). 
88 Burhanudin, op.cit p.129. 
89 According to Yusroh in this stage, Muslims will no longer talk about party, but will instead enter into a 
new discussion about nation, ummat and even the human race as a whole. Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in 
Jakarta, 24 November 2005. 
90 Buku AD PK, op.cit, p.43. 
91 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. One of the founding fathers of Partai 
Keadilan Ichsan Tanjung states that "nationalism based on national identity will only make the Islamic 
community stagnate in the local area, while on the other hand other groups, in this era of globalization, 
have growth with their international networks. Thus, today we cannot think narrowly, while the enemies of 
God have created their global connection", Panjimas, August 2003, p.26. 
92 Interview with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005; with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 
November 2005; see also comments from Matta, Wahid and Ridha in Furkon, op. cit, p. 250. 
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European Union but also within Islamic society with their caliphate.93 Therefore, by 
considering the latest historical developments, it is possible for Muslim to establish a 
kind ofregional state that can protect their interests in an Islamic area someday.94 
Related to this opinion, PKS believes that Muslims must reconstruct today's 
state system as in the Prophet's era. The kind of state in this era was a global state based 
on Islamic brotherhood regardless of nationality. To PKS, the phenomenon of the trans-
regional state in the Prophet's era is an unchallengeable historical fact that is suitable to 
be a role model for today's Muslims. Even though PKS considers that the formation of a 
supranational state needs a long process that involves several generations, this party 
believes that there should be some people who start the process.95 With this awareness, 
PKS has positioned itself as a conduit to reconstruct a state model as in the Prophet 
Muhammad's era. 96 
From PKS's view on the nation-state above, it can be seen that the concept of 
dakwah stages brings dualism to PKS in judging the existence of the nation-state. These 
stages on one hand legitimise the existence of the nation-state as an inevitable historical 
unit and functionally support the Islamization effort at the local level. On the other hand, 
the concept of stages implicitly gives a foundation for the interpretation of the existence 
of the nation-state as an element or small unit out of a bigger and trans-national entity. 
This situation essentially shows PKS's political thinking that acknowledges the existence 
or concept of the nation-state but at the same time it is still committed to the creation of a 
universal civilization that will be spearheaded by Islam or become "guru bagi seluruh 
alam" (the teacher for the universe). 
The belief that the Islamic government will bring prosperity and justice for all 
people, however, is not always in line with the opinion of non-Muslim groups who feel 
that they will encounter some restrictions in the field of politics, tradition and culture. 
93 Ibid, pp. 248-249. 
94 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 
November 2005; with Hantoni Hasan in Bandar Lampung, 22 November 2005: with Kamarudin in Depok, 
30 November 2005. 
95 One of verses in the Al-Qur'an sometimes used to legitimate this thinking and which is one of the 
materials in the Tarbiyah movement and the training of party cadre is "Let there arise out of you a band of 
people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones 
to attain felicity" (Q.V 3:104). 
96 Prayitno says "it is only a dream to establish the caliphate if we not start it now". Interview with Irwan 
Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005. 
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Research by the Centre for Political Studies Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P LIPI) 
shows that the majority of non-Muslims in South Sulawesi reject the formalization of 
syari 'ah, arguing that formalization will potentially increase injustice for them 
particularly related to religious activities. 97 Meanwhile by observing current global 
conditions where the existence of the nation-state is still strong98 and the fact that ethnic 
sentiment is getting stronger at least in Indonesia in democracy era,99 the reconstruction 
of the Prophet's life for Indonesian is still an ideal which is close to being rhetoric only. 
2. State Ideology and Pancasila 
PKS recognizes Islam as a proper ideology for the ummat. For this reason, PKS, as stated 
in the AD/ ART, tries to project Islam as political ideology which liberates people from 
exploitation, brings justice for all and provides happiness and peaceful life, as happened 
in the era of the Prophet Muhammad. 100 
In order to implement this objective, PKS emphasises three principles that 
should be followed, that is, to acknowledge the comprehensiveness and finality oflslamic 
system; to acknowledge the authoritative role of the syari'ah based on the Al-Qur' an and 
Sunnah; and to enforce the relevance of the application of the Islamic teachings with the 
current conditions. 101 Based on the effort to find this suitability, the implementation of 
the Islamic teaching as an ideology must consider the real political situation in 
Indonesian society. According to PKS MP Nursanita Nasution: 
"We in Indonesia must take into account the situation in Indonesia. And in 
my opinion, it will not be appropriate if we only follow what other nations 
do, and it is not appropriate if we mimic the American style of democracy. 
97 This group states that in an era where syari 'ah is not yet formalized, they have witnessed religious 
discrimination, let alone what will happen if syari 'ah is formalized. The research itself shows that 52.6% of 
respondents object to the formalization of syari 'ah, 22.2% of respondents are still waiting for the latest 
development (undecided) and the rest or 26.3% agree, if syari 'ah is truly dedicated to creating better 
condition for their life. Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi, Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia, (Jakarta: 
LIPI Press, 2005), pp. 222-224. 
98 On this phenomenon, see for example Linda Weiss, (ed.), States in the Global Economy, Bringing 
Domestic Institutions Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Colin Hay, 
"Contemporary capitalism, globalization, regionalization and the persistence of national variation", in 
Review of International Studies, (2000), 26, pp.509-531. 
99 On this sentiment see for example Daniel Brown, "The Democratization of National Identity", in Susan 
Renders, (ed.), Democratization and Identity. Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia, (Oxford: 
Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 43-66. 
10° Kebijakan Dasar PK, p. 45 
101 Ibid 
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That cannot be done. We have different culture ... with every characteristic 
that exists in Indonesia, we should take a lessons and values from other 
nation's experiences, including the Muslim countries, and we apply that to 
Indonesia". 102 
In the context of Indonesia, PKS believes that the existence of Pancasila is an 
inevitability. In several of its documents, PKS acknowledges Pancasila as produk 
dinamika politik bangsa (a product of the nation's political dynamics), 103 which has 
played a role as a national consensus. According to PKS as an ideology and a historical 
product, Pancasila is considered able to unify all religious people based on the consensus 
on universal values, 104 so that the Indonesian people can live peacefully. 105 Based on this, 
PKS can accept Pancasila and recognize that there is no single article in Pancasila that is 
not in the line with Islam. 106 Therefore, according to Siddiq the effort to dichotomize 
Pancasila and the Islamic people is an old-fashioned way done by those people who 
consider religion as a threat for the nation. 107 
However, even though they see Pancasila as something parallel with Islam, 
PKS does not comprehend it as a genuine ideology that moves PKS and the rest of the 
Islamic community to strive for Islamic goals. Nurmahmudi Isma'il, when he was party 
President said: 
"Historically, Pancasila, as mentioned in the preamble of the 1945 
Constitution was never intended to be a way of life, which would influence 
every day life for the Indonesian people. Because if that was the case, the 
Pancasila would put aside the role ofreligion". 108 
Thus it can be said that Pancasila has never been accepted fully by PKS. PKS 
also has never considered Pancasila as a superior philosophical foundation. 109 The 
102 Interview with Nursanita Nasution in Jakarta, 16 November 2005. 
103 Iman Nugraha, (ed.), Sikap Kami, Kumpulan Seruan, Pemyataan Politik, Bayanat dan Pidato Politik 
Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Humas DPP PK, 2000), p. 118 and 142. 
104 Interview with Maliludz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005; with Ahmad Syaichu in Bekasi, 6 
Desember 2005. 
105 Interview with Mustafa Kamal, 24 November 2005. 
106 Interview with Mallludz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005. 
107 Interview with Mallludz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005; with Ahmad Syaichu in Bekasi, 6 
Desember 2005. 
108 Nummhmudi Isma'il, "Pidato Politik Presiden Partai Keadilan Pada Peresmian DPW DKI Jakarta 27 
September 1998'', in Nugraha, (ed.), op.cit, p. 122. 
109 While in the "AD/ART Partai Kadilan Sejahtera", at under the objectives of the party PKS states that it 
wants to establish a just and prosperous society inside Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State 
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Islamic system is the best system for the people and PKS is there to fight for it. In the 
opinion of PKS J\.1P, Abdul Hakim, Pancasila is only a medium to unify the nation that is 
widely recognized at this moment; however the change of Pancasila one day can be 
accepted. Hakim believes that: 
"Pancasila as a consensus for the nation and the state is not final because if 
the people want to alter the foundation of the nation through democratic 
mechanisms, it will be valid, as people can change the foundation of the 
nation from capitalism to communism and the other way around". 110 
To him, moreover, based on the state administration logic, Pancasila can be 
amended just as has happened to the 1945 constitution. 111 Thus, in terms of dakwah 
stages, Pancasila is not final or at least it is not a perfect ideology that is truly suitable for 
the Islamic community. 112 
However, in line with the current stage of dakwah, to PKS, the focus of 
Muslims today should not be about changing Pancasila, but about implementing the 
values in Pancasila in accordance with Islamic interpretations. Proposing discourse about 
changing Pancasila in the current situation would be counterproductive to PKS' s 
struggle. In such circumstance, PKS considers the existence of Pancasila gives Muslims 
an opportunity to demonstrate that they are the carriers of universal values of tolerance, 
and respect for pluralism that can all flourish within Pancasila. 113 Based on this kind of 
opinion within Islamic groups - which have an ambition to establish an Islamic system -
we still can find a group that acknowledges the existence of Pancasila. This is against 
common opinion that this kind of group is automatically anti-Pancasila. 
of The Republic oflndonesia/NKRI) and Pancasila, "Pancasila" is not mentioned as the basis to reach the 
just and prosperous society as the objectives. Instead it is said that such society should be "in line with the 
Islamic values'', rather than "Pancasila". pk-sejahtera.org. 
110 Interview with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November 2005. 
111 Interview with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November 2005. 
112 PKS is not alone in its stance in the national political arena. The result of research conducted by the 
IAIN Jakarta Center of Research showed that 40% of the respondents, who consisted of the heads and 
secretary generals of Islamic political parties in 1998, were of the opinion that Pancasila is not final. They 
argued that in this world, nothing should be final because it is man-made. See Arskal Salim "Partai Islam 
dan Relasi Agama Negara'', (Jakarta: JPPR, 1999), p.47 in Neng Dara Affifah, "Perdebatan Islam dan 
Konstitusi Negara", Dialog, Edisi I Tahun 2004, p. 65. 
113 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Hantoni Hasan in Bandar Lampung, 
22 November 2005. 
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3. Comparison 
PKS shares some similar views with the modernists about the existence of the nation state 
and Pancasila. Based on their perception about dynamic human history, the modernists 
believe that the existence of a nation state is God's will that is impossible to be avoided 
by Muslims today. Moreover, for them, a nation-state such as Indonesia in reality still 
provides a conducive situation for Muslims to practice their religion. This includes 
conducting Islamic missionary endeavours and fighting for their many political interests. 
Because of that, Muslims cannot regard Indonesia as a futile nation state or even as an 
infidel entity. With regard to Pancasila, by giving priority to the essence rather than 
using distinctive symbols of Islam, this group believes that Pancasila is acceptable for 
Muslims. Even though the modernists acknowledge that both teachings are not at the 
same level - because Islam is a teaching from God, while Pancasila is a man-made 
ideology - they believe that there is no single article in Pancasila that is contradictory to 
Islam, which makes it necessary for Indonesian Muslims to replace it. 114 Thus, to the 
modernists, if all pillars of Pancasila were consistently implemented, it would be good 
for Muslim communities, because it would mean that Islamic teachings were 
implemented. 115 
Nevertheless, in contrast to PKS, the modernists do not consider the nation-state 
as a provisional form for Muslims before a caliphate is established. Modernists give 
priority to establishing the essence of Islam rather than its form and so in the national 
context the modernists do not see the establishment of an Islamic state as necessary and 
urgent. Moreover, the modernists consider Pancasila as a proper and final ideology for 
Indonesia as a plural country. The modernists, in line with their substantive approach, do 
not regard the replacement of Pancasila as an important thing for Muslim's to do in the 
future and are thus committed to maintaining Indonesia as a nation-state based on 
114 Amien Rais for example stated that "the five principles of Pancasila are completely in line with Islamic 
teachings", in Peter G. Riddell, "The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia", in 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol.13, No.I, 2002, p.77. See also Natsir, op. cit, pp. 158 & 376. 
M. Amien Rais, "Kata Pengantar" in M. Amien Rais, (ed.), Islam di Indonesia: Suatu Ikhtiar Mengaca 
Diri, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1989), p. xiv. Mal1endra's opinion in Firdaus Syam, Amien Rais dan Yusril 
Ihza Mahendra di Pentas PolitikindonesiaModern, (Jakarta: Khairul Bayan, 2003), pp. 236-239. 
115 See, for example, this kind of statement in Rais, "Tidak ada Negara Islam'', in op. cit, p. XXIII.See also 
his statement as the chairman of the MPR in Media Indonesia, 23 February, 2002. 
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Pancasila. In this regard, Natsir for example in front of The Pakistan Institute of World 
Affairs says that: 
" ... But though we recognize Islam to be faith of the Indonesian people, we 
have not made an expressed mention of it in our constitution. Nor have we 
excluded religion from our nation life. Indonesia has expressed its creed in he 
Pancasila, or the Five Principles, which has been adopted as the spiritual, 
moral and ethical foundation of our nation and our state ... ".116 
Even PPP, in proposing the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter, does not aim to replace 
Pancasila, but rather to incorporate it within the body of the constitution. 117 
On the other hand, PKS' s acceptance of the existence of nation state and its 
willingness to do the best within this institution differentiates this party from the radical 
fundamentalists who consider the nation state as a bad institution for Muslims in any 
circumstances. This group in essence wishes for the existence of the state based on 
universal values in Islam, which basically is freed from "the nation states' partition". 
According to the radical fundamentalists, the existence of a nation-state is not acceptable 
in Islam. This is because such a concept not only has inflicted a loss on Islam by dividing 
Muslims around the world into nations, but is also Western-made (secular) and 
importantly did not exist in the era of glorious Islam. 118 
However, in principle, in terms of believing an Islamic state to be the best entity 
for Muslims, PKS and the radical fundamentalists share a similar understanding The 
obsession with establishing an Islamic state, as a step toward the caliphate, is actually still 
a focal point for both. This is also demonstrated by the radical fundamentalist's 
commitment toward Muslims everywhere, such as Indonesia, Southeast Asia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, in the global sense, rather than merely in one particular state. 
Moreover Fealy argues that even though these groups have up to now appeared to 
acknowledge the existence of the Republic of Indonesia and tended not to bother about 
116 On this speech please see Mohammad Natsir, "Some Observation Concerning the Role of Islam in 
Nation and international Affairs". Data Paper Number 16 Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far 
Eastern Studies, (New York: Cornel University, 1954), in M. Natsir, Capita Selecta, II (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Pendis, 1957), pp. 61-80. 
117 "Risalah Rapat Sementara PAH I BP MPR", 14 June 2000, in Romli, op.cit, p. 196, Tempo Interaktif, 10 
August 2000. 
118 Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of 
Sayyid Qutb, (Lebanon: the American University of Beirut, 1992), p.218. 
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the existence of the nation-state, at the bottom of their hearts they are still obsessed with 
the supra-state institutions. 119 
Another consequence of such thinking, in the Indonesian context, is that the 
radical fundamentalists clearly reject Pancasila as the nation's uniting ideology. To them, 
Pancasila is meaningless, because in fact, such ideology has never been an "inspiring 
guidance" for Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular. According to Rizieq, 
Islam is the real ideology that inspires many young Muslims to liberate and also unite 
Indonesia. He claims that Indonesia in 1945 was actually liberated by nothing but the 
yells of "Allah Akbar" ("Allah is great") from the Muslims freedom fighters. 120 
Moreover, Muslims in Indonesia should not accept Pancasila because such ideology in 
essence was made by humans. By accepting Pancasila, Muslims will potentially become 
infidels because essentially they recognize teachings other than those of God. Ja'far 
Umar Thalib says: 
"We don't like Pancasila because it means that Islam is the same as other 
religions. This is not so. We believe that Islam is the highest religion and the 
best". 121 
This attitude towards Pancasila differentiates the radical fundamentalist with 
PKS which sees it as a product of Indonesian history and acknowledges the role of 
Pancasila in uniting the Indonesian people until today. 
D. The Caliphate 
The issue of the caliphate in PKS political thinking is closely related to its role as the 
final stage in the dakwah and education process. 122 Therefore, it can be said that the 
existence of the caliphate is a result of a long Islamic education process. In the Tarbiyah 
teaching developed by Al-Banna, it was said that caliphate is an ideal and final form for 
119 Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?", op.cit, p.5. 
120 See Erros Jafar, "Indonesia Merdeka Diawali Pekik Allah Akbar Bukannya Haleluya", in 
http://swaramuslim.net. 
121 Sadanand Dhume, "Islam's Holy Warriors", FEER, April, 26, 2001. 
122 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 
November 2005 and with Amri Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005. 
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Islamic people. 123 It can be said that a discussion about the caliphate is a discussion about 
the future of Muslims. 
Even though the issue of the caliphate is not formally mentioned in the 
AD/ART, that document does discuss matters such as the implementation and 
enforcement of Islamic law, and attempts to open channels of communication and 
cooperation with Muslim countries. It is also stated that PKS is part of world-wide 
dakwah movement which has the formation of the caliphate as its biggest goal. As 
mentioned previously, there is the desire to reconstruct the caliphate and PKS also 
fundamentally believes that the caliphate is an ideal form of governance for Muslims 
which must evolve gradually under Islamic authority. According to the Member of PKS 
Central Executive Board, Sitaresmi S. Soekanto: 
"As an Islamic dakwah movement, it is obvious that we wish for the 
enactment of the Islamic system in the form of daulah even up until the 
Caliphate. However, that requires a long process. To PKS, we give meaning 
to this kind of change as something gradual so that we can achieve our 
desired outcomes". 124 · 
This effort must also be in line with universal values and consider the current 
and the future situation in Indonesia and the world. The synthesis between the 
development of Islamic universal values in today's context and the existence of an 
Islamic territory in the future are an evolving discourse within PKS political thinking. 
1. The Rationale for and Model of the Caliphate 
According to PKS, the caliphate is a logical consequence for an Islamic party that is 
committed to establishing governance based on Islam. PKS regards the caliphate as the 
form of government developed by the Prophet Mohammad and his successors that 
extended across religions and was proven to support the upholding of Islamic values. 
According to Ridha, the caliphate system with its Rabbani (God) constitution was able 
for more than I 000 years to manifest a system that liberated people as well as organizing 
public matters and shaping pious individuals. 125 On that basis, according to Prayitno, the 
existence of the caliphate is basically a reflection of the need and guidance for the Islamic 
123 Furkon, op.cit, p. 245. 
124 From transcript of interview with Sitaresmi S. Soekanto by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 9 June 2004. 
125 See Ridha, Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p. 60. 
78 
people. 126 The significance of the caliphate doctrinally is related to the commitment of 
enforcing the spirit of loyalty, based on the spirit of Islamic brotherhood. This doctrine is 
directed to a political orientation that has universal scope and trans-geographical borders, 
where the Islamic people are united and bonded only by belief 127 
Meanwhile, the discussion about the caliphate in the Islamic world nowadays 
encompasses two main points of view. The first point of view puts forward the function 
and substance of the caliphate. For the first group, the establishment of a caliphate in the 
modern world is a reflection of universal Islamic values in a limited administrative 
territory. In this point of view the form, scope and certain area of governance are not the 
determinant factors for its existence. However, the second point of view puts forward the 
important of the definite area for the caliphate. To this second group, the caliphate is 
related to the existence Muslim territory, whereby there is a single leadership to control a 
geographical area based on religious similarity. 128 
In this connection, the caliphate model proposed by PKS is still not concrete 
and detailed. However, there have been discussions on the issue. In general PKS puts 
forward a caliphate model of government that is trans-national, under the leadership and 
guidance of Islam, even though PKS does not envisage that all civilizations in the world 
will be under the guidance of Islam. In this regard, PKS considers the caliphate as a 
means of conducting dialogue between civilizations to create human prosperity. 129 
In general, there are two caliphate models that are considered by PKS, namely; 
a single government where all countries are dissolved to become one (as happened in the 
past); or a confederation model where each country can rule itself under certain common 
arrangements, such as a constitution, currency, and security. In general, PKS believes in 
the need to reconstruct the caliphate format, by taking into account the current situation 
of Muslim countries' and the future direction of globalisation. For that reason, even 
though there are some groups who want to realise the example of the Prophet 
Muhammad's government into, PKS on the whole sees that a confederation is more 
possible for the Islamic people at this time, by referring to the European Union or the 
126 Interview with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005. 
127 "Kebijakan Dasar PK" in www.keadilan.or.id Interview with Ahmad Syaichu in Bekasi, 6 Desember 
2005. 
128 Furkon, op.cit, p. 246. 
129 Interview with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. 
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Organization of Islamic Conference. 13° Furkon has argued this is a modification of Al-
Banna' s political thinking. 131 
The range of PKS political thinking regarding the caliphate does, however, 
cover the substantial model of the caliphate as well as the formal one. For those who 
support the formal model, Islamic territoriality is something that needs to be considered. 
This group believes that there should be a clear physical definition of the caliphate. 
Whereas for the 'substantialists' who give priority to the existence of values rather than 
territory, such as Nur Wahid who believes that the caliphate has been established as long 
as the Islamic universal values has been implemented no matter the name is. 132 
It can therefore be inferred that the aspiration to establish the caliphate is still 
alive and well within PKS' s political thinking. Moreover, PKS and its functionaries 
believe that their function is to set up basic pillars for the creation of caliphate in the 
future. 133 
However, PKS's point of view about the caliphate, like that of other 
fundamentalists, is based on normative criteria rather than comprehensive historical 
studies. In history the existence of caliphate was not always in line with liberation and 
justice, particular for non-Muslims. In the situation where a non-Muslim group was a 
second class community, though with the right to be protected and live in peace, there 
was a tendency to the abuse of power. For the non-Muslim minority particularly in 
Europe who lived under the power of the Ottoman Empire, the caliphate was sometimes 
regarded as an occupation. Another problem with the caliphate model is that once a 
caliphate is established, it will be difficult for it to be replaced, since it is actually set up 
for long period of time and elections within a set period are not recognized. In such 
matters, PKS tends to use the normative approach by believing only a good person will 
be elected and control mechanisms will be effectively implemented in the caliphate 
system. 
130 Interview with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005; with Mustafa Kamal in Jakarta, 24 
November 2005; with Chairuman in Bekasi, 19 November 2005 and Hantoni Hasan in Bandar Lampung, 
22 November 2005. 
131 Furkon, op.cit, p.253. 
132 Furkon, op.cit, p.249. 
133 Abdul Hakim states that the existence of the caliphate is a natural result of the stages of the dakwah 
process, interview with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November 2005. Similar pinion is also stated by 
Mufidjar, interview with Bonnie Mufidjar in Tangerang, 26 November 2005. 
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2. Gradual Approach towards the Caliphate. 
PKS believes that the process towards the caliphate needs vigorous efforts undertaken by 
all Muslims. PKS also believes that this effort needs a long time, even involving several 
generations. It was mentioned in the PKS's AD/ART that this party's dakwah needs 
gradual process (al-tadarruj) and the future orientation (al-mustaqbaliyah). In the future 
context, PKS considers the formation of caliphate as a continuum from a particular era to 
another era. It is most likely that caliphate can only be experienced by the future 
. 134 generations. 
PKS' s understanding about the need for a gradual approach towards the 
establishment of the caliphate is related to the Tarbiyah conception of mihwar (the orbit 
of dakwah). PKS believes that the establishment of caliphate is the result of a long 
gradual process. 135 Therefore, this party emphasizes the process of socializing Islam 
through informal ways. In this regard, Wahono believes that Islamization is the first step 
before going further to any formal structures; the failure of this process will impede the 
successful in achieving any formal structures. 136 PKS emphasizes the strengthening of 
individuals towards the creation of a society that will support an Islamic system. The idea 
of the caliphate is counterproductive in a society that has not completely comprehended 
the true nature of the caliphate. Therefore, PKS believes that caliphate is a reflection of 
the strength of Islam at the individual level, which makes the strengthening of the grass-
root basis important. According to Wahono, every Muslim individual carries self-politics 
within them that will determine the righteousness and badness of other political levels. 137 
According to Yusroh, the important meaning of the individual is as follows: 
'The main capital in forming the society or the state is the individuals who 
have strong belief, a good personality, and are good examples. Good faith 
will have a good effect on individuals, family, society, and eventually 
Daulah Jslamiyah. There are some opinions that say that the current 
movement should jump towards establishing caliphate by skipping individual 
134 BukuADIART PK, pp. 41-43. 
135 Interview with Irwan Prayit:no in Jakarta, 9 December 2005 and Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 
2005. 
136 Interview with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005. 
137 Interview with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005 
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and family improvement. We hope that we undergo all the stages without 
ki . h l dd " 138 s ppmg any rungs on t e step a er . 
Thus the establishment of the caliphate is related to the strengthening process of 
understanding about Islam at the grass-root level and the effort to win public opinion by 
presenting positive images of every Muslim. 
Regarding the gradual approach, PKS considers the national political system as 
a stepladder that should be climbed by every Muslim. The current political system is not 
an obstacle but a wider medium for the development of Islamic dakwah and caliphate 
idea. Therefore, in principle, as stated by Prayitno 
"The strengthening process at the individual level will become a foundation 
for a further strengthening process of national politics whether in the 
parliament or executive, towards cooperation at the regional level with other 
Muslim countries or international bodies, as a stepping stone for the creation 
of Islamic leadership". 139 
3. Comparison 
There are some similarities of opinion regarding the caliphate between PKS and the 
radical fundamentalist group. This group also stress the importance of re-establishing the 
caliphate or a supra-state institution such as occurred in Islamic history. Irfan S. Awwas, 
the Chair of Executive Body ofMMI stated that 
"The obligation to establish an Islamic state or a medium for implementing 
syari 'ah - which is impossible to be practiced in a non-Islamic state - has to 
grow in the heart of every individual who calls themselves a Muslim. Then, 
every Muslim around the world has to struggle to re-establish the caliphate 
which was destroyed by the enemies. An Islamic state is just a starting basis 
to reach a more specific and worldwide objective, namely the caliphate".140 
The radical fundamentalists believe that the Islamic community will have only 
one authority that serves and protects all Muslims in the world. Such an institution is 
believed to be the as a best medium for Muslims and their communities, for not only 
138 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. 
139 Interview with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005. 
140 Irfan S Awwas, "Mengapa hams negara Islam?", http://members.tripodcorn!darul_Jslamlmengapa.html. 
See the conclusion made by Ahnaf in Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, "MMI dan HTI; The Image of The Others", 
in A. Maftuh Abegebriel, A Yani Abeveiro, SR-Ins Team, Negara Tuhan. The Thematic Encyclopaedia, 
(Jakarta: SR-Ins Publishing), p.701. 
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ensuring the implementation of Islamic teachings and ideals, but also re-establishing the 
real Islamic communities which are based on the spirit of universal brotherhood. 
Moreover, in the context of what kind of system Muslims should construct, this 
group believes the caliphs since the era of the Prophet Muhammad eras up to Ottoman 
Empire are the best examples for Muslims. Furthermore, in terms of governmental 
system, they argue that Islam, based on the experience of the Prophet and his successors 
clearly provides some arrangements, for instance the mechanism of bai 'at (electing by 
oath), to choose the leader of the state. 141 Such mechanisms essentially demonstrate that 
Islam has a set of laws to manage a state. 
In this matter, both the radical fundamentalists and PKS believe in some 
conditional steps that have to be completed before a caliphate is established However, 
PKS' s emphasis on the establishment of the caliphate as a gradual process from the level 
of individual, family, society, and the state differentiates this group from radical 
fundamentalists. The radical fundamentalists tend to focus on the implementation of 
syari 'ah at the state level as a main stepping stone before the creation of the caliphate. 
This sets PKS apart from those groups who emphasize the caliphate as a prerequisite of 
the establishment of Islamic teachings, 142 but also from those who prefer shorter, gradual 
approaches that emphasize only on the formal aspect and the importance of having 
control over the state from the beginning. 143 
E. Democracy and Shura (Consultation) 
Democracy as a political teaching about people's government is a philosophy that was 
born and nurtured within the West. In its development people have produced many 
definitions and interpret democracy in many ways which, according to Amin Saikal, 
141 Zada, op .cit, p.113. 
142 For example Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Ahnaf, op.cit, p.699. Since the beginning of its 
establishment, HTI has regarded the caliphate as a solution that should be implemented by Muslims 
wherever they are even though this group recognizes the existence of stages - such as training and cadre 
preparation stage (marhalah at tatsqif), interaction with ummat stage (marhalah tafa 'ul ma 'a al ummah), 
and the take over of power stage (marhalah istilaam al hukm). See www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id. 
143 MMI and FPI are the groups that believe in the need for "the shortening of stages". See the agendas of 
these groups in Gerakan Militan Islam, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafl Radikal di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2004) and Dhurorudin, Fragmentasi Politiklslam Pasca Orde Baru: Suatu 
Kajian dalam Perspektif Ketahanan Nasional, thesis, (Jakarta: Pasca Sarjana Kajian Ketahanan Nasional, 
2002). 
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basically agree with the notion that democracy is "a process of public participation 
whereby power and authority can be transferred in an orderly and peacefully fashion". 144 
In terms of substance, the meaning of democracy is related to the matter of people's 
government, freedom, equality, pluralism and fraternity. 145 All of these are located upon a 
civic foundation, as succinctly formulated by Abraham Lincoln as the government of the 
people, for the people, and by the people. 146 Therefore, philosophically, democracy is an 
idea that praises the majority of the people as the determinant of political life. 147 By 
putting universal values to the forefront, in the end, democracy has been able to impress 
and attract the attention of many of the world's leaders and political thinkers, including 
some Muslim countries. 148 In the Islamic world, there have been many approaches to 
democracy both in its capacity as a governmental system or a way of life/ideology that is 
imbued with philosophical values. 
There are at least three groupmgs of political thinking in responding to 
democracy in Islam. 149 The first group is those who comprehensively reject the idea of 
democracy. These people think democracy is not in the line with Islamic values, 
especially in the context of people's sovereignty. They also think the practice of 
democracy can become a trigger to divide Muslims, especially with the existence of a 
multiparty system. The second group is those who accept democracy but recognize 
differences between democracy and Islamic political concepts. To this group, democracy 
has a spirit which is in line with Islamic values and provides in practice an opportunity 
144 Amin Saikal, Islam and the West Conflict or Cooperation, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003), 
p,.112. 
45 David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 991), pp.15-16. Roy C. Macridis, 
Contemporary Political Ideologies. Movements and Regimes, second edition, (Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company 1983), pp. 19-20. Larry Arnhart, Political Question. Political Philosophy from Plato to Rawls, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 340-342. 
146 Wiliam Ebenstein, "Democracy" in William D. Hasley & Bernhard Johnston (eds.), Collier's 
Encyclopedia, (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1988), VIII: 75. 
147 Henry B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
Sidney Hook, "Democracy" in Encyclopedia Americana, Vol.8, (Connecticut: Golier Incorporated, 1984), 
p.683. Robert A. Dahl, Demokrasi dan Para Pengritiknya, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 1992), pp. 3-4. Herbert 
Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, (Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 
38-45. 
148 John L. Esposito, Demokrasi di Negara-Negara Muslim, (Bandung: Mizan 1999) and John L. Esposito, 
John 0. Voll, Islam and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
149 Sukron Kamil, Islam dan Demokrasi Telaah Konseptual dan Historis, (Jakarta: Gaya Media Pratama, 
2002), pp. 47-66. For more explanation about the response of Muslim Intellectuals to democracy in 
Indonesia see Masykuri Abdillah, Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna, Respons Intelektual Muslim 
Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi ( 1966-1993), (Y ogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999). 
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for the development of Islamic politics. However, this group is also critical of the 
shortcomings of democracy, whereby the interests of majority of the people greatly 
determine everything so that they can potentially obliterate the spirit and role of religion 
in government. The third group is those who accept democracy completely. Democracy is 
considered as an expression of the Islamic people in the government and political arena. 
This group believes that democracy is identical with the values and spirit of Islam 
although both of them reside in different areas. 
Over time, a new sub-group has emerged out of the second group. This "sub-
group" recognizes democracy as a political mechanism that shares some similarities with 
Islamic political concepts. However, democracy should only be temporary for Muslims. 
This group is of the opinion that the concept of shura (consultation) must be enforced 
because it will guarantee Islamic values without having to follow the majority voting 
mechanism. PKS can be seen as proponents of this subgroup. 
1. The Reasons of PKS' s Acceptance of Democracy 
PKS generally accepts democracy as an objective reality and recognizes it as providing 
the rules of the game that are similar to contemporary Islamic political concepts. PKS 
believes that in substance, democracy has a universal spirit that is parallel with Islamic 
teaching. 150 PKS recognizes that those values, such as equality, justice and consultation, 
are basic principles enshrined in the Al-Qur'an as well as implemented by the Prophet 
Muhammad in Medina. Additionally democracy is considered to be in line with the spirit 
of Islamic teaching, because democracy rejects the mechanism of exclusive authority and 
gives priority to shura, which involves the participation of the society in making 
decisions. Ridha has stated: 
"The Islamic governmental system does not support the efforts of totally 
protecting the ruler, which in the end will make state exploitation possible. In 
the Islamic system, Islamic people are given the chance to topple a leader if 
he/she commits a tyranny". 151 
150 See Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan dalam Musyawarah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Majelis 
Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) Partai Keadilan, 2000), pp. 46-47. 
151 Ridh . 64 a, op.cit, p. . 
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Furthermore, according to PKS, political participation is central to both 
democracy and Islamic political concepts152 which, in essence, makes the spirit of 
democracy in line with the Islamic spirit. 153 Therefore, democracy is generally regarded 
as a proper medium for Muslims to be involved in the political arena today. With its 
emphasis on individual freedom, according to Matta, democracy allows Muslim to exist 
and practise their faith and to develop their thinking and activities, particularly in order to 
improve people's quality of life and prosperity. In other words, by accepting democracy, 
in the end Muslims will have the opportunity to be a solution for the people. 154 Related to 
this PKS sees democracy as an open sphere for dakwah activists to convince people 
(about Islam) which is better than an authoritarian or totalitarian regime which is curbing 
dakwah. 155 Thus PKS understands democracy as a mechanism which provides an 
opportunity for Muslims to be politically involved and achieve their Islamic ideals. 
Besides those reasons, the acceptance of democracy in PKS' s opinion is also 
related to dakwah. This is because the reality is that democracy is a widespread political 
mechanism accepted by the majority of Indonesian, including Muslims. In such 
circumstances, democracy is actually a "popular term", so that in the end, it will support 
the effort to expand the conveyance of dakwah. According to Hantoni Hasan, the PKS 
MP at DPRD Bandar Lampung, PKS - with its tolerant dakwah methods - believes that it 
is counterproductive to use unfamiliar jargon such as shura, in terms of preaching 
daklvah about Islam and Islamic politics. 156 On that basis, democracy has to be accepted 
by the party's political activists as a means to do dakwah. 
152 See Nunnahmudi Isma'il, "Jatidiri Partai Keadilan'', in Hassan, Sukardiyono, Basri, op.cit, p. 46. See 
also Anis Matta, "Dakwah, Poltik dan Startegi", in Saksi, no.11, thn III, 6 March 2001. On political 
participation, see Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation. How and Why Do People Get Involved in 
Politics?, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965). 
153 Anis Matta, Menikmati Demokrasi, Strategi Dakwah Meraih Kemenangan, (Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 
2002), pp.22. 
154 Ibid, pp. 19-23. 
155 Dewan Pimpinan Pusat PKS, op.cit, p.87. Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; 
with Abdul Hakim in Jakarta, 25 November; with Agus Kurniawan in Bandar Lampung, 23 November 
2005. 
156 Interview with Hantoni Hasan in Bandar Lampung, 22 November 2005. 
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2. Shura: Between Divine and Popular Sovereignty 
Even though PKS sees some similarity between Islam and democracy, PKS has never 
acknowledged democracy as a political teaching as it is understood and applied by 
Westerners. PKS has indeed always been ambivalent in reacting to democracy. 157 PKS 
does not consider the majority voice as something absolute even though it accepts the 
role of the society and the people in the government and the state. 158 This is because in 
principle, according to PKS, the truth does not always follow the majority. 159 The truth is 
located within Islamic law and teaching, where it is possible to freely interpret certain 
verses, yet, in principle, it is the right of only certain able people to do so. 
This view, when it is adopted into political life, has become a belief whereby 
the will of the majority cannot become a yardstick in searching for the truth and the best 
policy for all. This is simply because there is a potential for the aspiration of the majority 
to be based on their particular interests which contradict the God's law. Moreover, PKS 
limits the definition of people's sovereignty whereby the people's sovereignty should not 
have the right to push aside God's laws. This is acknowledged by Matta who says that: 
"The basic difference between secular democracy and the Islamic political 
concept is related to the perspective about the holder of sovereignty. Secular 
democracy renders the sovereignty to the people, and says that the 
sovereignty is in the hands of the people; they believe that the voice of the 
people is the voice of God. On the other hand, in the Islamic concept, 
sovereignty totally belongs completely to God; therefore the voice of God 
must be the voice of the people. As a consequence, in secular democracy the 
law is a general agreement which is produced by constitution, while in Islam 
the law is given and the function of the constitution is to realize it". 160 
However, on the other hand, PKS does not recognize the clerical essence of 
religious scholars as an institutionalization of God's existence on earth. PKS does not 
accept the concept of the existence of exclusive groups of ulama who have the right to 
157 The ambivalence is reflected in Falrri Hamzah statement that "today democracy is our playing field, but 
we cannot abandon our religious ambitions'', in Dini Jalal, "Divided we fall", in Far Eastern Economic 
Review; Mar 22, 2001, p.28. 
158 PKS cadres, especially those who are in the local and center legislative body often complain about the 
concept of majority vote; interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005; with Arkeno in 
Jakarta, 18 November 2005: with Amri Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005; with Hantoni Hasan in 
Bandar Lampung, 22 November 2005 and with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005. 
159 Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) Partai Keadilan, Panduan Pengambilan Kebijakan Dalam 
Musyawarah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: 2000), p. 42. Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 
November 2005; with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005. 
160 Matta, "Dakwah, Poltik dan Startegi", in loc. cit. 
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decide everything for the sake of ummat. To PKS, the role of society must be 
accommodated, including the role to elect the best leader directly and having the right to 
control the executive. 161 The elimination of the rights of the people's will is not in line 
with the substance of Islam. 
In PKS' s opinion, the mechanism of shura is a means to bridge the gap between 
God and the people's sovereignty. Within the shura mechanism, there is a spirit to ask 
the experts for their opinion about certain problems so that people can achieve 
goodness. 162 In this context, the principle that is put forward is the real truth instead of the 
majority voice. The opinion that will be upheld is from those who have the most 
reasonable argument in accordance with syari'ah. However, this does not mean that this 
mechanism pushes aside the role of the majority voice. This is because the people still 
have the right to select the person eligible to hold positions in the shura mechanism. Thus 
to PKS, shura is a decision-making mechanism that enables the accommodation of 
people's rights and aspirations in the government, by appointing some experts and pious 
leaders, which in the end will guarantee the protection of religious values. 
On that basis, PKS sees shura as the best mechanism for the Islamic people, 
whilst democracy is only a temporary means. 163 The party has been implementing shura 
internally by recognizing the existence of ahlul halli wal aqdi (an expert group which is 
elected to determine the policy-making process) institution. 164 The existence of the 
Maje/is Syuro (Shura Council) is the implementation of this concept. It is stated in 
AD/ART that the Shura Council is the party's highest institution that functions as PKS's 
ahlul halli wal aqdi institution. 165 
161 Rid.ha stated that in the government of the Islamic state - especially in the era of the four Caliphates -
people still had an important position as they had the legitimate power to elect their leaders. See Ridha, 
Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik, p.32. 
162 MPP PK, op.cit, p. 34. 
163 Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 24 November 2005. According to Almuzzamil Yusuf the 
urgency of shura is related to several matters: first, as a reflection of worship, which is related to 
worshipping Allah; second, as a part of piousness and honoring the Laws of God; and third, a belief that 
only through the shura mechanism, which allows for many different opinions, can people gain the best 
results for them, from transcript of interview with Almuzzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 
2004. 
164 From transcript of interview with Almuzzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 2004. This 
institution derives from Islamic political tradition which has an aim to provide advices in decision making 
process. 
165 See Chapter V, Article 11, AD/ ART PKS, inwww.pk-sejahtera.org. 
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The role of the Shura Council in PKS is interesting. Other Islamic parties also 
have similar councils, but in reality the role of those parties' executive bodies is still 
dominant. On the other hand in PKS, this ahlul halli wal aqdi is gaining a greater role. 
The dominant role of the Shura Council activates a kind of "mechanism of command" in 
the party, whereby it can support the party's activities effectively and efficiently. This not 
only supports the party's unity, at least compare to other Indonesian Islamic political 
parties, but also means a faster implementation of the party's decisions in disciplinary 
matters. 166 On the other hand, this system has the potential to develop into the "iron law" 
of political party's oligarchy if the party considers that hegemony is acceptable under 
certain circumstances because it is related to the matter of "truth". 167 
Moreover, the idealism of shura and the establishment of ahlul halli wal aqdi, 
which treats Islamic law as a main source, will potentially place ulama as the majority in 
the decision-making process in almost all aspects of life. This situation will be difficult to 
implement comprehensively in a plural country like Indonesia that not only has a variety 
of religions and beliefs between communities, but also within the Muslim community 
itself As a consequence, it is not an easy task to select the right person to be in charge in 
the shura institution. 168 Thus in the context of shura, it can be seen that even though PKS 
does not close the right of the people, the thinking of PKS tends to be normative and 
exclusive, particularly in relation to the role of the pious Muslims in the decision making 
process. 
166 For example, the party's decision to prohibit the use of unclean money within the executive body can be 
implemented simultaneously in almost every part of the country. 
167 From transcript of interview with Untung Wahono by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 15 April 2004. For example, 
to describe this situation, in the BBM case, according to Kamarudin who is also a lecturer in Department of 
Political Science in Faculty of Social and Political Science Universitas Indonesia, most Tarbiyah cadres 
actually want PKS to quit from the coalition of Yudhoyono's administration, because of the negative 
impact for their political and dakwah movement in their regions, but the role of Majelis Syura has impeded 
this willingness. Interview with Kamarudin, 30 November 2005. 
168 It can be observed that most of the members of ahlu halli wal aqd are ulama or scholars who are experts 
in Islamic teachings, whether in Syari 'ah or Hadith Studies. However according to the perspective ofRidha 
the members of this body should be balanced equally by non-religious expert. On the concept of ahlul halli 
wal aqdi in Ridha's perspectives, see in Sjadzali, op.cit, pp.133-137. PKS itself tends to believe that those 
people who are qualified in religious matters should be in the majority in ahlul halli wal aqdi, rather than 
be balanced equally by non-Islamic experts, as proposed by Rasyid Ridha. On this attitude see Panduan 
Pengambilan Kebijakan dalam Musyawrah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP) 
Partai Keadilan, 2000), pp. 39-40. 
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3. Comparison 
PKS and modernist groups share similar understandings about the existence of universal 
values in democracy and the acceptance of democracy as a suitable mechanism for 
Muslims to achieve their agendas. The Modernists believe that in terms of politics, the 
Al-Qur'an and Sunnah basically order every Muslims hold universal values such as 
justice, affection and equality for humankind. Accordingly, modernists believe that any 
kind of government established by Muslims should implement those values. Using the 
process of ijtihad (independent reasoning), modernists argue that the type of 
governmental system that is closest to the spirit of Islamic in the modern era is nothing 
but democracy. 169 
Moreover, the acceptance of democracy is also based on two other reasons. 
First, in the philosophical context, the modernists are not bothered about the origin of 
democracy and do not see it as something that belongs exclusively to the West. To the 
modernists, democracy is in essence a universal teaching that contains universal values. 
Thus it is possible for every group to implement democracy, including Indonesian 
society. Meanwhile, modernists also believe that the idea of people's sovereignty, as the 
main element of democracy, is also in line with the Islamic political aims. 170 Based on 
this reason Rais stated he totally believes in democracy because it runs parallel with basic 
Islamic teaching. 171 Second is a practical reason. Modernists argue that the backwardness 
of the Indonesian society today is caused by uncontrolled, exclusive and oligarchic 
government as it was practised by the New Order. Thus it is acceptable for Muslims to 
learn democracy from the West and apply such a system. 172 
There are also similarities between PKS and the radical fundamentalists in the 
context of people's sovereignty. According to the radical fundamentalists, the main 
problem of democracy is the concept of people's sovereignty, 173 because essentially the 
169 Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, p.222. 
170 Harahap, op.cit., pp.114-115. 
171 Arief Affand~ (ed.), Islam Demokrasi Atas Bawah, (Yogyakarta: Dinamika, 1997). On Amien's 
political thinking about democracy, see Amien Rais, "Pengantar", in Demokrasi dan Proses Politik, 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988) and Idris Thaha, Demokrasi Religius, Pemikiran Politik Nurcholis Madjid dan M 
Amien Rais, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2005). 
172 For these reasons Uhlin believes that the modernists' ideas about democracy are influenced and actually 
similar to the West's democracy, although they use Islamic language, see in Uhlin, op. cit, p.74. 
173 This is the main reason for all radical fundamentalists to reject the idea of democracy. See, for example, 
Fauzan Al-Anshari, "Demokrasi Syirik'', in www.majelis.mujahidin.or.id 
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political system and political activities depends on the voice of the people. Radical 
fundamentalists contrast that with Islamic teachings in which, according to them, one of 
the main principles is belief in God's sovereignty. In this conception actually there is no 
room for other elements beside God that have the right to be sovereign. In other words, 
the concept of people's sovereignty is contradictory to Islam. Moreover, this group 
believes that the Qur' an and Sunnah are the ultimate source of law that arrange every 
aspect of human life. Thus, Muslims do not have to look for other sources as their 
guidance for life. 174 Rizieq indicates that there are only some minor aspects of life that 
are not arranged in detail in the Qur' an and Sunnah. Therefore, Muslims are still 
permitted to conduct musym·'v·arah (discussion) to contemplate these matters. 
Accordingly, Muslims in general have to be subjected to God's law and His 
sovereignty. 175 
Based on this standpoint, the concept of democracy which allows (the majority 
of) people to have their own opinions and run their activities based on their thoughts and 
interests (which to some extent demonstrates the people's sovereignty), is not acceptable. 
Furthermore, to the radical fundamentalists, the majority is not totally superior in Islam. 
In fact, for them, a model of government which basically glorifies the majority is not 
found in Islamic history. To them, in Islam, the truth is the most important thing and this 
actually has nothing to do with popularity. 
However, the radical fundamentalists and PKS do not see the position of 
democracy in the same way. PKS acknowledges that some values of democracy are in 
line with the spirit of Islam and that democracy is a mechanism that can be used to 
struggle for Islamic interests. According to Awwas, however, democracy is an infidel 
system which is not only inspired by secular and Western teachings, but also has caused 
the failure of Muslims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. 176 For the radical 
fundamentalists, what happened during the 1950s and at the beginning of the reform 
period has shown that the democratic system (which was prominently represented by the 
existence of parliament) cannot be trusted by Muslims to be used as a means to strive for 
their goals, especially in dealing with the establishment of an Islamic state. Awwas 
174 Interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Yunanto, op.cit, p. 54. 
175 Interview with Habib Rizieq, in Zada op.cit, p. 136. 
176 Ibid, p.132. 
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concludes that "the biggest obstacle to Islamic law being adopted in Indonesia is 
Democracy". 177 Moreover, democracy is also recognized as a system that has the 
potential to threaten the implementation oflslamic teachings. Logically, by accepting the 
opinion of the majority as the foundation of its policy, the government has to implement 
the interests of that majority. This means the government will potentially put into practice 
many opinions, including those which basically contradict God's law. This situation, in 
the opinion of the radical fundamentalists, will endanger all people and Muslims in 
particular. 178 
Conclusion 
From the discussion above we can see that the gradualism perspective becomes a core 
characteristic of PKS's political ideology. This characteristic shows that the Islamic 
political orientation of PKS is based on the aim to create an Islamic political system in 
the sense that Islam should be an ideology of the state and the importance of the 
caliphate. However in doing so, PKS emphasizes a moderate approach by taking in to 
account Muslim and society readiness, before conducting Islamic political ideals at the 
state level, as well as honouring the nature of Indonesia as a plural nation. This 
perspective leads PKS to accept Pancasila and the existence of the nation-state, without 
believing that such ideology and the form of the state is the final end for the Muslims. In 
relation to democracy, such mechanism is accepted as "a tool to strengthen" the political 
position of the ummat. However, even though PKS believes democracy is close to the 
spirit of Islamic teachings spirit, the mechanism of shura which fills the gap between the 
majority and "the truth" is regarded as the best mechanism for Muslims. In the context of 
Indonesian political thinking, the political view of PKS shows a new approach, which in 
turn shows more diversity in Islamic politics in Indonesia. On the one hand, PKS with 
other fundamentalists fill "the right wing" next to the modernists of the Islamic political 
streams, which in Indonesia today is becoming more obvious. On the other hand, PKS 's 
points of view indicate diversity inside the fundamentalist movement. 
177 
"Islam and democracy cannot meet. Irfan S. Awwas sets out his vision for Islamic law in Indonesia'', 
Inside Indonesia, July-September 2004. 
178 Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, in Zada, op.cit, p.133 and see also Ba'asyir's statement in Abegebriel, 
Abeveiro, SR-Ins Team, op.cit, p.688. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PKS AS A POLITICAL MOVEMENT: 
BETWEEN ISLAMIC IDEALISM AND POLITICAL INTEREST 
In recent years, PKS has emphasized inclusive themes and the general public interest in 
its political activities although it embraces Islam as its foundation and political goal. As a 
political movement, PKS has tried to show the public that its commitment towards 
Islamic values can grow and develop in the modern Indonesian political situation. Its 
political movement is nuanced by its recognition of the nation's political plurality, its 
willingness to cooperate with other parties through constitutional means, its commitment 
to the eradication of corruption; and its social commitment to society and Islamic 
solidarity by employing non-violent and moderate methods. Generally, PKS activities 
reflect its willingness to use modern political discourse and its acceptance of the national 
political system. 
As a new political phenomenon, PKS is indicative of a new approach in 
conducting political activities which combines three main elements. First, PKS thinks of 
Islam as a comprehensive political guide, whereby the Islamic teachings become main 
reference for their movement. It can be said that PKS to some extent tries to be 
consistently in line with Islamic idealism in running its political activities. The second 
element is PKS's commitment to Islamic idealism is conducted in the framework of 
dakwah principles, which emphasize gradual political change. Following the principle of 
gradualism, the beginning of the reform era is considered to be mihwar muassasi (the 
period of direct involvement with society) and PKS considers the importance of 
exercising tolerance with the political situation and other political groups. In this regard, 
PKS as a dakwah party is trying to develop a non-sectarian image and focuses on the 
problem solving agenda by rising social awareness and avoiding ideological matters. As a 
result of this strategy, PKS is involved in "non-political" arenas conducting social 
activities, and this is a major difference between this party and other Islamic political 
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parties, which are still focused on legislative and policy making political activities. The 
third element is related to its political strategy as a response to the recent political 
developments. In general, PKS' political strategy is related to attempts to instil positive 
images of the party in the eyes of the people and to attain a good position in the 
government. This strategy is sometimes problematic in terms of giving balanced priority 
to fulfilling the interests of dakwah and political achievement. 
This chapter explores how PKS implements moderate fundamentalist 
characteristics to involvement in the national political system1 and modem political 
issues. For this purpose, this chapter discusses the themes around PKS's political 
cooperation with various groups, its action surrounding the issue of the amendment of 
Article 29 of the National Constitution in the annual parliamentary meeting of the MPR, 
and about its stance on the matters of building a clean government, social awareness and 
rejection of the violent action that has spread around the country. 
A. Political Cooperation: An Inclusive Approach 
In contrast to the general belief which considers fundamentalists to be a group that has a 
tendency to develop an exclusive boundary in conducting its political agenda, PKS 
regards political cooperation as an inevitable matter which needs an extensive network. 
To PKS an inclusive approach involves contact not only with a variety of Muslim groups 
but also non-Muslim communities. PKS is inspired mainly by the political cooperation 
established by the Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime and by that of other Islamic 
political groups especially Muslim Brotherhood in the modern era. In PKS' s opinion, 
Islam allowed Muslims to develop an inclusive political cooperation with many groups in 
order to gain political influence to serve its constituent's interests.2 In this context, PKS 
also regards political cooperation as essentially related to the matter of musyarakah 
(participate in political activity), which, according to Hidayat Nur Wahid, is part of 
1 PKS willingness to involve itself with the national politics is a reflection of the moderate stance of this 
fundamentalist movement. This is interesting because for some fundamentalists this attitude is regarded as 
a bid 'ah (innovation) since it means entering secular system. See Muhammad Adlin Sila, "Gerakan Salafi 
Sebagai Gerakan Islam Politik di Indonesia", Dialog, edition I, 2004, p. 43. 
2 See Syamsul Balda, Abu Rid.ho and Untung Wahono, Politik Da 'wah Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: DPP 
Keadilan, 2000), pp. 135-144. 
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jihad.3 The importance of taking part in political activity is not only related to the process 
of Muslims learning to understand the real political situation, but also to their moral 
responsibility in providing Islamic solutions for problems. 4 Thus the combination 
between PKS's political interest and its commitment to participate in government, as well 
as upholding Islamic idealism, is central to PKS' s political cooperation. This section 
discusses some examples of cooperation undertaken by PKS and the motives behind this 
cooperation, both of which demonstrate PKS' s willingness to conduct their political 
activities in a moderate and inclusive manner. 
1. Forms of Political Cooperation 
The first form of political cooperation engaged in by PKS can be seen in the agreement to 
merge stembus accord (the vote transfer) of the 1999 election with seven other Islamic 
parties. 5 It was hoped this attempt would foster unity among Islamic parties and increase 
the bargaining position of the Islamic group in the parliament. In this kind of cooperation 
PKS regarded itself as a part of umma which had obligation to protect their interest and to 
compete with the political interest of other secular and non-Muslim political parties. 
Moreover, in the same context, PKS joined with other Islamic Parties in the Poros 
Tengah (the Middle Axis )6 alliance - a type of political caucus in the first Post-Soeharto 
Indonesian parliament - which proposed Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of NU, as 
Presidential candidate. 
For many groups, including PKS, Wahid in the end become the most suitable 
figure to lead the reform agenda as well as to avoid the political deadlock, ahead of the 
3 According to Hidayat Nur Wahid, jihad consists of the attitude of muwajaha (fighting against) as well as 
musyarakah (being involved with) in order to fight for Islamic ideals. See "Meneguhkan Trilogi 
Perjuangan'', Saksi, No.14/VI/12 May 2004. 
4 Wahid, ibid. 
5 These Islamic Parties were namely: PPP, PBB, Ummat Awakening Party (PKU), Islamic Ummah Party 
(PUI), Indonesian Islamic Political Party Indonesia Muslims Consultative Council (PPII Masyumi), 
Nahdatul Ummat Party (PNU) and Indonesian Islamic United Party 1905 (PSII 1905). 
6 This axis was actually a political caucus consisting of a number of Islamic parties in the first reform era in 
parliament, namely PPP, PBB, PK, PNU, PKU, PSII and PAN (as a Pancasila based party). This term was 
firstly introduced by Bambag Sudibyo and popularized and implemented by M. Amien Rais. The main idea 
of this axis was to seek an alternative group besides PDIP and Golkar to hinder the political deadlock. 
Concerning the process of the building making and political action of the middle axes, see Zainal Abidin 
Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2003), pp. 233-281. See also Kamarudin, Partai 
Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 
2003), pp. 124-154. 
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other presidential candidates such as Megawati Sukarnoputri from PDIP or Burhanuddin 
J. Habibie from Golkar.7 However, the political will to protect Islamic communities' 
aspirations played a crucial role in the existence of the Middle Axis. On the one hand this 
was related to the negative impression which was triggered by the political attitude of 
Megawati, the secular nationalist main figure, who was accused of giving 
disproportionate opportunity to non-Muslim politicians. On the other hand, Habibie, even 
though he was the Chair of Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), was 
regarded by the Middle Axis at that time as a continuation of the New Order regime, who 
would be not only counter productive for Islamic groups political image, but also like 
Soeharto as his political mentor, has potential to exploit Islamic communities for his 
political interests. 
Over time, PKS expanded its political cooperation by joining not only with 
other Islamic parties, but also secular nationalists as well non-Muslim parties. In fact, 
once they were in parliament, PKS at the national level was willing to join PAN, a party 
that embraced Pancasila, 8 under the Reform Faction in the DPR.9 At that time, PKS even 
rejected the offer of some Islamic parties to create a kind of Islamic faction - of which it 
could potentially have been made chair - by instead offering that those parties join the 
Reform Faction. 10 The willingness of PKS to join the Reform Faction indicated the first 
implementation of an inclusive political cooperation with a non-purely Islamic party and 
thus its willingness to cooperate with secular and non-Muslim groups, in the national and 
then local political arena. 
7 In such a situation, even though Wahid was still regarded as a controversial figure, to PKS, the middle 
axis was more promising than PDIP and Golkar. See "Bayanat Tentang Poros Tengah dalam Sorotan", in 
Iman Nugralia, Sikap Kami Kumpulan Seruan, Pernyataan Sikap, Bayanat dan Pidato Politik DPP Partai 
Keadilan, (Jakarta: Humas DPP Partai Keadilan, 2001), p. 81. 
8 This party's foundation later on was changed to be "based on the morality of the religion that bringing the 
mercy for the universe". On PAN and the changes to its foundation, see A.M Fatwa, PAN Mengangkat 
Harkat dan Martabat Bangsa, (Jakarta: Intrans, 2003). 
9 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan. Transformasi 20 Tahun gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, 
(Bandung: Teraju, 2002), pp.282-285. See the official reasons for joining the Reform Faction in "Bayanat 
Tentang Frak:si Reformasi", Nugraha, op.cit, pp. 83-85. 
10 Those Parties were Ulama Awakening Party (PNU), Ummat Awakening Party (PKU), Indonesian 
Islamic Political Party Masyumi (PPII "Masyumi), Indonesian Islamic League Party (PSII), People 
Sovereign Party (PDR). PKS's rejection which was followed by the creation of Reform Faction shortly 
appeals to other Islamic parties and groups to offend the party with critiques. Saksi No.5/VI, 31 December 
2003, p. 39. These Islamic parties later on created their own faction namely Fraksi Dau/ah Ummat (Faction 
ofUmmat Sovereignty). 
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At the national level, PKS continued to cooperate with other groups in the 2004 
Presidential election. At the second stage of the presidential election, PKS joined with 
three other parties, namely Democrat Party (PD), Party for Justice and Unity oflndonesia 
(PKPI) and PBB, to support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The first two parties based 
themselves on Pancasila and are characterised as nationalist parties. PBB, on the other 
hand, is a modernist party that was founded by the exponents of Masyumi and some 
modernists groups. 11 PD is a party that was formed by heterogeneous, inter-religious 
professional groups and some retired military officers. 12 PKPI is a nationalist party whose 
main figures come mostly from TNI and former Golkar elites who resigned after being 
replaced by civilians in Golkar. 13 Moreover, Yudhoyono, who is supported by this group, 
although a Muslim, is not an Islamic figure. He is known better as an intellectual, military 
technocrat. 14 Further, in joining this coalition, PKS endorsed a general memorandum of 
understanding which concerned modern political ideas such as good governance, national 
sovereignty and democracy; and did not clearly mention religious matters. 15 
During the first round of the President election, however, serious internal debate 
appeared between those who supported Wiranto, a retired General who was a presidential 
candidate for the Golkar party and also popularly known as the protector of Soeharto and 
his family; and the group which supported Amien Rais, the Reformasi figure, and also ex-
leader of Muhammadiyah. Although supporters of Wiranto, headed by the General 
11 On PBB see Bambang Setiawan and Bestian Nainggolan, eds, Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: ldeologi 
dan Program 2004-2009, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2004), pp. 54-59. See Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Dengan Prinsip 
Ummaatan Wasatan Kita Perjuangkan Sistem bukan Orang'', in Sahar L. Hassan, Memilih Partai Islam: 
Visi, Misi dan Persepsi, (Jakarta: Gema Insani, 1998). 
12 Setiawan and Nainggolan, ibid, pp. 172-175. 
13 Ibid, pp. 193-195. 
14 On Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, see Usamah Hisyam, SEY, Sang Demokrat, (Jakarta: Dharmapena 
Publisher, 2004) and Munawar Fuad Noeh, SEY & Islam, (Depok: eLSAKU, 2004). 
15 See "Points of Memorandum of Understanding for Togetherness in Conducting Reform for Civil, Just, 
Safe, and Prosperous Indonesia" between PKS and Yudhoyono-Kalla. (1) Consistent efforts to build a 
clean, caring and professional government; not repeating the previous government's mistakes in managing 
the government and not using the power for abusing the ummat and the nation; (2) to defend the 
sovereignty of Indonesia in the midst of international constellation, (3) to continue the democratization and 
reform process in order to establish civil society, civil supremacy and to avoid militaristic government or a 
police state (4) to improve the nation's morality, the quality of society, people's welfare and to promote law 
enforcement and human rights, (5) to support the struggle of the Palestinian people to achieve their 
independence and not to conduct diplomatic relations with Israel. See "Nota Kesepahaman Untuk Sebuah 
Kebersamaan Dalam Melaksanakan Pembahan Menuju Indonesia Madani yang Adil, Aman dan Sejahtera", 
in Sapto Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah, Konsep dan Praktik PKS di Masa Transisi, (Bandung: 
Harakatuna Publishing, 2005), pp. 372-373. 
97 
Secretary of PKS Anis Matta, 16 saw his sympathetic attitude towards dakwah interests, 17 
the reputation ofWiranto as a New Order figure and the suspicion that he is behind some 
human rights abuses, was seen as potentially causing trouble for the image of the party as 
a reformist party. Furthermore the choice to support Wiranto, would make and had 
generated a sense of political contradiction and pragmatism of PKS to some people. 
The political decision made by the Shura Council of PKS which recommended 
the party support Rais ended this dispute. 18 The long debate during the presidential 
election, however, indicated a potential for factionalism in this party particularly between 
those who tend to underplay idealism and prioritize the creation of a solid network with 
strong political groups; and those who try to uphold their political ideals and prioritized 
morality in conducting politics. Then again, in the case of cooperation building the 
various choices inside PKS in the first round of presidential election have not eliminated 
and even fostered the inclusive politics of this party. 
The attitude to open collaboration with various groups is also revealed in PKS' s 
political activities at the local arena. In the Local Election for Government Head 
(Pilkada) process, PKS showed its commitment to cooperating with other political 
parties. In this process, PKS put forward its candidates individually in several areas. 
However, in general, PKS formed alliances with parties of different ideologies. 19 In some 
areas, PKS even built a coalition even with Christian parties such as Prosperous Peace 
16 Anis Matta with other young figures such as Fachri Hamzah and Rama Pratama sometimes provide 
"unusual political options" which are the opposite to the political perception of other senior figures such as 
Hidayat Nur Wahid or Mahfudz Siddiq (The Chairperson of PKS in DPR Rl). Based on his attitudes, Matta 
is sometimes referred to as a "naughty boy". Nevertheless, not all Matta's political preferences are 
unpopular and run counter to the majority. His idea to quit the government coalition after the fuel case 
actually gained massive support from the grass roots and was in line with the majority of their 
sympathizers. On Matta's support to Wiranto, see Tempo, 09, XXXIII, 26 April-02 Mei 2004. See also 
Kompas, 2 July 2004. 
17 Defy Ruspiyandi, "Menebak Arah Dukungan PKS", Pikiran Rakyat, 21 June 2004. Supporters of 
Wiranto also pointed to the fact that this retired general was supported by Golkar as the strongest party in 
the recent election, with Solahuddin Wahid, an Islamic scholar and NU figure as candidate for the vice 
president. 
18 Of 44 members of the Shura Council, 70% (or around 31 members) chose Amien Rais-Siswono and the 
rest supported Wiranto-Solahuddin Wahid, Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar and SBY-JusufKalla, Gatra, 34th 
Edition, 2 July 2004. 
19 Up to 2005, PKS has been a part of 48 coalitions for Pilkada. Some of them were won by the cadre of 
PKS such as in Depok (West Jawa), West Bangka (Bangka Belitung), South Halmahera (Maluku), Sula 
Archipelago, Riau Archipelago (Riau Archipelago), East Lampung (Lampung) dan Banjarmasin (South 
Kalimantan). Two PKS's cadres Nurmahmudi Isma'il and Muhammad Kasuba have position as Mayor in 
Depok and Regent in South Halmahera. 
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Party (PDS).20 This attitude, according to the Chairman of Party Advisory Assembly 
(11PP) of PKS Hilmi Aminuddin, is a concrete implementation of pluralism. Aminuddin 
stated that: 
"To nurture and maintain this nation's pluralism, we develop pluralism 
through pilkada. There are 48 pilkada coalitions with various political 
parties. Out of 48 pilkada, we won 40 pilkada together with our coalition 
partners ... Even in Eastern Indonesia PKS formed a coalition with PDS, a 
party whose majority elements are Christian".21 
This political attitude shows PKS' s commitment in honouring pluralism at the 
practical level, notwithstanding that this commitment, considering PKS' s ideals on the 
leadership of Islam at national and international level, is still limited in the political sense 
that it emphasizes only the acknowledgement of the political right of other groups to 
participate in the political arena. 22 
PKS' s attitude above is not something new for Islamic political parties. At the 
international level, Islamic fundamentalist groups have practiced this in several countries, 
including IM in Egypt which was willing to cooperate with the nationalists and even the 
socialists. 23 In the Indonesian context, such cooperation has also been implemented, 
although not necessarily by the fundamentalists. Masyumi for instance, developed 
harmonious relations with some secular and non-Muslim parties during period of Liberal 
Democracy. In its coalition cabinet, Masyumi had figures from various political groups, 
except the communists, and this party also set up the Democratic League with some 
secular and Catholic parties. 24 
20 On PDS see Setiawan and Nainggolan, op.cit, pp. 376-379. See also www.partaidamaisejahtera.com. 
21 Suhartono, "PKS Telah Praktikan Pluralisme di Pilkada. Termasuk Berkoalisi dengan PDS'', Kompas, 1 
August 2005. 
22 On limited pluralism, see Masykuri Abdillah, Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna: Respons lntlektual 
Muslim Indonesia terhadap Konsep Demokrasi (1966-1993), (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1999). 
Arkeno explains that the differences between PKS and liberal Islamic groups in understanding pluralism is 
that while the liberals tend to accept extended pluralism by believing in and promoting internal plurality 
among Muslim and to some extent Islamic teachings itself, PKS tends to restrict the pluralism for only in 
terms of external situation among Indonesian citizen. Interview with Arkeno in Jakarta, 18 November 2005. 
23 Daniel Bromberg, "Rhetoric and Strategy, Islamic Movements and Democracy in Middle East'', in 
Martin Kramer, (ed.), The lslamism Debate, (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and Africa 
Studies-Tel Aviv University, 1997), pp.23-25. On the reasons behind their cooperative movement and 
political alliance see Taufiq Yusuf Al-Wa'iy, Pemikiran Politik Kontemporer Al-lkhwan Al-Muslimun 
Studi Analitis, Observatif, Dokumentatif, (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2003), particularly Chapter 5 and 6. 
24 On the political movement Masyumi, see Yusril Ih:za Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme 
dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-lslami (Pakistan), 
(Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999). 
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PKS' s stance is different from Islamic radical fundamentalist groups such as 
MMI, FPI and LJASWJ, which are reluctant to develop an inclusive and concrete 
cooperation with the secular and non-Muslims parties in their political activities. This is 
not only related to their exclusive political themes, but also because of the radical 
fundamentalist's critical attitude towards other parties or groups which are using 
Pancasila and are not based on Islam. For this reason, political barriers tend to exist 
between the radical fundamentalists with other groups in Indonesia. On the other hand, 
PKS has, since its establishment, declared itself not to be a part of those Islamic groups 
who strictly dichotomize parties between those that use Islam as their basis and those 
who use Pancasila. Instead, to PKS the cooperation with any parties regardless of their 
ideological basis whether Islam or Pancasila has to be developed.25 Therefore, to PKS, 
the important thing that should be developed is creating good cooperation, rather than 
making boundaries between Islamic groups and others. 
2. Dilemma between Dakwah and Power Maintenance 
In developing political cooperation, strategic considerations become inevitable. Dakwah 
interests are sometimes mixed with political power maintenance and the desire to gain a 
better political position. This mixture of motives, particularly in relation to the 
preservation of idealism, sometimes causes advantage as well as difficulties for PKS. 
PKS' s choice to join PAN was based on the belief that PAN - which 1s 
supported mainly by most Islamic modernists, especially Muhammadiyah and its cadres -
at least at that time26, has a commitment to develop dakwah in Indonesia. Therefore PAN, 
in PKS' s opinion can be expected to accommodate the Islamic agendas which were 
developed by the faction or PKS. In fact, according to Prayitno, under the Reform 
Faction, PK and PAN were successful in creating good understanding.27 Moreover by 
joining the reform fraction together with PAN which has 34 seats, the political agenda 
and interest of PKS would be more effectively articulated, compared to if PKS joined 
25 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, op.cit, p.155. 
26 The "first generation" of PAN elites and cadres, was mainly intellectuals and Islamic scholars mainly 
from Muhammadiyah. This can be observed in the first central committee of this party, including Amien 
Rais and AM Fatwa. At the local level, Muhammadiyah's cadres played a significant role in establishing 
the local committee board of PAN and took the leadership of this party. In such situation the sense that 
PAN as a party for Muhammadiyah cadres was strong. 
27 Interview with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005. 
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other small Islamic Parties. As a result, both parties were able to pursue their political 
agendas. 28 Additionally, it was hoped that Rais as reform leader provide PKS with an 
improved political image, particularly as a party which was committed to the reform 
agenda and moral politics. Thus, improved political capacity and image also became the 
reasons behind the establishment of political cooperation with PAN. 
Furthermore, dakwah interest and political strategy are also manifested in the 
case of the national government coalition and Pilkada. PKS considered that joining the 
Yudhoyono government coalition would give PKS - as a party which has an ambition to 
be "vanguard party" in the future - a wider opportunity to enter the national political 
arena and give them the opportunity to learn and be involved directly with national 
problems and national leadership, and in the end implement and articulate Islamic 
interests in the government.29 In the context of image building, PKS involvement in the 
Yudhoyono administration also showed that Islamic groups can cooperate with any party 
in the government. This was seen as a way to break the stigma, especially of the New 
Order era, that Islamic groups are exclusive, extremist and find it difficult to cooperate 
with other groups.30 PKS' attitude is a significant step even for a party that has 
fundamentalist background. However, this open attitude is not something new for the 
modernist groups in the reform era. PBB for instance since the early time of 
Yudhoyono's campaign declared its support for his candidature. 
The existence of PKS inside Yudhoyono's administration also indicates a 
political motive in terms of becoming a part of power. This is a common objective of a 
political party including PKS which aspires to gain political positions. Nevertheless, in 
the context of PKS, the situation is not so simple because this party declares itself and has 
commitment to developing moral values and social awareness in political life. A difficult 
situation became a reality when Yudhoyono's administration made unpopular decision, 
especially in relation to reducing the subsidy for petroleum (BBM). The issue of the 
BBM eventually caused internal tension with one group advocating the "radical choice" 
28 Interview with Irwan Prayitno in Jakarta, 9 December 2005. 
29 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005; with Yoyoh Yusroh in Jakarta, 21 
November 2005; with Untung Wahono in Jakarta, 17 November 2005 and with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 
November 2005. 
30 Interview with Amri Yusra in Depok, 18 November 2005; with Kamarudin in Depok, 30 November 
2005. On this image, see Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalarn Politik Orde Baru, (Jakarta: Gema 
Insani Press, 1996), pp. 243-244. 
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that PKS should become an opposition group so as to keep its positive image and 
idealism, and another arguing that it needed to keep its position inside the government.31 
Some critical figures demand this party withdraw from the coalition. 32 Considering the 
hardship created by fuel prices rises, Mashadi one of the previous PKS MP says that "this 
time the ummat has become a victim of the party's cooperative attitude to the 
government" .33 
However, the proposal to quit the government eventually lost out to the 
moderate choice to stay in the government, with the hope that PKS can keep its access so 
as to internally influence the government and the future of dakwah. This situation 
indicates that strong position of the Shura Council, which today has become more 
conscious of the importance of maintaining political relations with the government, has 
created more moderate attitudes which have sometimes generated negative public 
sentiments. In this context, I find this dakwah argument to be unconvincing, by itself. 
Although reduction in the BBM subsidy is inevitable, considering the increase 
m the world price of fuel, the choice to drastically reduce it shows governments' 
insensitivity towards the poorer sections of Indonesian population. PKS' s 
accommodating attitude during legislation process to reduce the BBM subsidy, compared 
to the attempts of resistance by other parties with positions in cabinet such as PKB and 
PAN, 34 in facing this fact was a political mistake for the party which has promoted itself 
31 The BBM issue has generated an internal restlessness in PKS. According to Kamarudin (a lecturer and 
also researcher at FISIP UI who is also a Tarbiyah cadre) based on his observation the cadres in some local 
areas face serious trouble in explaining PKS' s attitude towards the government's fuel policy to their 
constituents. Most of them regret their party's attitude which was mainly regarded as insensitive. 
According to Kamarudin and Prihandoko, even though formally only two Provincial Boards (in DKI 
Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta) and one Branch of PKS (in Solo) agreed with the Anis Matta's proposal, the 
majority of the cadre at the grass root level, personally, preferred PKS to quit from the government 
coalition. This is because for them the Memorandum of Understanding has actually been broken by SBY 
and they were worried PKS would potentially suffer, if PKS is still engaged in the coalition. Kamarudin 
describes this as a political gamble for PKS. Interview with Kamaruddin in Depok, 30 November 2005; 
With Prihandoko in Depok, 6 December 2005; with Arkeno in Jakarta, 18 November 2005. 
32 This includes the General Secretary of PKS, Anis Matta. On Matta's opinion to opt out from the 
coalition, see"Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan'', in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. 
33 "Ini Politik Bos'', Tempo, 16 October 2005. 
34 Before this proposal was stipulated there were five options in responding to the government's proposal 
for reducing subsidies (1) reject, (2) accept, (3), can understand, (4) reject and return the proposal to the 
DPR budget committee, and (5) review, which means government and DPR re-discuss this proposal before 
implementing it. Only PDIP Faction chose the first option. Meanwhile PKB walked out of this process 
because it did not want to take responsibility for the negative effects of the policy. On the other hand PAN 
chose the fourth option of returning the process to the first step. Other parties including Golkar, PD and 
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as a "caring" party in order to win support. Furthermore, considering PKS's critical 
attitudes toward Presidents Wahid and Megawati for their support of BBM subsidy 
reductions, this new moderate stance, which was mainly based on the attempt to stay in 
power, shows PKS' s inconsistency. This move indicates that PKS should be understood 
as being capable of acting inconsistency depending on political conditions. However, this 
does not mean PKS totally lose its critical attitude. In general, PKS regards the 
implementation of economic reform by Yudhoyono's government is slow and still not 
. . 35 
convmcmg . 
The will to implement Islamic ideals and demonstrate moderate attitudes was 
also the reason for PKS's participation in Pilkada. PKS saw that by involving itself in the 
government directly, it could implement the ideals of Islamic teaching at the local 
government level. Generally, PKS demands that the local government and the local 
leaders provide an umbrella for the progress of dakwah by giving wider space and 
opportunity for it.36 Related to this matter, the President of PKS Sembiring stated that: 
" ... our consideration in the context of Pilkada, as the initial stage to come 
into executive field, must in line with the context of the dakwah party. Stay 
within the context of enjoining good and avoiding evil. So, everything related 
to the process and the election of the candidates up until a coalition with 
other parties, should consider as a principle that we are da 'i (preacher) before 
we act. Therefore, we must design "dakwah" this is more comprehensive, at 
every field and level... and how do we make an effective change within the 
society and try to implement Allah's Law gradually through local autonomy 
authority". 37 
Based on this notion, Pilkada is actually considered as a sarana ekspansi 
dakwah (medium to expand dakwah), which demands professional people who are 
committed to the implementation of dakwah and the application oflslamic law. However, 
this does not mean that PKS will take dramatic measures. 38 PKS considers that the 
PKS chose the fifth option, which meant the wanted to review technical matters but basically agreed to this 
policy. See Waluyo, op.cit, p.325. 
35 See "Tifatul dan Rama: Rombak Kabinet", in http://pk-sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=3275 
36 "Agenda Kepala Daerah'', 22 July 2005, in http://pk-sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=3184. 
37 "Pilkada Sebagai Sarana Ekspansi Dakwah", in "Pesan Harian Presiden PKS", 22 June 2005, in http://pk-
sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=3086. 
38 Interview in Saksi with Ralunat Abdullah, in Saksi, No.14/VI/12 May 2004. 
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change should be made gradually. This is particularly related to the readiness of the 
system and the mentality of the local bureaucrats in conducting this change. 39 
In reality, however, PKS is not only trying to bring about gradual changes in the 
bureaucracy, but also trying to "soften" its dakwah implementation by supporting some 
political figures who are also supported by nationalist secular and pragmatic parties such 
as PDIP and Golkar.40 In the regions where Tarbiyah movement has not traditionally 
been active, PKS does not, in fact, have many options except to put forward a pluralist 
approach. In general, thus PKS' s inclusive political activities are part of its dilemma in 
maintaining its dakwah and political interests. In this sense, sometimes its activities have 
been inclined towards pragmatic strategies in order to gain wider acceptance and retain a 
better position in local government. The political behaviours of PKS accord with the 
arguments made by by Sanchez-Cuenca41 and Taniyici42 regarding the correlation 
between moderateness and political will to gain higher position. 
8. Amending the Constitution: Article 29 and Religious Pluralism 
Some people believe that the amendment of the 29th article, by restating 'the seven 
words' of the Jakarta Charter, is a stepping stone to the implementation of syari'ah and, 
finally, the establishment of an Islamic state. For this reason, the radical fundamentalists 
strongly support the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter, while on the other hand the 
secular nationalists and non-Muslim groups oppose this proposal. PKS, taking into 
consideration the stages of dakwah and long term political strategy, rejects the proposal 
of the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter. In this case PK shows its pluralist attitude by 
putting forward a moderate and "catch all" proposal which is mainly inspired by the 
39 Interview with Prihandoko in Depok, 6 December 2005. 
40 The fact is during the first five years of reformasi era both parties showed little commitment to fight 
corruption let alone implement Islamic dakwah. PKS' political cooperation in Pilkada with Golkar can be 
seen for example in the case of Riau Province, Kepulauan Riau Regency and The City of Batam, 
meanwhile with PDIP in Pangkajene Regency, Purbalingga Regency, Musi Rawas Regency, North Luwu 
Regency, The City of Semarang, The City of Bontang, The City of Batam. On these coalitions, see 
Republika, 4 Juli 2005. Waluyo, op.cit, p.356. Republika, 10 June 2006. 
41 Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca, "Party Moderation and Politician's Ideological Rigidity", in Party Politics, Vol 
10, No.3, pp. 325-342. 
42 Saban Taniyici, "Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey, Islamist Welfare Party's Pro-EU Turn'', in 
Party Politics, vol 9, no.4, pp.463-483. 
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Medina Charter. The discussion of this matter is important because it basically describes 
the political orientation of a party. 
1. Rejecting the Jakarta Charter 
PKS's political stance on the amendment of Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution in the 
2000 MPR Annual Session was generally related to the nation's political pluralism. In 
this case, PKS took into account the fact that Indonesia is not a single-religion country. 
Thus, this party believed that the obligation to perform religious activities must be 
afforded to all citizens based on the spirit of equality, not only for Muslims. 43 This 
basically is to avoid a sense of discrimination toward non-Muslim Indonesians. To PKS, 
the most important thing about amending Article 29 is to implement the basic idea of 
Islamic teaching that the state has the right to be involved in religious matters, without 
giving the impression of discrimination to secular and non-Muslim groups. 
PKS calculated that the attitude against the amendment was getting stronger. 
The party was of the view that to incorporate "Islamic terms" such as syari 'ah, including 
some of the words in the Jakarta Charter, into the constitution needs the support of a 
significant number of members of the MPR The reality is that the 'Islamic factions or 
parties have never been a majority in the Indonesian political constellation and the fact is 
that not all Islamic communities and parties agree on the reinstatement of the Jakarta 
Charter. Thus, to PKS it was better for Islamic groups to put forward a moderate 
proposal, by reducing to some extent the "Islamic terms", without losing its essence.44 
PKS's policy is that in such a political situation an alternative is needed that can be 
accepted by all groups. 45 
43 "Partai Keadilan Setuju Amandemen Pasal 29 UUD 1945'', 13 August 2000, in http://pk-
sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=296. 
44 Untung Wahono, "Jawaban Soal Penegakan Syariat Islam", in Saksi, No.5/VI, 31December2003. 
45 This amendment was rejected by some Islamic scholars, Islamic communities, secular nationalists, and 
non-Muslims. The main reason for their rejection was that the amendment would trouble the fundamental 
nature of Indonesia as a plural state. Also to these groups, the proposal of syari 'ah implementation for 
Muslims would cause a set back condition in terms of the nation honouring equality and justice for all 
citizens. See the second chapter of Umar Basalim, Pro Kontra Piagam Jakarta di Era Reformasi, (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2002). 
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To respond to this matter, PKS used the example of the practice of the Prophet's 
government in Medina under the Medina Charter.46 To PKS, the basic idea of this Charter 
was its pluralism so that it was considered appropriate to be adopted as an alternative 
idea 47 to the Jakarta Charter which was proposed by the modernists and radical 
fundamentalists. These groups, which were represented by PBB, PPP and several Islamic 
organisations, demanded that the amendment of Article 29 (clause one) should contain 
"the seven words" concerning the obligation of adherents of Islam to carry out Syari' ah 
law. Over time, PKS's attitude has been consistent in fighting for the Medina Charter. 
Therefore, even though PKS recognises the importance of the Jakarta Charter, it 
continues to view the Jakarta charter from the Medina Charter's point of view or 
sometimes stated as "Piagam Jakarta yang berwawasan Piagam Madinah ". 48 
At the MPR Annual Session in 2000, PKS, together with PAN, completed the 
proposals to amend article 29, by endorsing the idea of the "adherents of every religion 
are obligated to carry out their religious teaching" as the third proposal. The first proposal 
was to make no amendment to the article, a proposal which was supported by a majority 
in the parliament. The second proposal was suggested by two Islamic Parties, namely 
PPP and PBB, and was to add to the first verse of this article the statement regarding the 
obligation of every Muslim to perform religious activities, as stated in the Jakarta 
Charter. The third proposal was sponsored by a nationalist faction in MPR, which is 
Indonesia National United Faction (FKKI), and proposed the addition of all pillars of 
Pancasila in the first verses of the article. 49 
46 On Medina Charter and its relation to the Prophet's government, see Munawir Sjadzali, Islam dan Tata 
Negara, Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemrldran, (Jakarta: Universitas hldonesia Press, 1990), pp. 9-20. See also 
John L. Esposito and John 0. Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
p.40. On the impact of such charter and The Medina State on Islamic civilization, see in Robert N. Bellah, 
"Islamic Tradition and Problem and Problem of Modernization", in Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief 
Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World, (New York: Harper and Row Publisher, 1970), pp.150-
151. 
47 Interview by Nandang Burhanudin with Hidayat Nurwahid in Nandang Burhanudin, Penegakan Syariah 
Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan, (Jakarta: Al-Jannah, 2004), pp. 161-162. 
48 Saksi, foe. cit, p. 43. 
49 On each faction's proposal description, see Basalim, op.cit, pp. 123-126. 
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2. Religious Commitment in the Current Situation 
The endorsement of the third alternative was considered differently by several Islamic 
groups especially those who proposed the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter. These 
groups believed that PKS does not have a commitment to or at least is not serious in 
supporting the establishment of Islamic Law in Indonesia. It was even considered to be 
providing the opportunity for polytheism to develop in society. 50 
Meanwhile the reason for some of the Islamic political parties, such as PBB and 
PPP to support the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter is due to historical and principle 
matters. Historically, this is related to the effort to straighten the Indonesian history. This 
is particularly related to Soekarno' s promise to integrate the Jakarta Charter as an 
inextricable element of the preamble ofUUD 1945. As a consequence, constitutionally, 
the matters related to religions and the state must be connected to the Jakarta Charter. 
Further, in terms of principles, both parties believe in the role of the state as a strategic 
element in the effort to establish the right religious life for Muslims as the majority in 
Indonesia, without having to sacrifice the rights of the minority. Thus, based on those two 
reasons, it is interesting to note that even though the two parties support the establishment 
of the Islamic laws, the main reason is not to try and establish an Islamic state. 51 This 
stance, which is the political foundation of the modernists, is obviously in line with their 
point of view about the role of Islam in the state, as well as the existence of the nation-
state. 
On the other hand, to some radical fundamentalist organisations, the Jakarta 
Charter is deemed to be an entry point for the formal establishment of syari 'ah in 
Indonesia, which can become a stepping stone for the establishment of a more 
comprehensive Islamic system, even an Islamic state.52 For this group, the rejection of the 
Jakarta Charter indicates a betrayal attempt in keeping the wrong type of the state system 
for Muslims. 53 Thus, in contrast to the modernists who emphasized the historical and 
50 Hussein Umar, "Mereka tidak mendukung Syariat Islam'', inSaksi, No.5NI/31December2003, p.60. 
51 On these reasons, see Basalim, op.cit, pp.174-224. 
52 Khamarni Zada, Islam Radikal Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia, (Bandung: 
Teraju, 2002), p.183. 
53 S. Yunanto, et.al, Gerakan Militan Islam di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara, (Jakarta: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung and The Ridep Institute, 2003), pp. 46. 
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substantialist approach, the radical fundamentalists based their action on the legal and 
formal approach in promoting the Jakarta Charter. 
Nevertheless to PKS, the rejection of the Jakarta Charter does not mean refusing 
the implementation of syari'ah. In fact the proposal of the Medina Charter is considered 
by PKS as a right reflection of their religious commitment for a number of reasons. The 
first is that, ideologically, this proposal is considered as purely Islamic. This is because 
PKS directly extracted this idea from the Prophet's time, whiles the Jakarta Charter, on 
the other hand, was formed by the Indonesian founding fathers in the 201h century. 
Therefore, this proposal is actually considered more appropriate for Muslims. 54 The 
second reason is that, politically, PKS considers that the gradual impact of the Medina 
Charter will be the same as the Jakarta Charter. The state in the end has the right to 
organise religious life for all societies without any exception. 
However, even though PKS agrees in principle with the idea of the state 
managing religious affairs, as its commitment to construct public devoutness, PKS 
observes that Indonesian society is not yet ready to implement Islamic syari 'ah entirely. 55 
Thus by endorsing the third proposal, PKS is mainly concerned with the way to achieve 
medium-term political goals, that is, to build a state that pays attention to and supports 
religious matters in society. This loose attitude is in line with the current phase of dakwah 
that according to PKS is not yet directed to the Islamization of the state, but teaches an 
appropriate understanding about the essence of the Islamic syari 'ah and proves that this 
Islamic law can be implemented at the level of society. Therefore, according to Hidayat 
Nur Wahid, it can be understood if PKS prefers to provide a more moderate alternative. 
In this situation the process of syari 'ah implementation can actually be carried out 
without the major involvement of the state. 56 Furthermore by endorsing this proposal, 
PKS demonstrated Muslim commitment to pluralism so that it could refute the accusation 
of sectarianism. Thus, by endorsing the alternative amendment which was inspired by the 
Medina Charter, PKS was able to harmonize various interests particularly in terms of 
54 Interview by Nandang Burhanudin with Salim Segaf al-Jufri, in Burhanudin, op.cit. p.147. Interview with 
Chairuman in Bekasi, 19 November 2005; with Hidayat in Tangerang 26 November 2005. 
55 Interview in Saksi with Hidayat Nur Wahid, in Saksi, No.26/II, 5 September 2000. 
56 Republika, 18 February 2002. 
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translating their idealism into more contextual political language. This is where the 
essence of the idea of moderate fundamentalism is located - in the third proposal. 
On the other hand, the alternative proposal for this amendment in reality is more 
a rhetorical device than a serious proposal. This is due to the difficulties that would surely 
arise if this proposal was accepted. The proposal clearly demands the role of the state in 
organizing all religions in Indonesia. This would trigger challenges not only from Muslim 
groups, but also from other religious groups who are not yet used to government 
intervention in their religious affairs, at least in the context of Indonesia. Furthermore, the 
Medina Charter was an agreement that involved the ahlul kitab (Jews and Christians) 
who then had rights as zimmi. The question then arises concerning the role of non-ahlul 
kitab such as Hindu and Buddhist communities. Certainly this matter requires a more 
comprehensive contemplation. However, in reality, up until the end of the 2000 annual 
meeting of MPR, there was no serious political follow-up from PKS and PAN to consider 
a more systematic approach to this alternative proposal. 
PKS's attitude shows at least three things. First, the choice to propose the 
amendment based on the Medina Charter was actually an instantaneous political response 
towards political developments at that time. Therefore PKS at that time was actually not 
in the position to offer a feasible and concrete proposal based on deeper exploration, 
instead saying only that its proposal was in line with Islamic teachings and pluralism. 
Second, this unreadiness to provide a more detailed proposal was actually in line with the 
stage of dakwah, which according to PKS was still at the period of developing social 
networking within society. Thus the creation of a concrete proposal was not yet 
considered urgent. In fact for PKS the implementation of the Medina Charter will 
automatically be accepted someday in the future when the whole society is ready. Third, 
PKS had initially recognised the impossibility for the reinstatement of the Jakarta 
Charter. Consequently in such a situation, the main problem was not about winning the 
game, but rather how to provide a middle way proposal which could generate a good 
image for the public without loosing PKS's identity as an Islamic group which is 
committed to the establishment of syari 'ah. Based on these reasons, the moderate attitude 
of PKS in "the Medina Charter proposal" case at the 2000 MPR annual meeting is not a 
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senous exploration for the current constitutional model which can be implemented 
concretely for the nation today. 
C. Promoting "Clean and Caring" Government and a Non-Violent Attitude 
PKS' s political actions in its seven years of existence are also marked by their 
commitment to clean government, social awareness, and anti-violence. These 
commitments indicate that as an Islamic party, PKS does not only focus on ideological 
matters, but also, as part of its commitment to dakwah, tries to concentrate on the real 
problems of the nation as a way to justify Islam as a solution and a media for 
reconstructing good moral attitudes in politics. This attitude, not only gives a new view of 
the implementation of syari 'ah, which covers humanitarian and social dimensions, but 
also provides new meaning for non-political functions of political parties in Indonesia. As 
a consequence of its commitment, PKS has received a positive response from many 
people, so that M.C. Ricklefs, for instance, has described PKS as "the hope for the 
Indonesian people for an end to corruption and for greater competence and morality in 
government". 57 
1. Fighting Corruption 
During its existence, PKS has become the leading political advocate of clean government. 
This stance can be observed from their anti-corruption activities in this reform era. This 
has become a new spirit for political life in a country that was acutely engulfed by 
corruption. Even though it is difficult to prove that this party is entirely clean, PKS 's 
political action to combat corruption is not merely rhetoric. Anti-corruption activities and 
the reduction of expenditure of the government budget are demonstrated by PKS 
members at the national and local level. 
At the national level, for instance, PKS officially declined allowances for the 
DPR members and specifically orders its members not to travel abroad. 58 Moreover, one 
of the PKS' s cadres became the key figure behind the disclosure of a corruption scandal 
57 M.C. Ricklefs, "Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore's Giant Neighbour", Public 
Lecture in Asian Civilizations Museum, 23 September 2004. 
58 "PKS Tolak Kenaikan Tunjangan Anggota DPR'', Media Indonesia, 13 July 2005. See also "PKS Tolak 
Kenaikan Gaji Pejabat dan DPR", Suara Merdeka, 31 July 2005. "Anggaran Perjalanan DPR Naik 130%. 
PKS Menolak",Medialndonesia, 14 July 2005. 
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concerning pilgrimage funds at the Department of Religion. Furthermore, at the local 
level, several PKS members have refused to accept money which is indicated as bribe or 
from illegal sources and even bravely reported the use of this kind of money by some 
member of parliaments to the society. 59 PKS reported some corruptors in some regions 
trying to embezzle state money of more that 73 9. 5 billions. 60 In the context of corruption, 
PKS Syari 'ah Council has instructed all legislative members from PKS to reject all funds 
from uncertain sources. This instruction is obeyed by the legislative members from PKS. 
Indeed, in Tangerang City, the staff of DPD PKS set up a special institution to conduct 
surveillance of their members in the parliament, particularly in the corruption related 
matters.61 By considering many corruption cases that involve Islamic parties, 
organizations and figures, the quality of PKS' s attitude toward corruption indicates the 
strong influence of ideology to its cadres. In this context the meaning of Islam, as 
ideology, is not just an empty symbol, but becomes a motivation to commit to moral 
behaviours. 
However, PKS' s attempt to eradicate corruption is not free from some hurdles. 
The involvement of PKS cadre in the case of the trip to Hong Kong and South Korea 
which was held by Commission VIII of DPR 62 and the fact that two cadre of PKS, in 
their capacity as members of parliament of West Sumatra Province, were involved in 
committing corruption63 demonstrates that PKS cannot escape from the scandal of 
embezzling state money and corruption. In the Indonesian political situation, where 
corruption is to some extent still part of the political decision-making process, the party 
must be careful. Without serious and consistent awareness, the image of the party may be 
damaged in the future. However, PKS in general is a party that is quite successful to 
prove its commitment to fight corruption. This is reflected by its decision to sack its 
59 On the details of the struggle of some PKS' cadres against corruption, see Muhammad Nuh and 
Mochamad Bugi, Mereka Melawan Korupsi, Jihad Wakil Rakyat PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Pustaka Saksi, 
2003). 
60 Bisnis Indonesia, 29 April 2004. 
61 Interview withHidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005. 
62 This trip was coordinated by Irwan Prayitno (member of Reform Faction from PKS) and was said to be a 
waste of state money of at least 150 Million Rupiah. Some observers say that the using of that money was 
basically useless because in the end the visit itself did not give any particular advantage to the people. On 
this, see Sopian, Raport Merah PKS Jangan Terulang Kembali, (Jakarta: Haekal Publishing, 2004), pp. 25-
31. 
63 Kompas, 9 June 2004. 
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members who are proven corrupt. Consequently, this party sometimes becomes a 
"common enemy", particularly in some local governments due to its strict stance towards 
corruption. 
2. Social and Islamic World Awareness 
As a part of its commitment to the spirit of proving Islam as a solution by spreading 
mercy for all people, and in the interests of being more recognized by the people, PKS is 
involved in a number of social activities. These activities show that at least up until now 
PKS is the only party conducting regular social programs for the people. This includes 
the existence of many disaster care posts established by PKS in various disaster and 
conflict areas. This awareness is also exhibited by building cooperation with labors in 
various areas, 64 and with peasants through organizing farmers' cooperatives buying rice 
in the husk, and by con,ducting training and advocacy. 65 In terms of awareness, PKS has 
been also involved in demonstrations against the failure of government in dealing with 
the human tragedy in some conflict areas. 66 In addition, PKS also gave donations from 
the allowance of the DPR members to their constituents in some poor and disaster areas. 
This allowance, 10 Million Rupiah per month, was paid in the end of 2005 and the PKS 
Faction collected around 2. 7 Billion Rupiah from their members and distributed it to 
some areas like Aceh. 67 
However, PKS's approval of the withdrawal of the fuel subsidy in 2005 -
although the party refused it at first, 68 then changed its mind on the condition that the fuel 
rise would not occur before Eid Day and the price increase would not be tremendous -
generated criticism from many people. This engendered the impression that PKS's social 
awareness was declining. As a response to the internal disappointment and for PKS' s 
64 See Saksi, No.11/VI, 31 March 2004, pp.52-60. See also the testimony of one of the members of the 
National Labour Union (SPN) in Saksi, No.9/VI, 3 March 2004, p.48. 
65 Saksi, No.9/VI, 3 March 2004, pp. 46-47. See also "Untuk Mengangkat Harga, PK Sejahtera Beli Gabah 
Petani'', Kompas, 3 July 2003. 
66 Yuliawan Krisnadi, Hasan Syukur and Mochtra Touwe, "Mencari Pawang Bambu Gila", Gatra, 13 
March 1999, pp. 56-59. 
67 See "PKS Salurkan Tunjangan ke Konstituen", Republika, 28 December 2005. 
68 See "Anggota F. PKS DPR Tolak Kenaikan BBM' in News: 19 September 2005, in http://pk-
sejahtera.org!article.php?storyid=3320. See also "Sikap FPKS dalam Rapat Pleno Panitia Anggaran 
Seputar Polemik Subsidi BBBM' in News: 26 September 2005, in http://pk-
sejahtera.org/moduleslnews/print.php ?storyid= 3320. 
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political image, in relation to the BBM case, PKS then declared that its coalition with 
Yudhoyono's government was not permanent. By relating it to the concept of 
musyarakah, PKS believes that coalition is only a media to establish party's interests that 
can be renewed or even left if leaving the coalition will not bring disadvantages for the 
party.69 
PKS' s actions m ra1smg awareness are also focused on the external world, 
particularly the Islamic world. As a fundamentalist group that has a commitment to build 
Islamic civilization, PKS pays attention the growth of brotherhood sentiment among 
Muslims around the world. According to Almuzzamil Yusuf: 
"If we are consistent in upholding Islam, Islam will not only flourish in 
Indonesia, but also in all parts of the world. Our concern is not only for 
inside the country - in fact today the world has become a global village and 
h . . £ "70 t at 1s a certamty or us . 
Related to Islamic solidarity, it is written in PKS policy that the party has a 
mission to make positive contribution to defending oppressed Muslim countries.71 To this 
matter Mahfudz Siddiq admitted that 
"PKS as a political party not only discusses how to make maneuvers in the 
parliament, how to manage power in the executive, but also how to respond 
to the problems surrounding the Islamic world because they are the Muslims' 
bl "72 pro ems . 
Based on this view, since the beginning of its existence PKS has been active in 
holding demonstrations. Solidarity actions are sometimes followed-up by fund raising, 73 
the establishment of action committees, 74 and political attempts to persuade the 
government to release a policy that supports the struggle of the Palestinian people and 
condemns the violent actions of the Israeli government.75 Indeed, PKS pronounced that it 
69 Ibid, p.19. Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005. 
7° From transcript of interview with Almuzzammil Yusuf by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 7 June 2004. 
71 Buku Anggaran Dasar Partai Keadilan, (Depok: DPD Partai Keadilan Kota Depok), p.38. 
72 From transcript of interview with Mahfudz Siddiq by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 11 February 2004. 
73 See"PKS Galang Dana untuk Palestina", in http://pk-sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=3279. 
74 This includes Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Rakyat Irak (Indonesian Committee for Iraqi People 
Solidarity, KlSRA) and Komite Keadilan untuk Pembebasan Masjid Al-Aqsa (Justice Committee for 
Liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque). 
75 See "Pernyataan Publik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Aksi Solidaritas Untuk Pejuang Masjid Al-Aqsha, 
Jakarta 17 April 2005", "PKS Desak SEY-Kalla Dukung Penyelamatan Masjid Al-Aqsha", 22 April 2005 
in http:/lpk-sejahtera.orglmodules/newslprint.php?storyid=3014. See also "FPKS Minta Pemerintah Kutuk 
Langkah Israel Kuasai Kompleks Masjid Al-Aqso", 22 April 2005 in http://pk-
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is ready to deploy its members to fight in Palestine if Israel destroys the Aqsha Mosque 
and it is approved by the Indonesian Government. 76 US attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
oppression in Chechnya, the Southern Philippines, and Southern Thailand have also come 
to the attention of PKS. As a new party, to some extent PKS has successfully developed 
political communication with the public through its demonstration actions. 
Care and awareness of the Islamic world are also the concern of the modernists, 
radical fundamentalists, and Muslims in general. However, PKS is the party that 
consistently organisess rallies and these have become one of its trademarks. 77 This action 
provides a new image of the non-pragmatic role of a political party in Indonesia. This 
attitude is actually related to PKS's commitment to develop a role not only in the political 
realm at the state level, but also in social and cultural field from the level of the 
individual, then family, through society at large.78 Because of this commitment, 
according to Arkeno, other parties, including Islamic Parties, sometimes question PKS' s 
activities and involvement in social matters, such as the establishment of the aid posts 
and deployment of PKS' cadres in some disasters areas, because according to them, this 
is not part of a political party's function. 79 Thus, PKS 's social awareness provides a new 
nuance for Islamic political parties not only in terms of translating syari 'ah 
implementation into more extended meanings (not only related to constitutional matters 
but also cultural and day-to-day problems) but also giving a new meaning to the function 
of political parties by showing their non-political concerns to the people. In this situation, 
PKS does not restrict the function of political parties to matters of power in order to gain 
political position, but extents the meaning of power into the utilitarian perspectives 
which, according to Kymlicka, 80 is related to human welfare and equality problems. In 
sejahtera.org/modules/news/print.php?storyid=3013. "PKS Tuntut Bukti Pemerintah Dukung Palestina" in 
Kompas, 18 April 2005. 
76 See this comment by the Coordinator for Youth and Sport, DPP PKS, Ahmad Farad.is in "PKS Kembali 
Gelar Aksi Solidaritas Untuk Palestina", 6 September 2005 in http://pk-
sejahtera.org/article.php?storyid=3012. 
77 Damanik stated that this phenomenon is a natural "attitude" of the Tarbiyah movement in terms of 
paying attention to international problems. Damanik, op.cit, pp. 306-307. 
78 From transcript of interview with Abu Ridha by Hurriyah in Jakarta, 14 April 2004; and interview with 
Arkeno in Jakarta, 18 November 2005. 
79 Interview with Arkeno in Jakarta, 18 November 2005. 
80 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.10-12. 
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this understanding, politics should be down to earth and provide social advantages to 
society. 
However, for the sake of being consistent with the notion that Islam is a 
blessing for the universe, PKS should not limit their focus of care only to Muslims. 
Oppression and impoverishment are a fact of life that happens to many countries on 
earth. So far, PKS as a community that is obsessed with creating a trans-state caliphate 
has not been able to create a precise blue print for the creation of peace and welfare at the 
regional level, let alone the world. 
3. Peaceful Activism 
The interesting thing is that PKS has been able to carry out its demonstrations peacefully 
and in an orderly manner. 81 This attitude is quite new for Indonesia, particularly since the 
liberal democracy era of the 1950s. Generally, as well as holding these peaceful 
demonstrations, PKS has been able to restrain itself and not be trapped into using violent 
action to achieve its aspirations. 
PKS's anti-violent attitude is related to their interpretation that Islam is a 
teaching that rejects extremity. In line with this value, it is stated in the party's Policy 
Principles that PKS is al-aasath (moderate) which means promoting moderate behaviour, 
attitude, and character. PKS also believes that their duty to establish Islam in society and 
the state has to in line with the spirit of Islam as the mercy for the universe, as developed 
by the Prophet in Medina. 82 Meanwhile since PKS believes that Indonesia is not a state in 
war (Darul Harb), the development of dawkah has to be based by the spirit of tolerance 
and peaces. 83 Based on these perceptions PKS does not see the significance of violent 
actions and terrorism. 
81 On the acknowledgments of this manner see "Demonstrasi itu Tertib dan Damai", editorial, Media 
Indonesia, 15 Septemer 2003. "Aksi simpatik Partai Keadilan", editorial, Media Indonesia, 31 March 2003. 
"PKS Menuai Buah Konsistensi", Kompas, 25 June 2005. See also comment of the Chief of Jakarta Police 
Department, Makbul Padmanegara, in "detik.com', 9 April 2002, in Satria Hadi Lubis, Yang Nyata dari PK 
Sejahtera. 77 Manfaat dan Alasan Mengapa Kita Harus Mendukung dan Memilih PK Sejahtera dalam 
Pemilu, (Jakarta: Misykat Publication, 2003), p.13. Graito Husodo, "Partai yang Memberikan Suasana 
Sejuk", in Subhan Akbar, Misroji Salgan and Subhan, 15 Tokoh Bicara PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Saksi, 2003), p.53. 
82 Interview with Ahmad Syaichu in Bekasi, 6 December 2005. 
83 Interview with Hidayat in Tangerang, 26 November 2005. 
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In responding to the sectarian conflict in Maluku between Muslims and 
Christian during 1999-2002, PKS in general gave advice to Muslim communities in the 
conflict area to defend themselves as it was their right to do so, while calling on other 
Muslim communities to pray and collect materials for humanitarian assistance and 
demanding that the government be more serious in solving this tragedy. 84 Unlike radical 
fundamentalist groups, particularly Laskar Jihad, PKS deployed medical and 
humanitarian assistance teams, rather than combatant, to this conflict area. 
Related to PKS' attitude on terrorism PKS condemned the second terror attack 
in Bali. The President of PKS Sembiring called this terrorism "a savage and inhuman 
action" that disturbs the harmony of society both within and outside the country.85 For 
Wahid, who tends to believe in conspiracy theory rather than some facts, terrorism is 
something that cannot be carried out by Muslims, instead, that is a violent action that was 
conducted by essentially the "atheist people" so as to give Islam a bad name. 86 In this 
regard, Siddiq stated that violent action usually appears due to a mistaken understanding 
of Islam and as a reflection of despair. 87 Furthermore, as the reflection of its commitment 
to build harmony among Indonesian people, PKS joined with a number of other social 
organizations to promote anti-violence, such as Forum Indonesia Damai (Forum for 
Peace Indonesia), where PKS represented religious groups. 
Consistent with its peaceful activism, PKS reject to use anarchy in responding 
the existence and activities of Ahmadiyah, the group which so called as "deviant" by 
MUI and most Islamic groups in Indonesia for the belief on the position of its founder 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the last prophet after Muhammad. PKS suggests MUI and 
Islamic communities to put forward peaceful and legal attempts in finding the solution 
for both Muslims and Ahmadiyah group. 88 
PKS' opposition to the use of violence has become a symbol of what 
differentiates PKS from some Islamic radical fundamentalist groups. At the beginning of 
84 "Pemyataan Sikap Tentang Bentrokan SARA di Ambon, Maluku'', in Nugraha, op.cit, pp. 43-45. 
85 
"PKS Mengutuk Keras Born Bali", Republika, 3 October 2005. 
86 
"Ketua MPR Nilai Pembom Bali Atheis", Media Indonesia, 2 October 2005. 
87 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005. 
88 On the political attitude of PKS towards Ahmadiyah, see "Beberapa Butir Penting Sikap Politik PKS 
dalam Munas I PKS, 23-31 Juli 2005 di Senayan Jakarta", in pk-
sejahtera.orglmoduleslnewslarticle.php?mn=2&storyid= 3210. This document can also be seen in www.pk-
sejahtera.de/modules/newslarticle.php?storyid=422&PHPSESSiD=5el 3998556900048a56e6e0d84j92j53. 
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the reform era, whether in order to influence pubic opinion or to respond to some 
government policies or attitudes, some radical fundamentalist groups tended to use 
violent approaches in their action. Such actions included clashing physically with some 
non-Muslim groups under the spirit of jihad; conducting "sweeping actions"89 against 
Western people in some cities; vandalizing places where acts which are regarded as 
immoral are committed, or which do not respect Ramadan; as well as closing down and 
damaging some places of worship and centers of activity of some non-mainstream 
religious groups.90 Even though only some radical fundamentalist groups put violence at 
the forefront of their actions, in general these groups tend to have a frontal and 
hardhearted approach in articulating their understanding, opinions, and agendas. 91 
However, even though PKS rejects violent action and terror, it can, to some 
extent, understand the emergence of radical action by certain Muslims. PKS regards the 
failure of the state apparatus to maintain law enforcement due to misadministration and 
moral hazards as one of the main factors behind the rise in violent actions. 92 The 
involvement of the state apparatus in backing some bars, gambling or places of 
prostitution, and the connections to "orang pusat" (person from Jakarta) in some conflict 
areas, can also be seen as a situation that has provoked Islamic groups to violent action. 
In this circumstance where the government and its apparatus failed to establish law 
enforcement, PKS believes that the government essentially plays a role in giving the 
people an opportunity to be reactionary, and this eventually will lead to violent action. 
89 Sweeping is a common term that is used by most Indonesian people, including the radical fundamentalist 
groups, to describe a surveillance action conducted by civilian to capture a Western people. 
90 On these actions, see Zada, op.cit, pp. 162-165. On the attitude and behaviour of radical fundamentalist 
see Saifitl Mujani, Benturan Peradaban Sikap dan Perilaku Islamis Indonesia terhadap Amerika Serikat, 
(Jakarta: Nalar, 2005). Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicals in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?", in Southeast 
Asian Affairs 2004, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), pp. 5-13. See also Alip Pumomo, FPI Disalahpahami, 
(Jakarta: Mediatama Indonesia, 2003). Noorhadi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise ofLaskar Jihad in the 
era of Transition in Indonesia'', Indonesia; Ithaca; April 2002. Yunanto, op.cit, pp. 95-138. Forum 
Keadilan, No. 27, 30 October 2005. Tempo, 11 September 2005. 
91 See the sermon by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Solo, 18 October 2002 in Breck Batley, The Complexities of 
Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia, A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah, (Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, 2003), pp. 84-88. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Tunggulah Lonceng Kematian'', Sabili, 
No.9/XIII/17 November 2005. Fauzan Al-Anshori, Melawan Konspirasi Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Furqon, 2003). 
92 Interview with Arkeno in Jakarta, 18 November 2005. See also Saksi, toe.cit, p.80. 
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Related to such situation, PKS tries to find the core of the problem by relating it 
to the existence of a "failed system" and environment where such system exists. In this 
regard, Siddiq stated that: 
''When violent actions, a high degree of criminality, and terrorism happen in 
a certain country, society, and state, these indicate a weak social order, one 
which is not solid, not strong, and does not have control over all elements 
within it. This is for several reasons that can be caused by internal or external 
factors. This is what we should understand first, so in the end we will not 
simplify the problems and only make presumptions". 93 
This opinion indicates that PKS also believes that international factors provide a 
fertile ground for violent actions. This also indicates that even though PKS suspects that 
people have a faulty comprehension of Islamic teachings, it also suspects the existence of 
national (internal) and international (external) conspiracies that provoke the enmity of 
some Muslims. This attitude is typical of fundamentalists who tend to consider the 
existence of the secular government and of global conspiracies as the source of many 
problems. In this context, the moderates and the radicals - even though they differ in 
articulating their views - in the end believe and fight for an Islamic political system as 
the best alternative solution for human civilization. 
However, the belief in the existence of a conspiracy in reality is never followed 
by systematic attempts to objectively reveal the real story based on the factual evidence. 
Compared to their social activities, PKS so far has shown no willingness, and is thus 
wasting their potential as a party mainly supported by intellectuals, to be involved 
seriously in solving this matter. 
From the above explanation, it can be inferred that the interests of dakwah and 
the need to develop positive image in the government and society has become a motivator 
for PKS to seriously commit to involvement in "secular matters". This attempt, even 
though is not always successfully conducted, is a part of PKS' main interests in order to 
convince people about the advantages of the implementation oflslamic values in political 
life. Extensive support from the people themselves is a desirable condition for PKS, as a 
political basis for the implementation of an Islamic system today and in the future. 
93 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq in Jakarta, 5 December 2005. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSION 
The Reformasi era has been witness to the emergence of a new political group in the field 
of Islamic political thinking and activities in Indonesia. The group that was initially 
popularly known as Tarbiyah displays a distinct Islamic political approach, which 
distinguishes them from other mainstream Islamic political group in Indonesia. In this 
study, I have called this movement moderate fundamentalism. This movement then 
established PKS as its political vehicle during the first seven years of the post-Soeharto 
era. 
By integrating the view of Islam as a comprehensive teaching (syamil) and a 
gradualist approach through dakwah, PKS offers an alternative model of Islamic thinking 
and action, which not only reveals the diversity of Islamic politics, but also specifically 
shows the variety within the Islamic fundamentalist group in Indonesia. 
The characteristics of moderate Islamic fundamentalism displayed by PKS are 
the result of a set of arguments about what exactly Islamic political ideals are and how 
they should be implemented in modern times and more specifically in the Indonesian 
context. On the basis of a belief in the inextricable relations between Islam and politics, 
PKS considers Islam to be the fundamental basis and final goal for the ideal government; 
a government that is able to bring prosperity to and improve the piety of its citizens. In 
this regard, therefore, according to PKS, the best political system is the system which is 
in line with the values and mechanisms stated in the Qur' an and practised by the Prophet 
Muhammad. Specifically, this means an Islamic state which is guided by Islamic 
ideology towards a caliphate system and the implementation of the shura mechanism. 
With such basic ideals, as a consequence, PKS believes that the existence of the nation-
state, secular ideology - including Pancasila - and democracy (government by majority) 
which are the dominant institutions in modern political life, are inevitable but also 
provisional. 
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However, based on the belief in the importance of the gradual method of 
dakwah and on political strategy (in order to be more accepted by the society), PKS tend 
to implement those fundamentalist ideals using a moderate approach. 
By applying the understanding of dakwah in a gradual sense, in terms of 
thinking, PKS has been prepared to open dialogue and accept the existence of the modern 
political system. Based on this gradual thinking, PKS's main political priority, in the 
current political situation, is to develop a new comprehensive understanding about Islam 
that emphasizes the importance of substance rather than form. As a consequence of this 
approach, apart from having fundamentalist objectives, PKS is not reluctant to accept the 
existence of the nation state, Pancasila, and democracy. In PKS's political thinking, 
those "secular ideals" are not only a means for the development of Islamic dakwah but 
also part of the historical reality before the reestablishment of the caliphate. The spirit of 
gradualism also provides a belief that the existence of the caliphate is a result of a long 
struggle of dakwah, which automatically exists when the needs of the people demand it. 
Thus in terms of the caliphate, to PKS, the important thing to do is to maintain the spirit 
of the caliphate by conducting Islamic teachings comprehensively in day-to-day 
activities, so that the people understand the significance of the caliphate in their life. In 
this point of view, it can be understood that the main agenda of PKS in its first seven 
years of existence did not focus on the creation of the Islamic system. The main agenda 
of PKS's politics today, therefore, is actually to establish a very basic foundation of the 
Islamic system for the future. 
At the practical level, in general, the spirit of dakwah and political interests has 
motivated PKS to propose inclusive approach. Specifically, PKS has developed an 
approach of compromise and inclusive cooperation with other groups, as well as focusing 
on practical matters and avoiding violence. In this regard, PKS is willing to accept and 
enter the present political system, and offers a moderate alternative policy for the people. 
PKS' s willingness to enter into inclusive relations with diverse political groups, and its 
rejection of the restatement of the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian Constitution, are the 
main examples of such a moderate attitude. Moreover, at the society level, PKS has 
focused on matters of spiritual and social improvement of the society and individuals. In 
conducting these attempts PKS has avoided ideological disputes and rejects violence. The 
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rejection of a violent way itself has become a hallmark of PKS which distinguishes this 
party with some other radical fundamentalist groups. 
In the meantime, with its political thinking and behaviours, PKS holds a unique 
place in the field of contemporary Islamic political thinking. The similarities between 
PKS and radical fundamentalists who are also popularly known as the 'radicals' or 
'Islamists', are related to the function of Islam in the field of politics. To the radical 
fundamentalists, the establishment of an Islamic system in the formal sense is the main 
prerequisite and should be implemented first, so that the deterioration of the condition of 
the ummah can be ended. However, for this group, any kind of compromise towards non-
Islamic ideas and non-Muslim groups is not only unnecessary, but is also regarded as a 
reflection of weakness and even a betrayal of Islamic teachings. This attitude in the end 
provides a deadlocked dialogue, even among Muslims. In addition, as a consequence of a 
lack of confidence in the current system, radical fundamentalists tend to express 
themselves through extra-parliamentary movements and sometimes unlawful action. It 
does not mean that PKS' political thinking can escape from exclusiveness. PKS' 
perspectives towards the caliphate which seems to neglect the shortcomings of this 
institution throughout history, and the optimism towards shura mechanism that put aside 
the Indonesian plurality context, basically describe its normative and exclusive 
perspectives. 
On the other hand, the moderate approach implemented by PKS provides some 
similarities with the modernists. Similar to PKS, modernists accept the existence of the 
national system and develop inclusive relations with various groups in the democratic 
spirit. Nevertheless, the formalization of Islam in the modernists' point of view must be 
contextually conducted by recognizing the existence of the nation-state and in line with 
the spirit of democracy. Therefore, for the modernists, the desire to establish the caliphate 
is actually no longer relevant for today or in the future. Moreover, while modernists tend 
to accept democracy comprehensively, PKS, as a consequence of putting forward the 
essence of Islam, basically regards democracy as a provisional political medium from the 
genuine Islamic mechanism of shura. These attitudes toward caliphate and democracy 
have become crucial points distinguishing PKS and modernists. 
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In general, from the discussion in Chapter III, we can see that although PKS is 
basically part of the fundamentalist stream, it has some points of contact with the 
modernists. Thus, it can be said that the position of PKS as a moderate fundamentalist is 
in between the modernist and the radical fundamentalist. This situation also implies that 
the Islamic political fragmentation in Indonesian is not related only to the matters of the 
ego of the Islamic political leaders and political interests, but also, as has been shown by 
PKS, ideological reasons. It also means Islam as political ideology still plays crucial role, 
and s more than just symbolic political tools. 
As a closing remark, the future of PKS' s moderate attitudes depends on first, 
how capable the PKS elites are of maintaining moderate values, and second, how 
conducive the national political environment remains for the distribution of pluralism. 
Changes in these two factors can affect the perspectives and attitudes of PKS. PKS will 
appear to be a more moderate political power if its moderate elites stay in power or are 
replaced by younger "pragmatic" groups. This moderate attitude will grow further if the 
Indonesian political environment is still conducive for pluralism. In such a political 
situation, PKS will see the implementation of moderate values as a possible legitimate 
way to gain support, to increase its votes, and to maintain its position in the government. 
Nevertheless, PKS is a fundamentalist group which also comprises of a number 
of "militant" supporters, and thus the possibility remains open for this party to be 
radicalized. This situation could happen if 'the militant' groups, who want PKS to be 
"straight forward", can take over the key positions in the party. On the other hand, such a 
possibility could also potentially emerge if Indonesian politics were to become more 
conducive to the idea of Islamization. In such circumstances, PKS would take into 
consideration becoming more accommodative toward this idea as their priority. Current 
conditions show that such a process is not unprecedented. The rise of votes for Islamic 
parties, the significant support for the implementation of Islamic law and for regulations 
based on Islamic interests in a number of local areas indicates, to some extent, the 
possibility of the enlargement of Islamization in the future. 
This second possibility also shows that the potential for fractionalization inside 
PKS is related to the degree of militancy and rigidity in interpreting and implementing 
the basic principles of Islamic fundamentalism, rather than the Islamic background of the 
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cadres (whether NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis and so on). This is because the Tarbiyah 
process has merged and unified a variety of backgrounds into a new paradigm. Thus, how 
rigidly such a paradigm is understood and carried out will be one of the latent causes for 
internal fractionalization and determine the political thinking and actions of PKS in the 
future. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TABLE 1 
The Big Ten Parties in The 1999 Election 
NO POLITICAL THE NUMBER SEATS 
PARTY OF VOTES INDPR 
1 PDI Perjuangan 35,689,073 153 
2 Partai Golkar 23,741,749 120 
3 PKB 13,336,982 51 
4 PPP 11,329,905 58 
5 PAN 7,528,956 34 
6 PBB 2,049,708 13 
7 Partai Keadilan 1,436,565 7 
8 PKP 1,065,686 4 
9 PNU 679,179 5 
10 PDKB 550,846 5 
11 Other Parties 8,292,463 12 
TOTAL 105,786,661 462 
Source: Election Commission, www.kpu.or.id 
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APPENDIX2 
TABLE2 
The Big Ten Parties in The 2004 Election 
NO POLITICAL THE NUMBER SEATS 
PARTY OF VOTES IN DPR 
1 Partai Golkar 24.480.757 127 
2 PDI Perjuangan 21.026.629 · 109 
3 PKB 11.989.564 52 
4 PPP 9.248.764 58 
5 Partai Demokrat 8.455.225 56 
6 PK Sejahtera 8.325.020 45 
7 PAN 7.303.324 53 
8 PBB 2.970.487 11 
9 PBR 2.764.998 14 
10 PDS 2.414.254 13 
11 Other Parties 8.021.758 12 
TOTAL 113.462.414 550 
Source: Election Commission, www.kpu.or.id 
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